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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the global health challenges of the 21st century is chronic diseases. As the leading
cause of death, chronic diseases killed 38 million people worldwide in 2012, up from 31
million in 2000 (World Health Organization, 2014). Almost half of these deaths were
premature, i.e. affect people younger than 70 years old (World Health Organization,
2014). Besides a heavy death toll, chronic diseases also hurt economies deeply. For
example, chronic diseases costed the United States economy around 1.3 trillion dollar
in 2003 in terms of treatment expenditures (20 percent) and reduced labor supply and
productivity (80 percent; DeVol et al., 2007). Recognizing the rising burden of chronic
diseases, in 2011 world leaders committed themselves to establish and strengthen national
policies for prevention and control of chronic diseases in the United Nation Political
Declaration on Noncommunicable Diseases (United Nations General Assembly, 2011).
Prevention methods in the industrialized world cover a wide range from health promo-
tion activities that aim to encourage healthy behaviors to early diagnosis efforts with an
objective to detect disease at a more treatable stage. The latter is commonly organized
around population-based programs which extend disease screening (e.g. mammography
for breast cancer, colonoscopy for colorectal cancer) to all members of a target popula-
tion at little or no cost. The first part of this thesis raises two questions about organized
screening or population-based prevention programs in high income countries in general:
(i) are they effective in reducing chronic disease mortality (ii) can they address the widely
documented socioeconomic disparities in preventive care use (Fletcher & Frisvold, 2009;
Mullahy, 1999; Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2010), and if yes, how?
Health behaviors in high income countries are under the spotlight in the second part
of the thesis. According to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009), four health
behaviors – smoking, alcohol use, physical inactivity, unhealthy eating – are responsible
for much of the disability, morbidity and mortality from chronic diseases in the United
States. A similar picture emerges also for the remaining developed nations (World Health
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Organization, 2009). Therefore it is justifiable to ask why people behave unhealthily,
despite its harms, and how can we convince them to behave in a healthier way. When
we look at time trends in health behaviors in the developed world, we see both positive
and negative developments. For example there has been a considerable reduction in the
prevalence of smoking during the second half of the 20th century in high income countries
(Cawley & Ruhm, 2011). Alcohol consumption per capita has declined gradually in many
European countries and in the United States over the same time period (Lakins et al.,
2008; OECD, 2014a). In contrast, there is an unprecedented increase in unhealthy eating
patterns and sedentary lifestyles that lead to obesity, especially in the United States and
England (OECD, 2014b). This thesis puts forward lack of information/knowledge as a
possible explanation for unhealthy behaviors and tests the ability of information provision
in generating behavior change. Information argument is also used to explain why people
from high socioeconomic class behave in a healthier way than people of low socioeconomic
class.
Prevention is perceived by many as key to cut or avoid costs of treatment. When
then the U.S. President Bill Clinton proposed a major health care reform in 1992, he
argued that “it is just common sense ... [that] long-term costs to the health system will
be lower if we have comprehensive preventive services”. Not everyone agrees with this
reasoning, at least not entirely. If incidence of the target disease is very small in the
population, it is possible that prevention adds to health care costs rather than saves
money (Russell, 1986). The reason is that prevention in this case is delivered to a large
group of asymptomatic individuals only a small fraction of whom would develop the
disease without the intervention and incur treatment costs. However, in health care,
cutting costs should not be a goal in itself. What truly matters is whether we get enough
health in return for our money – in other words whether prevention is cost-effective.
If prevention produces more health with the same amount of resources compared to
treatment, it should be implemented even if it doesn’t save money. It has been shown
that whether prevention is more cost-effective than treatment depends largely on type
and frequency of the intervention, and target population of the intervention (Russell,
1993; Cohen et al., 2008; Russell, 2009). For example aspirin use to prevent heart disease
and stroke is cost-effective among healthy, middle-aged men whose ten-year risk of disease
is at least 5 percent. Screening for cervical cancer every three to five years is more cost-
effective than no screening at all, but screening at a higher frequency costs more than it
saves.
As well as its cost-effectiveness, health benefits of prevention are also open to discus-
sion. It has been argued that the principle of “first do no harm” should be applied more
strictly to the case of prevention because it is offered to healthy individuals, and without
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proper assessment of harms and benefits, it carries the risk of turning them into patients,
causing real harm (Ge´rvas et al., 2008; Welch et al., 2011). Screening for breast cancer is
the most famous and heavily-debated example. According to Gøtzsche & Nielsen (2011)
“for every 2000 women invited for screening for 10 years, one will avoid dying of breast
cancer, while 10 healthy women, who would not have been diagnosed if there had not
been screening, will be treated unnecessarily. Furthermore, more than 200 women will
experience psychological distress including anxiety and uncertainty due to false positive
findings.” The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), an independent
organization within the framework of the World Health Organization, responds to this
claim by arguing that the benefits of screening in terms of reduced breast cancer mor-
tality outweigh its risks like false positives (Lauby-Secretan et al., 2015). Cutler (2008)
provides evidence in line with the view of IARC by identifying screening as the main
driver of the reduction in breast cancer mortality during the late twentieth century.
The second chapter of this thesis contributes to this debate by reporting evidence from
the Dutch breast cancer screening program. The empirical strategy exploits the gradual
spread of the program across municipalities between 1995 and 1997, which caused some
women of a given age to be invited for screening for the first time later than others, to
estimate the causal impact of the program on breast cancer and overall mortality. The
results indicate that the program succeeded in reducing deaths from breast cancer. There
is estimated to be around 170 more breast cancer deaths per 100,000 women at the end
of a 17 year follow-up period among women who entered the program with a delay of at
least 24 months and consequently received, on average, one less screening invitation than
women who entered the program earlier. On the other hand, the program did not have
any impact on overall mortality.
The third chapter looks at differences in the take-up of screening mammography across
education groups in the Netherlands that has a national screening program and in the
United States which does not. There are no educational disparities in mammography use
among Dutch women invited through the national screening program for a free mam-
mogram, while in the United States screening uptake differs by education level. Further
analyses indicate that the education gradient in the United States is largely related to
differences in income, insurance coverage and access to medical advice.
One of the most common explanations to the observed education gradient in preven-
tive care use or health behaviors in general is health knowledge. In his seminal article,
Grossman (1972) argues that educated individuals produce health more efficiently. One
reason for this is allocative efficiency – higher educated individuals hold a higher level
of health knowledge and on the basis of this choose healthier behaviors. Another reason
is the productive efficiency – the more educated make use of a given amount of health
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knowledge more efficiently. Chapter three considers whether the allocative efficiency hy-
pothesis can explain why there is no education gradient in mammography screening in
the Netherlands that operates an organized screening program while there is a gradient
in the U.S. where there is no such program. The premise is that such a program may be
expected to reduce the importance of information disparities by education. However, the
analysis reveals that conditioning on subjective assessments of screening and breast can-
cer risk makes no difference or only slightly reduces the education gradient in the United
States, suggesting that information disparities by education play at most a minor role in
understanding education differences in screening behavior that exist in the absence of a
universal screening program.
There are only a few studies which directly tested the allocative efficiency hypothesis
as data on both health knowledge and health behaviors are scarce (Kenkel, 1991; Lange,
2011). Chapter four overcomes this issue by designing a Discrete Choice Experiment to
answer the question why higher educated individuals follow healthier diets than the less
educated. By randomly varying the information load that the respondents face, the exper-
imental design allows testing between two explanations: health knowledge versus health
valuation. The results indicate that the education disparities in diet derives mostly from
superior health knowledge among the higher educated. When provided with information
about adverse health consequences about unhealthy eating and daily recommended levels
of important food components like calories, lower educated individuals switch from un-
healthy meal choices to healthy ones, while hardly any change is observed in the choices
of the higher educated. Nonetheless, even after fully equalizing health information across
education groups, the lower educated tend to choose unhealthier diets, suggesting that
they place a lower value on their health.
Chapter five evaluates the potential of information provision in inducing healthy be-
haviors among the chronically ill. Patients newly diagnosed with a chronic condition are
exposed to a considerable amount of information. On one hand, they receive lifestyle
advice from their doctor at the point of diagnosis which emphasizes the connection be-
tween health outcomes and health behaviors such as smoking and exercise. On the other
hand, a new diagnosis informs the individual about his/her true underlying health status
which can be taken as a wake-up call for change among some patients. Therefore, it
is possible to see getting diagnosed with a new chronic condition as an equivalent of a
strong information treatment at the individual level. The results show that, in line with
the doctor’s recommendation, individuals abstain from smoking and drinking, both in the
short- and long-run, after being diagnosed with a chronic condition. This finding holds
equally true for major conditions, such as cardiovascular disease, and minor conditions,
such as diabetes, with the caveat that magnitude of the response in terms of smoking is
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larger for major conditions. However, in terms of losing weight and getting physically
active, there is hardly any response, if not a tendency towards the opposite of what is
recommended.
Chapters four and five illustrate the role that information plays in modifying be-
havior. A well-studied example is the case of smoking. Demand for cigarettes dropped
significantly in response to the new scientific evidence linking smoking to lung cancer
in the 1950s. Cigarette consumption further dropped as a result of health warning la-
bels on packages, mass media anti-smoking campaigns, and other public health efforts
that disseminate information about health risks of smoking (Chaloupka & Warner, 2000).
More recent but less conclusive evidence comes from the case of nutrition information.
Some studies have shown that calorie consumption went down in response to mandatory
menu-labeling regulations that mandate posting calorie information on menus in chain
restaurants (Wisdom et al., 2010; Bollinger et al., 2011), yet some others find no impact
on healthier food purchasing in fast-food chains (Elbel et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al.,
2011).
This thesis contains valuable insights for policy discussions. First, the finding that the
Dutch breast cancer screening program reduces breast cancer mortality is of considerable
importance in the context of doubts about the effectiveness of such programs. This finding
is based on a solid identification strategy, hence represents a valuable contribution to the
current, extremely fragmented screening debate where not all evidence presented is of
equal quality. But the lack of the impact of the program on all-cause mortality does leave
some doubt over the effect on population health. The evidence presented in the thesis
suggests that the role that health knowledge plays in generating educational disparities
differs across health behaviors. Hence, the success of interventions that distribute health
knowledge with the aim of eradicating educational disparities is likely to depend on the
behavior that is targeted.
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Chapter 2
Effect of Population-Based Screening
Mammography on Breast Cancer
Mortality in the Netherlands
Despite its power to detect tumors at an early stage while they are still treatable, the
effectiveness of screening mammography in preventing breast cancer deaths has recently
come into doubt. In this paper we evaluate the effect of the Dutch population-based
screening mammography program, on both breast cancer and overall mortality. Identifi-
cation relies on the geographic expansion of the program between 1995 and 1997 across
municipalities. Using administrative and mortality register data, we find that a delay of
at least 24 months in entry to the program – equivalent to receiving one less screen in a
lifetime from the age at which a woman becomes eligible – raises breast cancer mortality
by about 170 per 100,000 women, or by 10 percent relative terms.
This chapter is based upon:
Koc¸, H. and O’Donnell, O. and Van Ourti, T. and the National Evaluation Team for Breast
Cancer Screening (2015). Effect of Population-Based Screening Mammography on Breast Cancer
Mortality in the Netherlands. (Mimeo). Erasmus University Rotterdam.
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2.1 Introduction
In Europe, around 460,000 women were newly diagnosed with breast cancer in 2012, and
131,000 died from the condition (Ferlay et al., 2013). By detecting tumors at an early
stage while they are still treatable, screening with mammography is expected to reduce
mortality from breast cancer. Starting with Health Insurance Plan trial in 1963 (Shapiro
et al., 1982), the impact of screening on breast cancer mortality has been evaluated via
several randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Based on favorable results emerging from
these trials, several countries initiated nationwide organized screening programs in the
late 1980s and 1990s. In 2002, the International Agency for Research on Cancer, an
independent organization within the framework of the World Health Organization, eval-
uated the most recently published results from the RCTs, and estimated that screening
reduced relative risk of breast cancer mortality by 25 percent among women aged 50-69
(International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2002, p. 98-99). The European Union has
supported the implementation of screening programs as a part of its fight against cancer
(Commission of the European Countries, 1990). Expert groups like the National Cancer
Institute, the American Cancer Society, and the United States Preventive Services Task
Force have also recommended use of screening mammography for early detection (Dodd,
1992; U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1989).
However, 40 years after the start of the first randomized trial, the medical benefits of
screening with mammography have been questioned (Nelson et al., 2009; Independent UK
Panel on Breast Cancer Screening, 2012; Gøtzsche & Jørgensen, 2013). Methodological
concerns with the randomized trials, advances in breast cancer treatment and results from
observational studies have fueled this discussion. This paper contributes to the ongoing
debate by reporting evidence from the Dutch breast cancer screening program. This
organized screening program invites all women aged 50-69 biennially to breast cancer
screening.1 The program spread gradually across municipalities between 1989 and 1997,
which caused some women of a given age to be invited for screening for the first time
substantially later than others, creating variation both in the age at first screen and in
the total number of screens a woman could receive over the age range that determines
eligibility.
We use administrative data on postal address, date of birth, date and cause of death
on more than 250,000 women for the period 1995 to 2011. Since we do not have access to
mortality data before 1995, we use the part of the roll-out that happened between 1995
and 1997 to find women who are otherwise comparable but differ in their time of first entry
to the program. Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that geographical roll-
1 Formally the target age range is 49-68. Women receive their first invitation in the year they turn
50.
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out of the program occurred in a non-systematic manner, creating exogenous variation in
the timing of invitation for a first screen. We show that there is no association between
the spread of the program across municipalities and pre-program differences in breast
cancer prevalence and incidence, as well as other population characteristics that may be
related to breast cancer mortality.
Our results indicate that the program succeeded in reducing deaths from breast can-
cer. We estimate 172 more breast cancer deaths per 100,000 women at the end of a 17
year follow-up period among women who entered the program with a delay of at least 24
months and consequently received, on average, one less screening invitation than women
who entered the program earlier. Magnitude of this effect is larger compared to other
studies in the literature possibly due to differences in methodology, underlying assump-
tions and populations analyzed. On the other hand, we do not find any impact of the
program on overall mortality. Our estimates are robust to a battery of checks on the
validity of the identification. Allowing for provincial differences in breast cancer mor-
tality which could arise from differences in the quality of breast cancer treatment and
for women who move across municipalities has little or no impact on the estimates. A
placebo test builds further confidence that the effect estimated is real by demonstrating
that application of the identification strategy to older women, who are not eligible for the
program, produces no significant impact on the breast cancer mortality of this group.
One of the central questions of the screening debate is how many breast cancer deaths
can be averted with mammography. Miller et al. (2014) attempt to answer this question
by using data from the Canadian National Breast Screening Study, which is an RCT that
began in 1980s and involved 90,000 women. Half of the women between the ages of 50
and 59 years were randomly assigned to a treatment group that received an annual mam-
mography screen for five years in addition to physical breast examinations. The control
group received physical examinations only. After 25 years, breast cancer death rates were
similar between treatment and the control groups (relative risk=1.02, no estimate of the
absolute risk is available). The Swedish Two County Trial was conducted at the end of
1970s. It randomly invited women aged 40-49 years to receive mammography screening
once in every 24 months, and those aged 50-74 once in every 33 months for seven years
(Taba´r et al., 2011). After 29 years, relative risk of death from breast cancer was reduced
by 27-31 percent among women invited to screening, corresponding to an absolute risk
reduction of 166-200 per 100,000 women.
The Canadian and Swedish trials provide contradictory evidence on the effectiveness
screening in preventing deaths from breast cancer. A meta analysis of eight trials con-
cluded that more than half of the trials were methodologically problematic (Gøtzsche
& Jørgensen, 2013). In some studies, the randomization process failed to create similar
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treatment and control groups and in others different study exclusion criteria were fol-
lowed. Determination of cause of death was not blinded to treatment assignment in some
experiments.2 Trials judged to have made adequate randomization found that screening
resulted in no significant reduction in breast cancer mortality, while trials with suboptimal
randomization indicated a 25 percent decrease in relative risk due to screening.
Advances in breast cancer treatment – specifically, adjuvant systemic therapy – have
contributed to the doubt about the effectiveness of screening in reducing breast cancer
mortality (Jatoi & Miller, 2003).3 Bleyer & Welch (2012) argue that screening mainly
identifies small tumors that have no potential to become life-threatening disease. They
claim that from 1976 to 2008, screening in the United States only marginally reduced the
incidence of late-stage regional cancer, which often can be treated successfully anyway,
and had no effect on that of life-threatening late-stage distant cancer. The observed
reduction in breast cancer mortality in this period must, it is argued, be largely the
result of improved treatment rather than screening.
In this paper we present evidence on the effect of a population-based screening pro-
gram on mortality. Apart from the need for new sources of information in the face of
doubts about the quality of the RCTs, there is a need for evidence on the life saving po-
tential of screening when implemented in a large-scale program. Results from RCTs may
not be relevant to establishing the effect of a nationwide program. Women volunteering
for trials are not necessarily representative of the whole population, and RCT screening
centers may not resemble the actual setting in which organized screening is offered with
respect to the quality of staff and control of screening quality indicators like the number
of false positives (Allcott, 2015).
The study closest in spirit to ours is Kalager et al. (2010) which evaluates the mortality
effect of the Norwegian breast cancer screening program. Using the geographical roll-
out of the program, as we do, to identify the effect of the program, a reduction of 2.4
breast cancer deaths per 100,000 person-years among screened women is estimated to
be causally attributable to screening. This constitutes only one third of the reduction
observed in breast cancer mortality over time between screened and unscreened women.
The remaining two thirds can be due to advances in cancer treatment/diagnosis and
heightened cancer awareness. At first sight, the magnitude of our estimate of the program
2 The Canadian trial is one of the RCTs that are classified as adequately randomized. However, in
the case of Swedish trial, treatment and control groups are argued to be incomparable and cause of death
assignment was not blind. In response, the Swedish Cancer Society convened an independent overview
committee to investigate these claims. The committee concluded that the original finding of lower breast
cancer mortality among women invited to screening is robust.
3 Adjuvant therapy is any treatment given after primary therapy to increase the chance of long-term
disease free survival. It can include chemotherapy, hormonal therapy, radiation therapy, or a combination
of treatments to kill any cancer cells that may have spread to the other parts of the body.
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effect might seem huge in comparison to Kalager et al. (2010). However, when we express
our estimate per 100,000 person-years, like Kalager et al. (2010) do (estimates per 100,000
women is not available), we get a reduction of 10 breast cancer deaths per 100,000 person-
years at the end of a 17 year follow-up period among women who entered the program
earlier.4 Possible reasons for the difference between the two estimates are the difference
in the follow-up periods, method of identification of the program effect and calculation
of person-years.
Kalager et al. (2010) separate the impact of mammography screening from that of
improved treatment and of greater awareness of the risks of breast cancer only under the
assumption that the non-screening contributions to reduced mortality were the same in
more and less recent periods. This is a highly questionable assumption given the steady
advances in breast cancer treatment since the 1980s. By following a cohort of women who
differ by at most 36 months in their time of entry into the screening program, we are able
to more plausibly assume that differences in rates of mortality are not attributable to the
treatment technology available. Robustness of our results to geographical differences in
treatment quality supports this assumption. By following the same cohort of women, we
also avoid changes in age composition, the primary determinant of breast cancer risk in
a population, that could bias a study, such as that of Kalager et al. (2010), that makes
comparisons across periods of screening and non-screening within a given region. Finally,
RCTs have shown that it takes between 7 to 10 years to observe the impact of screening
on breast cancer mortality statistics (Jatoi & Miller, 2003). Therefore, a 17 year follow-
up period, in comparison with the 2.2 years that Kalager et al. (2010) follow an average
female, allows us to estimate effects over a period of sufficient length for the full mortality
effects of a screening program to emerge.
Otto et al. (2003) evaluate the impact of the Dutch breast cancer screening program on
breast cancer mortality by analyzing the trend in breast cancer mortality between 1980-
2001. They adjust the trend for gradual implementation of the program by denoting the
year when the program was introduced in a municipality as 0. The authors estimate a 1.7
percent reduction in breast cancer mortality per year among women aged 55-74 after the
introduction of the program compared to a pre-program period (no estimate of absolute
or relative risk is provided in this study). The main disadvantage of this study is the
absence of a real control group which would describe the trend in breast cancer mortality
in the absence of the program. This deficiency has been tried to be compensated by use
of a simulation model (MISCAN) to create a non-screened group, however this model
cannot incorporate improvements in treatment over time. Our study uses geographical
4 Person-years is a measure that combines the number of persons and their time contribution in a
study. It is calculated by summing the number of years that each individual in the sample is observed.
10
roll-out of the program to find women who are yet to be invited and therefore can be
used as controls for women who are already receiving invitations. Moreover, similar to
Kalager et al. (2010), the follow-up period of this study is too short – only 4 years after
the program reaches full-coverage of its target population – to observe the full mortality
effect of the program.
Otten et al. (2008) look at the breast cancer incidence and mortality trends from 1975
till 2006 to assess the Dutch screening program. They show that breast cancer mortality
declines by 2.3% per year for age group 55-64, and 2.8% for age group 65-74 after 1994,
i.e. 5 years later than the start of the program (no estimate of absolute or relative risk is
provided in this study). Compared to Otto et al. (2003), this study has a longer follow-up
period of 9 years but the analysis solely relies on time-trends. Consequently, disentangling
the mortality effects of screening, improved treatment and changing risk factors is not
possible. The results are purely descriptive and it is not known whether the estimated
reductions in breast cancer mortality can be causally linked to screening. In contrast, as
we mentioned above, our study design allows us to separate the impact of screening from
that of treatment technology on mortality.
Van Schoor et al. (2011) and Otto et al. (2012) conduct recent case-control studies to
evaluate the mortality effect of the Dutch breast cancer screening program. Both studies
assess the life saving potential of screening for the period when breast cancer is developing
and potentially detectable by screening but not yet by a physical exam. It is estimated
that screening mammography lower the relative risk of breast cancer mortality by 28
percent (1977-1991) and 65 percent (1992-2008) among women who attended either of
the two screens preceding diagnosis compared to those who attended none (Van Schoor
et al., 2011), and by 44 percent (1995-2003) among women who attended the screen just
before the diagnosis compared to those who did not (Otto et al., 2012). These estimates
are larger in comparison to our estimate of a reduction of 10 percent in relative risk of
breast cancer mortality possibly due to the fact that we estimate the mortality effect of
receiving one extra invitation, on average, in a lifetime from the program while Van Schoor
et al. (2011) and Otto et al. (2012) estimate the effect of attending to the screening(s)
prior to the diagnosis.
The main weakness of a case-control design is the inability to provide an estimate of
the attributable risk (see Appendix 2.A for the derivation). From the relative risk, one
cannot infer how many breast cancer deaths can actually be averted by screening. We
estimate the attributable risk in addition to relative risk. Moreover, we do so without
invoking the assumption that death from breast cancer is a rare event – rare disease
assumption – which is required to identify the relative risk with a case-control design.
Additionally, case-control studies are prone to bias since it is difficult to match cases
11
and controls on all relevant risk factors for breast cancer mortality. For example, Otto
et al. (2012) require cases and controls to be born at the same year, receive the same
number of invitations before case’s diagnosis and get their first invitations at the same
year. Van Schoor et al. (2011) correct only for differences in age at first invitation. In
both studies, it is highly possible that cases are different from controls with respect to
other observable (e.g., number of children, age of first birth) and unobservable (e.g.,
genetic susceptibility to breast cancer) risk factors. We compare across women who differ
in timing of entry to the screening program only as a consequence of their municipality
of residence. We confirm the non-systematic roll-out of the program by examination
of municipality characteristics. Finally, case-control studies only look at the survival of
women who did get screened. This is insufficient to judge a nationwide program because
there are women who decide not to screen.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we provide some institu-
tional background on the Dutch breast cancer screening program. Section 2.3 describes
the data used in the analysis. In section 2.4, we outline the empirical strategy. Section
2.5 documents and discusses the results, and section 2.6 checks for the internal validity
of the results. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings and conclude in section
2.7.
2.2 Institutional Setting
A population-based, organized screening program was initiated in the Netherlands in
1989. The target group of the program was women aged between 50 and 69. The initial
program has gradually expanded across municipalities over a period of 9 years and in 1997
reached full coverage of its target group. During the 1990-1997 period, around 750,000
women were targeted by the program per year and on average 78.2 percent of the invited
women participated (Appendix Table 2.B.1). In 1998, the upper age-limit of the program
was extended to women aged 70-75. Within 3 years, the extended program also reached
full coverage and since 2001, all women in the Netherlands between the ages 50 and 75
have been invited to participate in the screening program. In 2011, 80.1 percent of the
invited women attended screening (Appendix Table 2.B.1).
The target women are identified via personal records provided by the municipal popu-
lation registers. The records contain a unique identifying number, place of residence and
the date of birth. All eligible women living in the same postcode area receive invitations
at the same time. Every two years women get a personalized invitation letter with a fixed
appointment to get screened.5 A screening examination is usually carried out in a mobile
5 Every year, two to seven percent of the target population, called definitive non-participants, indicate
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screening unit. Women who do not respond are sent a reminder after 2-3 months.
Screening results are independently read by two radiologists and sent out to women
in writing. Patients are recalled for further examinations only if both radiologists agree.
In this case, the woman’s general practitioner is informed in advance.
During the period we use to provide variation in screening exposure (1995-97), the
primary test offered was X-ray mammography. Since the second half of 2004, digital
screening began to be offered and in 2010, 94 percent of the screening examinations were
digital.
2.3 Data
Via Statistics Netherlands, we have access to individual level administrative data that
cover the period from January 1995 until December 2011. These data contain, for every
female living in the Netherlands, date of birth, date and cause of death (if applicable), and
residential address at postcode level.6 From the Dutch Cancer Registry, we obtain data,
at the municipality level, on the invasive and non-invasive breast cancer incidence rate for
the years 1989-2011, and on the 5-year invasive breast cancer prevalence rate for the years
1994-1995. The National Evaluation Team for Breast Cancer Screening (NETB) provides
us with data, at the municipality level, on the rate of participation in the program when
it was first introduced in a municipality. Thanks to NETB, we also know the launch
date (i.e. month and year) of the screening program in every municipality (see Otto et
al., 2003 for more information on the geographic expansion of the program.). Based on
this information we calculate, for every female, the date on which she receives her first
invitation which happens on the earliest date she falls into the target age range of the
program in her municipality of residence.
The fact that our mortality data start from 1995, while the screening program started
already in 1989, has two important consequences. First, we cannot identify the full
impact (if any) of the program on mortality since 1989. Second, even with respect to
the impact on mortality since 1995, the estimate would suffer from survival bias if the
program does indeed reduce breast cancer mortality and we were to use variation in entry
to the screening program prior to 1995. The survivors to that year in the municipalities
that have been in the program for a shorter period should be, on average, at lower risk of
that they do not want to receive invitations for screening (National Evaluation Team for Breast Cancer
Screening, 2014). These women leave the program by their own choice because of medical reasons
(already having checks/treatment for her breasts), or procedure related reasons (unpleasant experiences
with the screening in the past) or personal reasons (disbelief in benefits of screening).
6 Source of address data is municipality records. Every individual living in the Netherlands has to
register his/her address with the municipality.
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breast cancer mortality than the survivors to 1995 in the municipalities that have been
exposed to the program for longer. If one compares the mortality of these survivors, then
there will be a bias towards lower subsequent breast cancer mortality in the municipalities
with shorter exposure. So, if there is an effect, we would obtain an underestimate of it if
variation in screening over the full roll-out of the program from 1989-1997 were used.
Although we cannot do anything about the first problem, we can circumvent survival
bias and get an unbiased estimate of the mortality impact of the roll-out during 1995-
1997. To this end, we restrict the analysis to women who, in January 1995, were aged
49-68 and living in municipalities that started to offer screening for the first time in 1995
and afterwards. All women in this subsample are eligible to receive an invitation from
the program as of January, 1995, and except the ones who moved from the municipalities
which have already implemented the program, none of them has been invited by the
program before. The assumption here is that moving is unrelated to the roll-out of the
program. We consider it highly unlikely that high-risk women would move from one
municipality to another simply to get access to mammography screening. According to
Schouten et al. (1996), in the Netherlands, only less than 2 percent of the population
above the age of 40 move annually. But if this occurs, then the estimated effect will
have a downward bias. In a robustness check, we test the sensitivity of our estimates to
dropping women who move between municipalities from the sample.
30 percent of the municipalities whose launch date of the program is known to us
started organized screening between January 1995 and December 1997 (n=197). We are
able to match addresses to 138 municipalities.7 Of these, 67 implemented the program
in 1995, 52 in 1996 and 19 in 1997 (see Figure 2.1).
We exclude women who were aged 64-68 in January 1995 since there is unobserved
variation in this group in the time of entry to the extended program that raised the upper
age limit for screening to 75 years in 1998-2000.
With these exclusions, we focus on Dutch females who, in January 1995, were aged
49-63 and living in the municipalities that started to offer organized screening in 1995
or afterwards. We follow this fixed sample of women regardless of mortality, or moving
between municipalities, until December 31, 2011, giving us a balanced panel of 17 years.
Women who move into the municipalities of analysis after January, 1995 are not included.
7 We have access to data on residential addresses at the postcode level starting from 1995. The key to
match addresses with municipalities is available only from 1999. Out of 197 municipalities which started
organized screening in 1995 and afterwards, 54 of them had merged with bigger municipalities by 1999.
We do not observe these municipalities in our dataset. As a result, we define the date of first invitation for
a woman living in municipality A, which became municipality B sometime before 1999, with reference to
the program launch date in B. This is unlikely to cause much bias because municipalities usually merged
with adjacent municipalities which have similar launch dates. We dropped 5 municipalities for which
breast cancer incidence/prevalence data are missing.
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There are 263,777 women who satisfy our sampling criteria. For 1380 women who
were alive in January 1995, but died before the program arrived to their municipality, we
attribute a date of program entry according to the municipality of residence in January
1995. We drop 4803 women as they left the Netherlands and fell outside of the coverage
of the screening program. We also drop 82 women who move to municipalities, before
getting their first invitation, for which the start date of the program is unknown to us.
We further exclude 1793 women who moved to municipalities which started organized
screening before 1995, and got their first invitation there. We cannot calculate pre-
program breast cancer incidence and prevalence rates or these municipalities, as explained
in Section 2.4. We finally exclude 387 women whose date of first invitation is delayed for
more than 35 months because of frequent movement between municipalities. In the end
we follow 256,712 women and observe 3,604 breast cancer deaths out of a total number
of 38,341 deaths during the course of 17 years. Mean age in the sample in January 1995
was 55 years, and average waiting time for the first invitation is 13 months (Table 2.1).
2.4 Estimation Strategy
We estimate the causal impact of the length of delay before entering the program on the
cumulative mortality from breast cancer and all causes, at the end of a follow-up period
of 17 years. Our identification strategy utilizes part of the geographical roll-out of the
program that occurred between January, 1995 and December, 1997. We define length of
delay as the number of months a woman has waited to receive her first invitation since
January 1995.
We do not observe whether each woman responds to the invitation. However, we
are able to establish that there is no statistically significant relationship between the
introduction date of the program and participation in the program when it first arrived
to a municipality (see Table 2.2, column II). Given this, while what we identify is the
impact of a delay in the receipt of the first invitation for screening, it seems safe to assume
that this corresponds to the impact of a delay in the receipt of first screening, after taking
into account the fact that not all invited women get screened.
We estimate the following model
Yi = γ0 + γ1Agei + γ2Delaym + εi, (2.1)
where Yi is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if woman i is dead from
breast cancer by the end of 2011, and 0 otherwise, i.e. alive or dead from another cause.8
8 Deaths whose primary cause is registered as breast cancer are counted as breast cancer deaths.
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Age is a categorical variable that indicates whether woman i was of age 49-54, 55-59
or 60-63 years in January 1995.9 Delay is equal to 1 for women who had to wait for
24 to 35 months before getting their first invitation, and 0 for those who waited for
less than 24 months. We choose to dichotomize the program variable this way because,
given age, in a biennial screening schedule, receiving the first invitation with a delay of
24 months or longer translates into the receipt of one less invitation/screening from the
program in a lifetime. Note that since the program was rolled out at the municipality
level, our program variable varies at the municipality level (m). εi is a random error term
representing unobserved determinants of breast cancer mortality. We cluster standard
errors over women living in the same municipality at the time of the first invitation.
If roll-out of the program has indeed created variation in the length of delay that is
not correlated with breast cancer mortality risks, then, γ2 is the causal impact on breast
cancer mortality of waiting 2 years or longer for an invitation for screening.
We estimate Model 2.1 also for all-cause mortality. The effects may differ from those
on breast cancer mortality because of a) screening influencing the attribution of deaths
to breast cancer (Black et al., 2002), b) deaths arising from treatment of cancers that
were not life-threatening (Early Breast Cancer Trialists’ Collaborative Group, 2000), and
c) competing risks (Honore´ & Lleras-Muney, 2006).
In order to check whether the geographical roll-out of the program is indeed unre-
lated to breast cancer mortality risks, we regress the binary program delay variable on
indicators of those risks at the municipality level prior to 1995, as follows10
Delaym = α0 + α1Incidencem + α2Prevalencem
+ α3Participationm + α4Populationm + α5Targetm + m
(2.2)
We do not have data on pre-program breast cancer mortality rates, and use crude
breast cancer incidence and prevalence rates as proxies. Given fluctuations in breast
cancer incidence at the municipality level, we use the median rate over the 1989-1994
period (Incidencem). For prevalence, we use the 5-year invasive breast cancer prevalence
rate as of January 1994 (Prevalencem). Since incidence counts the number of new breast
cancer cases and prevalence counts the number of survivors, the difference between them
provides an estimate of breast cancer mortality. Participation is the share of invited
These are deaths with ICD-9 code of 174 or ICD-10 code of C50.
9 The findings are robust to controlling for age more flexibly via single year dummies.
10 In addition, we regress a continuous variable which shows the implementation date (i.e. month and
year) of the program on the same regressors. The results (not shown) are highly consistent with those
presented in Table 2.2. The findings are also robust to using a categorical variable which shows the
half-year period (i.e. first half of 1995, . . . , second half of 1997) when the program was launched in an
ordered probit model (see Appendix Table 2.B.2).
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women in the municipality who responded positively to the invitation and got screened
when the program was first introduced. Population is the average size of the female
population and Target is the average share of the target age (i.e. 50-69) women in the
female population between 1989 and 1994.
Table 2.2 presents estimates from four different variations of Model 2.2. The most
important finding is that the introduction date of the program is not statistically related
to the breast cancer incidence or prevalence rate before the start of the program (column
I), and so is unlikely to be related to pre-program breast cancer mortality. This is in line
with what is suggested by Figures 2.2 and 2.3, which respectively plot breast cancer inci-
dence and prevalence rates against the program introduction date. Table 2.2 additionally
reveals, as mentioned above, that there are no significant differences in the uptake of the
screening invitation across municipalities with different implementation dates (column
II).11 Finally, the launch date of the program in a municipality is not correlated with
demographics (column III). Column IV confirms that the program expanded across mu-
nicipalities irrespective of pre-program breast cancer incidence and prevalence rates and
demographics, and that uptake was not related to the launch date.12
2.5 Results
Estimates of Model 2.1 presented in the first column of Table 2.3 indicate 172 more breast
cancer deaths per 100,000 women when implementation of the screening was delayed by
at least 24 months in comparison with a delay between 0 and 23 months. This implies
an increase of about 12 percent in the cumulative breast cancer death probability. This
effect is equal to that of 5 years age difference (55-59 years versus 49-54 years). Women
who were aged 55-59 years in January 1995 experienced 173 more breast cancer deaths
per 100,000 women over the course of 17 years than women who were aged between 49
and 54.
We have demonstrated that the delay in program implementation is not significantly
related to pre-program incidence/prevalence of breast cancer, nor to population size and
the share of women within the target age group. This is not sufficient to exclude these po-
tential confounders from the outcome model. Belloni et al. (2014) demonstrate that model
11 We have no knowledge on the existence of differences in the share of definitive non-participants
across municipalities. However, even if such differences exist, and even if they are related with the roll-
out of the program, our estimates are unlikely to be affected from this since we explicitly account for
differences in the share of women with breast cancer across municipalities by controlling for pre-program
breast cancer incidence/prevalence.
12 For sub-sets of municipalities with available data, we have confirmed that the program launch date
is not correlated with average household income in 2005 (N=122) and with average female labor force
participation rate during 1996-1998 (N=82).
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selection solely on the basis of correlation of covariates with the treatment variable results
in invalid inference for the treatment effect. We therefore test whether the same covari-
ates are significantly correlated with breast cancer mortality, given treatment. The results
presented in columns II-IV of Table 2.3 confirm that pre-program incidence/prevalence
and demographics, entered separately or simultaneously are not significantly correlated
with breast cancer mortality. According to Belloni et al. (2014)’s double selection crite-
rion, the appropriate specification is the one given in the first column. This also gives
the smallest (but not significantly different from the estimates in columns II-IV) estimate
of the treatment effect and so relying on it is conservative with respect to the claimed
impact of screening.
Entering the program with a delay can affect breast cancer mortality via two mecha-
nisms. First, it can reduce the total number of invitations, and consequently the number
of screenings a woman can get from the program in her lifetime. Second, for a given
number of invitations, it can raise the age at which a woman receives her first screen-
ing. Breast cancer incidence rises with age, therefore being exposed to screening for the
first time at a later age reduces a woman’s chances of early diagnosis, and consequently
survival. Using a binary program variable provides an estimate of the combined effect of
these two mechanisms.
In Table 2.4, we show the results with using a categorical program variable which
groups the number of months a woman waited before entering the program into six cat-
egories: 0-5 months, 6-11 months, . . . , 30-35 months. We control only for age having
confirmed that the pre-program incidence/prevalence and population size/share in tar-
get group covariates are not significantly correlated with either the categorical treatment
variable or breast cancer mortality conditional on this.13 The estimates provide sugges-
tive evidence that the reduction in the total number of invitations/screenings is the main
mechanism behind the program effect. There is no significant (statistically or substan-
tively) effect of any delay between 6 and 23 months in comparison to waiting for less than
5 months. With biennial screening, variation in the delay to program entry of less than 24
months is likely to produce little variation in the number of screens received. Rather, it is
variation in age at first screening that will be generated. The lack of any effect below this
threshold suggests that this variation contributes less to the estimated treatment effect
of waiting for more than 24 months to enter the program. The immediate increase in the
magnitude and significance of the effect on crossing the 24 month threshold supports our
baseline specification that uses the binary treatment variable. The point estimate rises
further, but not significantly, for a delay of more than 29 months.
13 The categorical treatment variable is regressed on the covariates using an ordered probit. Estimates
from this and the mortality regression with this specification of treatment plus the controls are given in
Appendix Tables 2.B.2 and 2.B.3.
18
The hypothesis that the effect of delayed program entry differs by age can be tested
more directly by allowing the effect of a delay of at least 24 months to differ for women
aged 49-54, 55-59 and 60-63 in January 1995. Doing so suggests that entering the program
with a delay has the largest impact on breast cancer mortality of women aged 55-59 and
on women aged 49-54 next (Appendix Table 2.B.4). However due to the small sample
size within each age group, standard errors are very large. Pairwise Wald tests indicate
no age differences in program effect in statistical sense. We believe that this is due to the
loss of power of the test resulting from the small sample. In short, we see some indication
of an age-specific program effect but a bigger sample is needed to draw reliable inference.
In Figure 2.5, we plot the evolution of the program effect over time (Appendix Table
2.B.5 contains the coefficient estimates). It is widely claimed in the medical literature
that it takes 7 to 10 years for the impact of screening on breast cancer mortality to
become apparent (Jatoi & Miller, 2003; Taba´r et al., 2011). Our estimates suggest that
there is indeed a lag before the effect emerges, but it is not quite as long as 7-10 years.
Not until the end of 2001, when the program had been operating for up to seven years in
the reference group and for no more than five years in the delayed treatment group, do
we observe a statistically significant and sustained difference in the cumulative number of
breast cancer deaths. The difference gets larger over time. In 2001, there were 97 excess
breast cancer deaths per 100,000 women in the group that experienced a delay of at least
24 months before entering the program. This number increased by almost 80 percent
within 10 years and reached to 172 in 2011. This is in alignment with other studies which
report a positive correlation between the length of the follow-up period and the number
of lives saved by screening (Taba´r et al., 2011; Nystro¨m et al., 2002). This correlation
arises mainly because of the time lag between the detection of breast cancer and death
from it.
Estimates of the impact of the delayed implementation of the screening program on all-
cause mortality are presented in Table 2.5. In all specifications the standard error is large
relative to the point estimate and there is no statistically significant effect of the program
on all-cause mortality. The standard error is large also relative to the standard error of
the point estimate for breast cancer mortality (see Table 2.3) due to lower explanatory
power of the model and the resulting large error term. Unlike breast cancer mortality, the
point estimate for all-cause mortality changes dramatically between columns II and III.
Following the double-selection criterion for model specification Belloni et al. (2014), the
preferred model is the one in the far right column, which suggests that all-cause mortality
is correlated with pre-program incidence/prevalence of breast cancer and population size,
but not with the delay in entry to the screening program.
These results suggest that while the program has successfully reduced the number of
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deaths from breast cancer, it failed to make any impact on mortality from all causes. It
has been argued that a discrepancy between the impact of screening on disease specific
and all-cause mortality may arise due sensitivity of breast cancer mortality to correct
identification of cause of death (Penston, 2011; Black et al., 2002). The high degree of
reliability of cause-of-death statistics in the Netherlands (Harteloh et al., 2010) makes
errors in the registration of deaths by cause an unlikely explanation.
Another explanation could be the existence of non-breast cancer deaths that are re-
lated to breast cancer screening or subsequent early treatment, but not counted in the
breast cancer mortality figures. Fatal complications may arise from an invasive procedure
carried out in response to a positive screening result. It has been shown that adjuvant
tamoxifen therapy for early stage breast cancer is associated with an increased risk of
developing endometrial cancer and, in the case of long-term use, dying from endometrial
cancer (Van Leeuwen et al., 1994; Bergman et al., 2000). Use of radiation therapy on
women with left-sided breast cancer can increase the probability of radiation induced
heart disease, especially in young patients. Harris et al. (2006) document a higher rate of
cardiac deaths, as well as chest pain, coronary artery disease, and myocardial infarction
among left-sided breast cancer patients at 20 years after the receipt of radiation therapy
as part of breast-conservation treatment for early-stage breast cancer. To the extent that
these screening and treatment related deaths are attributed to causes other than breast
cancer, the estimated impact of screening on breast cancer mortality will be of greater
magnitude than the impact on all-cause mortality.
Finally, competing risks is a possible explanation for the lack of any significant impact
on all-cause mortality. Thanks to the program more patients survive breast cancer and
become at risk of dying from non-breast cancer-related causes. In the presence of depen-
dent risks, a breast cancer survivor dies from another cause which shares the same risk
factors with breast cancer. If risks are independent, the survivor dies from an unrelated
cause “X” which does not have any common risk factor with breast cancer. In this case
the person dies because she lived long enough to contract with cause “X”. Looking at a
cohort of women who are disease free after 5 years of adjuvant therapy, Chapman et al.
(2008) find that 60 percent of the deaths observed during the median follow-up period of
4 years are due to causes other than breast cancer.
Our current analysis does not allow us to distinguish between these different expla-
nations. Future research will look at the impact of the program on mortality from a
variety of causes. Higher mortality rates from screening/treatment related causes, like
endometrial cancer or cardiovascular disease, among women who entered the program
with a shorter delay, and got one extra screening, will imply that screening kills as many
women as it saves. In contrast, if existence of competing risks is the true explanation,
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then higher mortality rates from a wider variety of causes should be observed among
women with a shorter delay.
2.6 Internal Validity
In this section we assess the validity of our estimates and check their robustness to a
number of assumptions we have made. Results are summarized in Table 2.6.
We are identifying the effect of the screening program by using geographic varia-
tion in its time of implementation. We have established that the start date of the pro-
gram and breast cancer mortality are uncorrelated with pre-program breast cancer inci-
dence/prevalence and the (target) population of municipalities. While this is reassuring,
it remains possible that the estimates are biased by correlated unobservable determinants
of breast cancer mortality that vary geographically with the start date of the program.
One particular concern might be variation in the quality of treatment available. Compre-
hensive health insurance coverage with a sophisticated risk equalization system should
limit the scope for such differences. But they cannot be ruled out. In years for which
we observe variation in exposure to screening hospitals operated under a fixed budget
determined by the government. All care delivered in a hospital including the drugs pre-
scribed had to be financed from this budget. Niezen et al. (2006) argue that, under this
system, there was considerable geographic variation in the availability of new, expensive
cancer treatment drugs (e.g., Taxol-introduced in 1996, Herceptin-introduced in 1999).
For example, small hospitals which find it more difficult, relative to large hospitals, to
economize on other costs and make extra budget for the expensive drugs failed to offer
them to their patients. Referring patients to larger or more specialized hospitals did
not solve the problem as well, because these hospitals did not also have enough budget
to treat such a large influx of expensive patients. The necessity to allocate patients to
limited resources forced each hospital to give priority to the patients living in the regions
they serve, turning where you live into an extremely important determinant of the qual-
ity of the care you get.14 The Dutch Breast Cancer Foundation reports that, in 2004,
which is not within the period over which we observe variation in screening, prescription
of Herceptin was as low as 6 percent in the province of Friesland, while it was as high as
86 percent in the province of Zeeland (Borstkanker Vereniging Nederland, 2005). Apart
14 The Dutch government tried to solve this issue by passing a law in 2002 which obliged health
insurers to contribute to the costs of some government determined expensive drugs. Until 2005, the
contribution rate had to be negotiated with the insurers, differed by drug and varied between 0 and 75
percent. In 2006, it became fixed at 80 percent. However, this also did not fully address the problem
because, given the price level for expensive drugs, even the remaining 20 percent is a significant burden
hospitals’ budget. Furthermore, the criteria to be listed as an expensive drug is hard to meet. As of
March 2006, there were only 16 drugs (12 of which are cancer drugs) approved as expensive drugs.
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from financial capacity, hospitals could differ with respect to the available technology,
knowledge, awareness and physician preferences (Savage & Widener, 2008; Hershman et
al., 2008).
We cannot use fixed effects to allow for differences in treatment quality and other
potentially unobservable time invariant confounders at the municipality level but we can
allow for province fixed effects. To do this we must drop municipalities in the three
provinces in which screening was already fully implemented by the beginning of 1997. No
women experienced a delay of 24 months or longer in those municipalities creating a lack
of variation in delay in program entry. Column I of Table 2.6 presents the estimated effect
of a 24 month or more delay on breast cancer mortality for this restricted sample with
control for age only. The estimate differs very little from that obtained from applying
the same specification – control for age only – to the full sample (Table 2.3, column I).
Allowing for province fixed effects causes a moderate but statistically insignificant rise in
the estimated program effect.
We previously established that there is no correlation between launch date of the
program in a municipality and the rate of response to the screening invitation at the
start of the program. But we did not test whether breast cancer mortality is related to
the response, which it should be if screening has an effect, because the initial screening
participation rate is not available for five municipalities. To our surprise, dropping these
municipalities has a large impact on the estimated effect. It drops from 0.172 (Table 2.3,
column I) to 0.122 (Table 2.6, column III) but remains significant at the 5 percent level
and within the 95 percent confidence interval of the original estimate. Further checks
have shown that two municipalities, namely Westerveld and Middenveld, are responsible
for the reduction in the estimated effect. These municipalities started screening late,
i.e. in January-February in 1997 and have a larger pre-program breast cancer mortality
rate than the other municipalities. Adding the initial participation rate has little or no
impact (Table 2.6, column IV) which supports our baseline specification. It also supports
interpretation of the estimated mortality effect of the delay in first invitation as the effect
of the delay in the receipt of first screening after correcting for rate of attendance to
screening.
Restricting the sample to women who did not move between municipalities, over the
period 1995-97, that we use to identify the effect results in a (not significant) reduction
in the estimated effect from 0.172 to a still highly significant 0.148 (Table 2.6, column
V). The direction of this change is the opposite to what one would expect if high risk
women were moving into the municipalities where they could access the program earlier.
Lastly, we run a placebo test to check whether the program effect we estimate is arising
simply by chance or because of some systematic difference in breast cancer mortality risks
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across municipalities that entered the program at different times. To this end, we restrict
the sample to women aged 72-77 in January 1995 and living in municipalities that started
to offer screening to women aged 50-69 at some time after that date. The older group
are too old to qualify for the program and so its breast cancer mortality rate should not
be related with the start date of the program. This is confirmed by the results in column
VI of Table 2.6, lending further support to interpretation of the estimated effect for the
younger age group as truly indicative of the impact of delayed exposure to the screening
program.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have assessed the impact of the Dutch breast cancer screening program
on breast cancer and all-cause mortality over a 17 year period. We estimate that a
delay of 24-35 months in entry to the program led to 170 excess breast cancer deaths
per 100,000 women in comparison with a delay of 0-23 months. This corresponds to a
10 percent increase in relative risk. We do not find any statistically significant difference
in the overall mortality rates of women with shorter or longer delay. Our findings are
strengthened by our large sample size, nationwide design, and long follow-up period.
It should be noted that we report intention to treat estimates. Given that participation
rate to the program is around 80 percent, the estimate of the mortality impact of a delay
in the receipt of first screening mortality will be larger.
Women who waited for at least 24 months to enter the program can be expected to
receive, on average, one less invitation for screening in a lifetime than women who did not
have to wait for so long. Kalager et al. (2010), evaluating the Norwegian breast cancer
screening program, estimate 2.4 fewer breast cancer deaths per 100,000 person-years due
to screening, although the estimate is not statistically different from zero. The authors
say that they observe a reduction in mortality mainly in the first four years of the follow-
up period, which implies that the estimated screening effect is mainly driven by 2 screens.
We estimate 24 fewer deaths per 100,000 women or 5.8 fewer deaths per 100,000 person-
years due to 1 additional invitation at the end of 4 years (i.e. 1998) which is also not
statistically significant. Given the hypothesized concave relationship between the number
of screens and the size of the impact on breast cancer mortality in the medical literature
(Fielder et al., 2004; Collette et al., 1984), our estimate seems large in comparison to the
Norwegian study. Taba´r et al. (2011) estimate 133-159 more deaths from breast cancer
per 100,000 women among women aged 50-74 years who were not invited to screening
relative to those who received 4-5 invitations, after 15 years from entry in the Swedish
Two-County Trial. This effect is considerably smaller than our estimate of the effect of
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1 invitation at the end of 17 years, i.e. about 170 more breast cancer deaths per 100,000
women. This could be related with the fact that the screening practice (e.g., single-view
versus double-view mammography) and frequency (once in every 24-33 months versus 48
months) are different between the Swedish Two-County Trial and the Dutch program.
Otto et al. (2012) find that relative risk of breast cancer mortality is 44 percent lower
among women who responded to the invitation from the Dutch breast cancer screening
program that precedes their diagnosis. This estimate is considerably larger than our
relative risk estimate of 10 percent because it is based on the screen has the highest
potential to make a difference. Unfortunately this study does not have an estimate of the
mortality effect in absolute terms due to its case-control design.
Our findings lend support to the effectiveness of organized mammography screening
in reducing breast cancer mortality at a time when this has been called into question.
But they are less encouraging with respect to the impact on overall mortality. The
correct implication to be drawn from the discrepancy in the estimated effects on the two
outcomes hinges crucially on the reasons for it. One possible mechanism could be that
all-cause mortality includes fatalities arising from screening or treatment related causes
that are not counted as breast cancer deaths. In that case, it would indeed be time to
reconsider effectiveness of mammography screening. But it could be that the absence of
any effect on all-cause mortality is simply attributable to breast cancer survival due to
screening inevitably being followed by death from something else over a reasonably long
follow-up. In this case, mammography screening does raise the length of life.
Finally we would like to mention that the mortality impact of screening is not the
only aspect of the ongoing mammography debate. With changes in screening technology,
harmful effects of screening have also emerged as a growing concern. False positive results
and over-diagnosis are claimed to be major problems with screening. Over-diagnosis refers
to detection of small tumors which would not have caused illness and/or death. Some
tumors grow so slowly that they either never reach the clinically detectable phase or the
patient dies of something else before they do so. Patients in this condition are harmed
by screening because there is no survival benefit of treating those tumors, and treatment
has its own risks. Mammograms increase the rate of over-diagnosis because their working
principle is to detect small tumors, and all detected tumors are treated as there is no way
of knowing which ones will grow into invasive disease. Miller et al. (2014) report that, 22
percent of the screen detected cancers in the mammography group were over-diagnosed in
Canadian National Breast Cancer Screening Study. In this paper we provide no estimate
of the degree of over-diagnosis or false positives in the Dutch breast cancer screening
program. Despite its significance, this topic is left for future research.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Geographical spread of the Dutch breast cancer screening program
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25
Figure 2.2: Launch of organized screening and pre-program breast cancer incidence
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Figure 2.3: Launch of organized screening and pre-program breast cancer prevalence
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Figure 2.4: Launch of organized screening and participation to screening
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of the binary program effect over time
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In each year, an indicator for having died from breast cancer between 1995
and the respective year is regressed on the binary program variable, i.e.
entering the program with a delay of 24-35 months versus 0-23 months and
on categorical age variable, i.e. 49-54, 55-59, 60-63 years in January 1995.
Coefficient estimates for the program variable, expressed as percentage
points, are plotted. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Sample characteristics
Individual characteristicsa
Mean Sample size
Age in January 1995 55.59 256,712
(4.35)
Months between Jan. 1995 12.62 256,712
and entry to the program (8.15)
Distribution of date of entry to the program
No. of municipalities No. of individualsb
First half of 1995 33 61,350
Second half of 1995 34 60,384
First half of 1996 33 65,341
Second half of 1996 19 42,724
First half of 1997 12 17,591
Second half of 1997 7 9,322
Total 138 256,712
a Standard deviations are in parentheses.
b Living in those municipalities as of January 1995.
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Table 2.2: Regression estimates of delay in launch of screening program of at least 24
months
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Breast cancer statistics
Breast cancer incidence (Incidencem) -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Breast cancer prevalence (Prevalencem) 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Program participation rate (Participationm) -0.002 -0.005
(0.007) (0.008)
Demographics
Female pop.size (Populationm) -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Share of target pop. (Targetm) -0.003 -0.003
(0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.272∗ 0.270 0.211 0.756
(0.155) (0.576) (0.265) (0.781)
P-values on Joint Hypotheses
Incidencem = Prevalencem = 0 0.472 0.553
Populationm = Targetm = 0 0.426 0.375
All coefficients 0.591
N 138 133 138 133
R-square 0.013 0.001 0.005 0.024
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of organized screening starting in a municipality
in 1997 (1), as opposed to 1995-96 (0). Linear probability model estimates reported. Breast cancer
incidence is the median breast cancer incidence during the period 1989-1994. Breast cancer preva-
lence is the 5-year invasive breast cancer prevalence as of January 1994. Program participation rate
is the share of invited women who attended screening when the program was first introduced in a mu-
nicipality. Female population size is expressed in 1000s. Share of target population is the percentage
share of women aged 50-69 among the female population. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.3: Effect of the delayed program entry on cumulative breast cancer mortality
to 2011 – Binary treatment
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Delay in program entry
0-23 months base base base base
24-35 months 0.172∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.054)
Age in January 1995
49-54 base base base base
55-59 0.173∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
60-63 0.241∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Breast cancer statistics
Breast cancer incidence (Incidencem) 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Breast cancer prevalence (Prevalencem) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Demographics
Female pop. size (Populationm) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Share of target pop. (Targetm) 0.002 -0.004
(0.008) (0.010)
Constant 1.273∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.109) (0.170) (0.169)
P-values on Joint Hypotheses
Incidencem = Prevalencem = 0 0.334 0.340
Populationm = Targetm = 0 0.582 0.460
No. of municipalities 138 138 138 138
No. of women 256,712 256,712 256,712 256,712
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for having died from breast cancer between 1995
and 2011. Coefficient estimates are expressed as percentage points, except the constant which is
expressed as a percentage. See Table 2.2 for definitions of covariates. Standard errors are clus-
tered over women who were living in the same municipality at the time of the first invitation, and
reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Effect of the delayed program
entry on cumulative breast cancer mortal-
ity to 2011 – Categorical treatment
Delay in program entry
0-5 months base
6-11 months 0.034
(0.070)
12-17 months -0.044
(0.059)
18-23 months 0.009
(0.075)
24-29 months 0.162∗∗
(0.072)
30-35 months 0.185∗∗
(0.077)
Age in January 1995
49-54 base
55-59 0.173∗∗∗
(0.055)
60-63 0.242∗∗∗
(0.053)
Constant 1.274∗∗∗
(0.050)
No. of municipalities 138
No. of women 256,712
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator
for having died from breast cancer between 1995
and 2011. Coefficient estimates are expressed
as percentage points, except the constant which
is expressed as a percentage. Standard errors
are clustered over women who were living in the
same municipality at the time of the first invita-
tion, and reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.5: Effect of the delayed program entry on overall cumulative mor-
tality to 2011 – Binary treatment
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Delay in program entry
0-23 months base base base base
24-35 months 0.006 -0.013 0.329 0.356
(0.596) (0.547) (0.382) (0.420)
Age in January 1995
49-54 base base base base
55-59 5.782∗∗∗ 5.778∗∗∗ 5.762∗∗∗ 5.752∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.165) (0.167) (0.166)
60-63 14.211∗∗∗ 14.208∗∗∗ 14.165∗∗∗ 14.152∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.240) (0.243) (0.240)
Breast cancer statistics
Breast cancer incidence 0.017 0.024∗ 0.022∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Breast cancer prevalence -0.004 -0.006∗ -0.006∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Demographics
Female pop. size 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Share of target pop. -0.094
(0.084)
Constant 9.678∗∗∗ 9.399∗∗∗ 10.143∗∗∗ 8.900∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.851) (1.360) (0.676)
No. of municipalities 138 138 138 138
No. of women 256,712 256,712 256,712 256,712
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for having died from any cause between
1995 and 2011. Coefficient estimates are expressed as percentage points, except the
constant which is expressed as a percentage. See Table 2.2 for definitions of covariates.
Standard errors are clustered over women who were living in the same municipality at
the time of the first invitation, and reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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Appendix 2.A: Case-Control Sampling and Attributable
Risk
The discussion in this appendix is based on Manski (2009).
Consider a population whose members are defined by a set of covariates x and an out-
come y. The practice of case-control sampling divides the population into sub-populations
on the basis of the possible values of the outcome. Consequently, for each j ∈ Y ,
P (x|y = j) can be calculated. However, given the ultimate goal is to find P (y|x), the
inferential question arises: What does knowledge of P (x|y = j) tell about P (y|x)?
To study this question, let’s focus on the simple case of a binary outcome: y = 1
indicates mortality from breast cancer, and 0 otherwise. Let x = (w, r) where w contains
some covariates like age, socioeconomic status, race; and r contains risk factors for breast
cancer mortality. Assume r takes only two values: k and j (e.g., getting screened or not).
A relevant research question is to find the probability of breast cancer death for the two
different realizations of the risk factor: P (y = 1|w, r = k) versus P (y = 1|w, r = j).
This question can be answered via calculating the relative risk (RR)
RR =
P (y = 1|w, r = k)
P (y = 1|w, r = j) (2.3)
and/or attributable risk (AR)
AR = P (y = 1|w, r = k)− P (y = 1|w, r = j) (2.4)
Relative risk is the ratio of the probability of breast cancer death conditional on getting
screened to the probability of breast cancer death conditional on not getting screened.
Attributable risk is the difference in the probability of breast cancer death conditional
on getting screened and not.
Case-control sampling reveals the conditional distributions P (w, r|y = 1) and P (w, r|y =
0) but not the distribution P (y = 1|w, r). This can be seen by using Bayes’ Theorem
and the Law of Total Probability
P (y = 1|w, r) = P (w, r|y = 1)P (y = 1)
P (w, r)
=
P (w, r|y = 1)P (y = 1)
P (w, r|y = 1)P (y = 1) + P (w, r|y = 0)P (y = 0)
(2.5)
While case-control sampling is informative about P (w, r|y = 1) and P (w, r|y = 0), it is
silent about P (y = 1). To solve this problem, epidemiologists resort to the rare-disease
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assumption which simply states that prevalence of the outcome (disease) in the population
is low. Formally, this means that P (y = 1|w) approaches zero. Under this assumption,
both relative and attributable risk can be identified. To see this rewrite equation 2.5
P (y = 1|w, r) = P (r|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w)
P (r|w)
=
P (r|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w)
P (r|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w) + P (r|w, y = 0)P (y = 0|w)
(2.6)
and insert it into the definitions of relative and attributable risk
RR =
P (r = k|w, y = 1)
P (r = j|w, y = 1)
× P (r = j|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w) + P (r = j|w, y = 0)P (y = 0|w)
P (r = k|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w) + P (r = k|w, y = 0)P (y = 0|w)
(2.7)
AR =
P (r = k|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w)
P (r = k|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w) + P (r = k|w, y = 0)P (y = 0|w)
− P (r = j|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w)
P (r = j|w, y = 1)P (y = 1|w) + P (r = j|w, y = 0)P (y = 0|w)
(2.8)
Letting P (y = 1|w) approach zero gives
lim
P (y=1|w)→0
RR =
P (r = k|w, y = 1)
P (r = j|w, y = 1) ×
P (r = j|w, y = 0)
P (r = k|w, y = 0) (2.9)
lim
P (y=1|w)→0
AR = 0 (2.10)
Cornfield (1951) shows that equation 2.9 is the relative risk under the rare disease
assumption. The right-hand side of the equation is called the odds ratio and thanks to
equation 2.6 can be written as,
OR =
P (r = k|w, y = 1)
P (r = j|w, y = 1) ×
P (r = j|w, y = 0)
P (r = k|w, y = 0)
≡ P (y = 1|w, r = k)
P (y = 0|w, r = k) ×
P (y = 0|w, r = j)
P (y = 1|w, r = j)
(2.11)
The above given derivation reveals two important points:
• Case-control sampling leads to calculation of the odds ratio. Under the rare-disease
assumption, it is possible interpret the odds ratio as relative risk which is a function
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of the unknown distributions P (y = 1|w, r = k) and P (y = 1|w, r = j).
• Case-control sampling is incapable of providing an estimate of the attributable risk.
Appendix 2.B: Additional Tables
Table 2.B.1: Dutch breast cancer screening program 1990-2011
1990-1997 1998-2006 2011
Target population per year (x1000) 733-813 1,021-1,164 1,275
Overall attendance (%) 78.2 80.7 80.1
Breast cancer mortalitya 91.6 76.7 64.6
a European standardized rate per 100,000 women for age category 50-74
Source: National Evaluation Team for Breast Cancer Screening (2014)
Table 2.B.2: Regression estimates of delay in launch of screening program
measured in categories
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Breast cancer statistics
Breast cancer incidence (Incidencem) -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
Breast cancer prevalence (Prevalencem) 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Program participation rate (Participationm) -0.008 -0.010
(0.023) (0.026)
Demographics
Female pop. size (Populationm) 0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007)
Share of target pop. (Targetm) 0.041 0.021
(0.038) (0.043)
P-values on Joint Hypotheses
Incidencem = Prevalencem = 0 0.439 0.532
Populationm = Targetm = 0 0.564 0.872
All coefficients 0.855
N 138 133 138 133
Pseudo R-sq 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.004
Notes: Ordered probit coefficients are reported. Dependent variable is the start date of
organized screening in a municipality, measured in half year intervals between 1995 and
1997. See Table 2.2 for definitions of covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.B.3: Effect of the delayed program entry on cumula-
tive breast cancer mortality to 2011 – Categorical treatment
(I) (II) (III)
Delay in program entry
0-5 months base base base
6-11 months 0.031 0.052 0.042
(0.069) (0.074) (0.074)
12-17 months -0.059 -0.033 -0.051
(0.063) (0.066) (0.068)
18-23 months -0.015 0.010 -0.010
(0.079) (0.075) (0.077)
24-29 months 0.162∗∗ 0.185∗∗ 0.175∗∗
(0.073) (0.078) (0.081)
30-35 months 0.184∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.083) (0.077)
Age in January 1995
49-54 base base base
55-59 0.172∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
60-63 0.241∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Breast cancer statistics
Breast cancer incidence 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Breast cancer prevalence 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Demographics
Female pop. size 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Share of target pop. 0.003 -0.004
(0.009) (0.010)
Constant 1.110∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.178) (0.179)
No. of municipalities 138 138 138
No. of women 256,712 256,712 256,712
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for having died from
breast cancer between 1995 and 2011. Coefficient estimates are ex-
pressed as percentage points, except the constant which is expressed
as a percentage. See Table 2.2 for definitions of covariates. Standard
errors are clustered over women who were living in the same munici-
pality at the time of the first invitation, and reported in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.B.4: Effect of the delayed program entry on cumulative
breast cancer mortality to 2011 by age
24-35 months delay in program entry x Age:49-54 0.151
(0.134)
24-35 months delay in program entry x Age:55-59 0.308∗
(0.185)
24-35 months delay in program entry x Age:60-63 0.031
(0.157)
Age in January 1995
49-54 base
55-59 0.156∗∗∗
(0.050)
60-63 0.254∗∗∗
(0.055)
Constant 1.275∗∗∗
(0.032)
No. of municipalities 138
No. of women 256,712
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for having died from breast
cancer between 1995 and 2011. Coefficient estimates are expressed as per-
centage points, except the constant which is expressed as a percentage.
Standard errors are clustered over women who were living in the same mu-
nicipality at the time of the first invitation, and reported in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Chapter 3
What Explains the Education
Disparity in Screening
Mammography?
Less educated women in the United States are substantially less likely to receive screening
mammography. It is not clear whether this is due to differences in access to screening
or in perceptions of breast cancer risks and the effectiveness of screening. There is no
education gradient in the Netherlands, where there is universal access to screening mam-
mography. Using cross-sectional and cross-country comparable individual level data, we
found that in the absence of a universal screening program in the U.S., determinants
of access – income, insurance coverage and receipt of medical advice – appear to drive
the education disparities in screening mammography. The Affordable Care Act require-
ment that mammography be covered by new health plans and Medicare may therefore
be effective in reducing the gradient.
This chapter is based upon:
Koc¸, H. and O’Donnell, O. and Van Ourti, T. (2013). What Explains the Education Disparity in
Screening Mammography? A Comparison of the United States with the Netherlands. (Mimeo). Erasmus
University Rotterdam.
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3.1 Introduction
Breast cancer is the most commonly diagnosed cancer among women worldwide, account-
ing for 23 percent of all new cancer cases (American Cancer Society, 2011). It is also the
leading cause of cancer-attributable mortality of females around the globe being respon-
sible for 14 percent of such deaths. Breast cancer is curable if detected sufficiently early
and treated appropriately (World Health Organization, 2011). Screening mammography
– a mammogram taken when there is no sign of breast cancer – is the recommended early
detection tool for breast cancer due to its ability to detect pre-cancerous cells while they
are still treatable (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 2009).
Utilization of screening mammography increased steeply in the last two decades of the
twentieth century (Bleyer & Welch, 2012). But there remain large differences in uptake
by education: In the United States (e.g. Lange, 2011; Picone et al., 2004) and a number
of European countries (e.g. Avitabile et al., 2011; Jusot et al., 2012; Pale`ncia et al.,
2010), lower educated women tend to receive mammograms less often than their higher
educated counterparts. This may reflect higher barriers to access faced by less educated
women (Pale`ncia et al., 2010; Walsh et al., 2011). But it could also arise from differences
in perception of the breast cancer base rate, the incorporation of information available
from objective risk factors and beliefs about the effectiveness of screening (Lange, 2011;
Pale`ncia et al., 2010; Walsh et al., 2011; Carman & Kooreman, 2014).
We use comparable data that include information on subjective perceptions of breast
cancer risk and screening effectiveness to estimate and explain the education gradient in
screening mammography in the United States and the Netherlands. Comparison of these
two countries is instructive because they differ in access to screening. The Netherlands
operates a universal, fully publicly subsidized screening program covering all women aged
50-75. Mammograms are delivered in mobile screening units to maximize accessibility
(Holland et al., 2007; Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu, 2015). There is
no such program in the U.S, but the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF)
recommends biennial screening of women aged 50-74 (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force,
2009). Prior to the compulsory coverage of mammography by new health plans and
Medicare following the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA), insured, as well as uninsured,
American women were likely to pay out-of-pocket for a mammogram (U.S. Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2011).
The absence of organized, subsidized screening in the United States leaves scope for
the observed socioeconomic difference in mammography uptake (Lange, 2011; Picone et
al., 2004). If this is mainly driven by financial barriers, then the coverage extension
brought about by the ACA would be expected to reduce the gradient. If, on the other
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hand, the education gradient is attributable mainly to perceptions of breast cancer risk
and of the effectiveness of mammography, then health promotion programs that raise
awareness of risks among less educated women will be required to even out the gradient.
We aim to weigh the plausibility of these two scenarios by estimating the dependence of
mammography on access and perceptions, as well as education, in both the U.S. and the
Netherlands.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Data sources
Data from the American Life Panel (ALP) and the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies
for the Social Sciences (LISS) were analyzed (CentER Data, 2011; RAND Corporation,
2011). Both surveys were administered over the internet following a similar protocol,
and contained modules that include detailed individual-level information on breast can-
cer screening. Female respondents aged 40+, the earliest age recommended for screening
(U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 2009; American Cancer Society, 2012b), were ex-
tracted from the breast cancer module of the ALP (n = 646), which was fielded from
mid-December 2011 until early January 2012, and from the disease prevention module of
LISS (n = 1490), which was fielded in September 2008.
3.2.2 Variables
Dependent variables
The outcome of interest was receipt of a mammogram in the past 2 years. In LISS, the
question was: “Have you had a mammogram in the last 2 years?”. In ALP, respon-
dents were asked “Have you ever had a screening mammogram”, and if the answer was
yes, “When did you have your most recent screening mammogram?”. Based on these
questions, the binary variable indicating mammogram usage in the last 2 years was con-
structed. The ALP explicitly asked about receipt of a screening mammogram, while no
differentiation was made between receipt of a screening and a diagnostic mammogram in
LISS, where the latter is conventionally defined as a test provoked by some indication of
the possible presence of breast cancer. Therefore, Dutch women who reported previously
having been diagnosed with breast cancer were dropped from the study sample.
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Independent variables
Educational attainment was measured by the highest level completed with a diploma. To
ensure comparability between the U.S. and the Netherlands, categories were constructed
based on ISCED mappings of qualifications (Unesco Institute for Statistics, 2011), dis-
tinguishing between low (upper secondary, i.e. high school, education or less, ISCED<4),
middle (post-secondary non-tertiary education, ISCED=4), and high education (higher
education, ISCED>4).
Some additional independent variables were common for the U.S. and the Netherlands,
while others were country-specific. The set of common covariates included age – controlled
with 5-year intervals in the Netherlands and as 40-50, 50-65, 65-75 & 75+ in the U.S. to
avoid small cell sizes (e.g. Avitabile et al., 2011; Pale`ncia et al., 2010), household income
(e.g. Avitabile et al., 2011; Lairson et al., 2005), race/ethnic origin (e.g. Sambamoorthi
& McAlpine, 2003; Selvin & Brett, 2003), objective risk factors for breast cancer – the
number of first degree relatives with breast cancer for both the U.S. and the Netherlands,
and whether a women has given birth only for the Netherlands (e.g. American Cancer
Society, 2012a), and perceptions of breast cancer risk (Lange, 2011; Carman & Kooreman,
2014) and of mammogram effectiveness in reducing mortality from breast cancer. Risk
perception was measured by the reported probability of getting breast cancer within
5 years. Perceived effectiveness of mammography in reducing the risk of death from
breast cancer was measured on a four and five point categorical scale for the U.S. and
the Netherlands, respectively. Household income was measured before taxes for both
countries and entered into the models as quartile group indicators.
Covariates included in the models estimated with U.S. data only were: i) whether
the respondent had full insurance (versus partial or no) coverage for a mammogram
(e.g. Meissner et al., 2007; Sambamoorthi & McAlpine, 2003; Selvin & Brett, 2003), ii)
whether a mammogram had been recommended by a health care provider (e.g. Meissner
et al., 2007; O’Malley et al., 2001), and iii) perceived probabilities of a mammogram
giving a) a false positive, b) a false negative, and c) a true positive. For the Netherlands,
an indicator of having received an invitation for a mammogram from the national breast
cancer screening program (Carman & Kooreman, 2014) was included, as was having been
invited in some other manner, which should mainly correspond to referrals given that
Dutch women only very rarely receive a mammogram in a private clinic with no referral.
Reporting having had a friend who died from breast cancer, which may influence risk
perceptions, was also included in some models estimated for the Netherlands.
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3.2.3 Statistical analysis
The education gradient in mammography in the U.S. and the Netherlands was estimated
by several logit models with education entered as a categorical variable. The first model
estimated included only age, in addition to education, to obtain the age-standardized
education gradient. Additional covariates were cumulatively added to reveal the extent
to which the association between education and screening was related to these variables.
The second model added the objective risk factors, race/ethnic origin, and subjective
perceptions of breast cancer risk and mammogram effectiveness at detecting breast can-
cer and preventing death from it. The third model added income, insurance coverage and
whether a health care provider had recommended getting a screening mammography in
the case of the United States. For the Netherlands, whether an invitation for mammog-
raphy had been received from the national screening program or through referral were
added at this stage.
From the logit model estimates, the difference between the probability of receiving a
mammogram at a given education level and at the reference level was calculated for each
observation and averaged across the sample. These average marginal effects (or adjusted
risk differences) on the probability of getting a mammogram were also calculated for the
other covariates. Sample weights were applied throughout.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 reports the rate of mammogram receipt in each country for women within the
recommended age range for screening (50-75) and those outside of this range. At target
ages, mammography prevalence in the previous two years was high (>80 percent) in
both countries. At other ages, screening was still rather high in the United States, but
relatively uncommon in the Netherlands. In the United States, three-quarters of women
aged 40+ were recommended by a health care provider to get a mammogram and the
same fraction had insurance that fully covered the costs of regular mammograms. Neither
rate varied between women within and outside the recommended age range for screening.
Less than 10 percent of Dutch women in the eligible age range reported not having been
invited for screening by the national program.
Table 3.2 presents relative frequencies of the control variables by country. Around
half of the American and Dutch women had no more than upper secondary (high school)
education. American women had a higher expectation of getting breast cancer in the
coming 5 years as well as a stronger belief in the effectiveness of a mammogram in
45
preventing death from breast cancer.
3.3.2 Education disparities in screening mammography
Table 3.3 presents the age-adjusted differences by education in the probability of receiving
a mammogram. There was a pronounced, significant gradient in the United States:
Women with low education were 11.5 percentage points less likely to be screened for
breast cancer than their counterparts with higher education (p-value=0.040). The middle
education group is 10.4 points less likely to get a screening mammogram than the most
educated (p-value=0.056). There is no significant age-standardized education gradient in
mammography use in the Netherlands (Wald test joint significance p-value=0.397).
3.3.3 Accounting for education disparities
The first two rows of Table 3.4 give the estimated education gradient in screening uptake
after controlling for covariates in addition to age. Controlling for objective risk factors,
race and perceptions of the risk of breast cancer and the effectiveness of mammography
in averting death from this condition had little effect on the estimated education gradient
in the United States (column 1). The difference in the screening probability between the
most and least educated women narrows slightly from 11.5 (Table 3.3) to 9.7 percentage
points but remains significant (p-value=0.061). The estimated difference between the
top two education groups actually widens from 10.5 to 12.5 points (p-value=0.020). This
persistence of the education gradient is not the result of differences in objective risk
factors offsetting differences in risk perceptions. Controlling for age and objective risk
factors only, the education gradient remains similar: Low and middle educated women
are estimated to have a 11.1 (p-value=0.043) and 11.3 (p-value=0.034) percentage point
lower probability to be screened compared to higher educated women (not shown in Table
3.4).
Adding income, insurance coverage and medical advice to get screened (column 2) has
a much larger impact on the education gradient in the U.S., which decreases in magni-
tude and becomes statistically insignificant (Wald test joint significance p-value=0.653).
Insurance coverage and medical advice are the strongest correlates of screening uptake.
American women with insurance that fully covered mammography costs were 22.5 per-
centage points more likely to be screened than women with partial or no coverage; and
those recommended by a medic to get screened were 38.4 percentage points more likely
to do so.
Controlling for objective risk factors, ethnicity and perceptions of risk and the effec-
tiveness of screening did not change the conclusion that there is no education gradient in
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the age-standardized rate of mammography in the Netherlands (Wald test joint signifi-
cance p-value=0.580) (Table 3.4, column 3). After controlling for income, being invited
for screening from the national program or by referral, the least educated Dutch women
had a statistically significant 3.8 percentage point lower probability of getting a mammo-
gram than the most educated women (p-value=0.044). A program invitation itself raised
the probability of getting a mammogram by 69 percentage points, while referral raised it
by 42 points.
3.4 Discussion
There is a clear education disparity in age-standardized rates of mammography in the
United States. Controlling for differences in perceptions of breast cancer risk and of
screening effectiveness did not affect this gradient, while conditioning on income, in-
surance coverage and receipt of medical advice markedly weakened its magnitude and
rendered it insignificant. This suggests that lower educated American women were less
likely to be screened because they were poorer, had less comprehensive insurance cover
and, perhaps because of that, were less likely to come into contact with a physician who
recommended mammography, and not because they perceived less benefit from screen-
ing. The importance of financial barriers to mammography is evident from the fact that
the education gradient becomes insignificant (Wald test joint significance p-value=0.268)
after controlling only for income, in addition to age (estimates not shown in Table 3.4).
Less educated, poorer women do not have the insurance cover and access to medical
advice that are the main determinants of mammography screening in the United States.
In the Netherlands, a moderate education gradient in mammography emerges only
after controlling for differences in the propensity to be invited for screening through the
national program or by referral. Further analysis revealed that this education disparity
existed among women who were not invited for screening by the national program. Among
such women, who are uninvited mostly because they are outside the 50-75 age range,
the least educated were 5.6 percentage points (p-value<0.027) less likely than the most
educated to get a mammogram. Given the lower incidence of life-threatening breast
cancer in this age range and risks arising from false positive screens, it is not obvious
that this disparity is to the advantage of the more educated.
3.4.1 Role of health insurance and access to screening
In the U.S., the strongest correlates of screening uptake were medical advice and insur-
ance coverage (Table 3.4, column 2). In the Netherlands, it was an invitation for screening
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(Table 3.4, column 4). These determinants are largely responsible for the differences be-
tween the two countries in the distribution of breast cancer screening. Table 3.5, column
1 shows that, in the U.S., the probability of receiving medical advice to get a mammo-
gram did not vary by age (Wald test joint significance p-value=0.981) and by income
(Wald test joint significance p-value=0.949). It varied (only marginally) with objective
risk factors (Wald test joint significance p-value=0.218) and by education (Wald test joint
significance p-value=0.161) and, most strongly, by insurance coverage (p-value=0.001).
In turn, comprehensive insurance coverage of mammogram was determined by age (Wald
test joint significance p-value=0.006), due to Medicare qualification at 65, but also by
income (Wald test joint significance p-value=0.030) and education (Wald test joint signif-
icance p-value=0.138), but not by objective risk factors (joint significance p-value=0.289)
(column 2).
Higher educated and better-off American women are more likely to be insured, which
is associated with a greater likelihood of being advised to undertake a mammogram,
perhaps because doctors are more likely to recommend screening to patients they believe
can afford it (O’Malley et al., 2001; Urban et al., 1994). Better-off women may also
be more likely to consult with doctors known to recommend screening, or may be more
successful in asking for a referral.
In the Netherlands, invitation for screening, which is the dominant determinant of
mammography receipt, was almost exclusively determined by age and objective risk fac-
tors, and not by education or income (Table 3.5, columns 3 and 4). Differences in the
role of financial barriers and in access to medical advice seem important in explaining
the strong socioeconomic gradient in breast cancer screening in the U.S. and its absence
in the Netherlands.
3.4.2 Strengths and weaknesses
This study is strengthened by the availability of comparable data on perceptions of breast
cancer risk and mammogram effectiveness allowing consideration of the hypothesis that
education disparities in screening behavior reflect differences in ability to accumulate and
process information.
A weakness of the study is that while the sample sizes are sufficient for the main
analyses, the U.S. sample does limit the extent of disaggregated analysis that is feasible
and, together with the categorical nature of the income information, is partly responsible
for the insignificance of income despite its importance in reducing the education gradient.
While insurance coverage is identified as an important correlate of breast cancer
screening in the U.S., it is not possible to conclude from the analysis that insurance
raises the likelihood of receiving a mammogram. It could be that women who want to be
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screened are more likely to purchase an insurance plan that covers it.
Control for some objective risks increases the likelihood that the education gradient
in insurance coverage in the U.S. implies differential financial barriers to screening for
equal risk. But this is not guaranteed because of lack of control for risk factors, such as
nulliparity and later age at first birth, which are more common among higher educated
women (Heck & Pamuk, 1997; Menvielle et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely
this is driving the education gradient in insurance since age and the number of relatives
dying of breast cancer are much more important risk factors.
3.5 Conclusions
There is a clear socioeconomic gradient in breast cancer screening in the U.S. that ap-
pears to reflect differences in financial barriers and insurance coverage. Differences in
perceptions of breast cancer risks and screening effectiveness appear to be less impor-
tant in explaining education disparities. This, together with absence of a gradient in
the Netherlands, where there is a universal breast cancer screening program and risk
perceptions are also unimportant in explaining screening uptake, suggests that access,
rather than information may be the more important determinant of the distribution of
mammography.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Rate of screening mammograms by country and age
United States Netherlands
50–75 40–50, 75+ 50–75 40–50, 75+
(recommended (not recommended (recommended (not recommended
screening age) screening age) screening age) screening age)
Mammogram:
in the last 2 years 80.82 69.38 84.90 16.39
recommended by doctor 76.00 74.60 n.a. n.a.
covered by insurance 75.95 74.80 n.a. n.a.
invite from screening program n.a. n.a. 91.41a 5.03b
invite in other manner n.a. n.a. 3.60 8.57
N 501 145 861 537
a The remaining 8.59 percent includes women who left the program by their own choice and refused to receive
further invitations (National Evaluation Team for Breast Cancer Screening, 2009), and women who had recently
entered the eligible age range at the time of interview but had not yet received an invitation for screening.
b Women aged 75-77 might have been screened during the last two years while they were still below 75 and re-
ceived an invitation from the national program.
All numbers are stated as percentages.
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Table 3.2: Means of control variables by country, women aged 40+
United States Netherlands
Education
Low 47.00 53.72
Middle 20.54 19.60
High 32.46 26.68
Age group
40-44 (U.S. 40-49)a 30.07 16.74
45-49 – 18.60
50-54 (U.S. 50-64) 42.00 16.52
55-59 – 16.24
60-64 – 13.52
65-69 (U.S. 65-75) 20.24 9.80
70-75 – 5.51
75+ 7.69 3.08
Gross household incomeb
Low 30.06 25.75
Low-middle 22.87 24.25
High-middle 27.98 25.04
High 19.10 24.96
Race/Ethnic origin
White 77.11 n.a.
Non-white 22.89 n.a.
Dutch n.a. 90.70
Breast cancer in the family
No 85.03 87.98
Yes – 1 family member 11.46 10.80
Yes – 1+ family member 3.51 1.22
Has given birth n.a. 84.26
Has a friend who died of breast cancer n.a. 48.71
Perceived risk of getting breast cancer in the next 5 years 24.64 20.28
Perceived effectiveness of mammogram at preventing death
Negative n.a. 12.45
Low 20.66 24.96
Medium-low 22.34 23.03
Medium-high 32.05 21.67
High 24.94 17.88
Perceived probability of mammogram:
giving a false-positive result 32.78 n.a.
giving a false-negative result 13.40 n.a.
detecting breast cancer 62.22 n.a.
N 646 1,398
a Wider age intervals are used for the U.S. because of the smaller sample size.
b The income quartiles constructed from the U.S. data did not divide the sample into four equally
sized groups since they were derived from a categorical income variable.
All numbers are stated as percentages. 51
Table 3.3: Age-adjusted education differences in
the probability of screening by country
United States Netherlands
Education
Low -0.115∗∗ -0.027
(0.056) (0.023 )
Middle -0.104∗ 0.001
(0.054) (0.028)
High base base
Average marginal effects from logit models are reported.
Both models control for age. For each individual, we cal-
culate the marginal effect of an education category by
taking the difference between the predicted probability
of screening in that category and in the reference cate-
gory. Average marginal effect is the average of individ-
ual marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.4: Differences in probability of screening mammogram by country
United States Netherlands
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education
Low -0.097∗ 0.024 -0.023 -0.038∗∗
(0.052) (0.046) (0.023) (0.019)
Middle -0.125∗∗ -0.011 -0.004 -0.025
(0.053) (0.043) (0.028) (0.023)
High base base base base
Breast cancer in the family
No base base base base
Yes - 1 family member 0.057 0.051 0.054∗ 0.045∗
(0.052) (0.047) (0.032) (0.025)
Yes - 1+ family member -0.006 -0.010 0.104 -0.002
(0.145) (0.080) (0.104) (0.079)
Has given birth n.a. n.a. 0.009 0.028
(0.027) (0.023)
Race/Ethnic origin
White -0.135∗∗ -0.075 n.a. n.a.
(0.060) (0.054)
Dutch n.a. n.a. -0.008 -0.010
(0.033) (0.026)
Perceived risk of getting breast cancer in the next 5 years 0.001 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Perceived effectiveness of mammogram at preventing death
Negative n.a.a n.a.a -0.018 0.020
(0.034) (0.028)
Low base base base base
Medium-low 0.088 -0.001 0.019 0.039∗
(0.095) (0.062) (0.028) (0.023)
Medium-high 0.300∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.079) (0.054) (0.028) (0.023)
High 0.235∗∗∗ 0.081 0.048 0.040∗
(0.086) (0.057) (0.030) (0.024)
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Table 3.4 – continued from previous page
United States Netherlands
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Has a friend who died of breast cancer n.a. n.a. 0.042∗∗ 0.021
(0.020) (0.016)
Perceived probability of mammogram:
giving a false-positive result 0.001 0.000 n.a. n.a.
(0.001) (0.001)
giving a false-negative result -0.001 0.000 n.a. n.a.
(0.002) (0.001)
detecting breast cancer 0.000 0.001∗ n.a. n.a.
(0.001) (0.001)
Income
Low base base
Low-middle -0.028 0.013
(0.055) (0.022)
Middle-high 0.006 0.009
(0.049) (0.023)
High 0.072 0.029
(0.058) (0.023)
Mammogram
covered by insurance 0.225∗∗∗ n.a.
(0.050)
recommended by doctor 0.384∗∗∗ n.a.
(0.063)
invitation by program n.a. 0.693∗∗∗
(0.041)
invitation in other manner n.a. 0.415∗∗∗
(0.019)
a No coefficient since ALP respondents are presented with options 0%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% and 100%.
Average marginal effects from logit models are reported. All models control for age. Reference category for white
is non-white. For each individual, we calculate the marginal effect of a covariate category by taking the difference
between the predicted probability of screening in that category and in the reference category. Average marginal
effect is the average of individual marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Differences in probability of medical advice, insurance coverage and screening
invitation for mammogram
United States Netherlands
Medical advice to Insurance coverage Invited for mammogram by Invited for mammogram in
get mammogram for mammogram national program other manner
Age group
40-49 base base base base
50-64 0.022 -0.023 0.864∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.064) (0.014) (0.017)
65-75 0.016 0.179∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.070) (0.021) (0.018)
75+ 0.030 0.243∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗ n.a.a
(0.098) (0.070) (0.060)
Education
Low -0.038 -0.107∗ 0.019 0.004
(0.055) (0.057) (0.017) (0.016)
Middle -0.115∗ -0.016 0.015 -0.006
(0.061) (0.045) (0.021) (0.017)
High base base base base
Income
Low base base base base
Low-middle 0.016 -0.085 0.015 -0.036∗
(0.065) (0.080) (0.018) (0.020)
High-middle 0.031 0.065 0.035∗∗ -0.019
(0.059) (0.069) (0.018) (0.020)
High 0.002 0.130∗ 0.003 -0.033
(0.081) (0.067) (0.020) (0.020)
Breast cancer in the family
No base base base base
Yes - 1 family member 0.090∗ 0.087 -0.028 0.088∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.055) (0.021) (0.030)
Yes - 1+ family member -0.011 0.102 -0.066 0.342∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.109) (0.065) (0.121)
Has children n.a. n.a. -0.006 -0.002
(0.018) (0.17)
Race/ethnic origin
White -0.129∗∗ -0.016 n.a. n.a.
(0.061) (0.068)
Dutch n.a. n.a. -0.009 0.006
(0.022) (0.020)
Invited in other manner n.a. n.a. -0.405∗∗∗ n.a.
(0.053)
Insurance coverage 0.204∗∗∗ n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.061)
a No coefficient since there are no women in the 75+ age range that have been invited in another manner.
Average marginal effects from logit models are reported. Reference category for white is non-white. For each individual, we calculate
the marginal effect of a given category by taking the difference between the probability of getting screened in this category and in the
reference category. Average marginal effect is simply the average of individual marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Chapter 4
Thought for Food: Understanding
Education Disparities in Food
Consumption
Higher educated individuals are healthier and live longer than their lower educated peers.
One reason is that lower educated individuals engage more often in unhealthy behaviors,
including consumption of a poor diet, but it is not clear why they do so. In this paper,
we design a Discrete Choice Experiment, based on an economic model of food consump-
tion, to understand the relationship between education and diet. Our results show that
differences in dietary knowledge are responsible for the greatest part of the education
disparity in diet. However, even when faced with the most explicit information regarding
components of a healthy diet, lower educated individuals still state choices that imply
a lower concern for negative health consequences of unhealthy eating patterns. This is
consistent with the model’s prediction that part of the education differences across health
behaviors is driven by a higher “value of health” among the higher educated.
This chapter is based upon:
Koc¸, H. and van Kippersluis, H. (2015). Thought for Food: Understanding Educational Dispari-
ties in Food Consumption. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 15-034/V)
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4.1 Introduction
The question “How can we induce people to look after their health?” has recently been
chosen as one of the 10 most pressing questions in the social sciences (Giles, 2011). An-
swering this question requires a solid understanding of why people behave unhealthily.
Given the strong disparities in the prevalence of healthy behaviors across education groups
(e.g. Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2010; Cawley & Ruhm, 2011), the reasons why lower edu-
cated individuals behave unhealthily is of particular interest. In a recent review, however,
Cutler et al. (2011) note that why education affects health behaviors remains largely un-
clear.
In this paper our aim is to understand educational differences in one important type
of health behavior, namely diet. With obesity rapidly approaching smoking as the lead-
ing preventable cause-of-death, dietary behavior gains unprecedented significance. We
use an economic model to guide our design of a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), in
which respondents make repeated choices between hypothetical meals that differ in taste,
monetary price, preparation time, and health consequences. By randomly varying the
information load that respondents face, our experimental design enables us to identify
the parameters of the model, and helps us understand why lower educated individuals
follow unhealthier diets: Is it because they know less about the health consequences of
eating unhealthily or because they are very well aware of the consequences but simply
care less about them?
Health behaviors have attracted a considerable amount of attention in the economics
literature. One reason is the widely documented contribution of the education gradient in
health behaviors to the education gradient in health (Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2010). One
can initially be inclined to argue that the education gradient in health behaviors is simply
due to higher educated individuals earning a higher income. Drewnowski & Specter (2004)
argue that unhealthy diets composed of energy dense foods (such as refined grains, added
fats and sugars) are more affordable than healthy diets, and that the low cost of energy
dense foods may partially explain the high prevalence of obesity among people with low
levels of education. While an appealing argument, it is possible to find many unhealthy
habits which are costly and more prevalent among the lower educated, such as smoking
and binge drinking. Therefore it is unlikely that income is the sole explanation.
A further explanation can be the positive association between education and the
personality traits that are needed to initiate and maintain healthy lifestyles, such as
self-regulation (ability to defer an immediate reward for a future reward), internal locus
of control (perceived control over one’s life), and self-efficacy (Leganger & Kraft, 2003;
Saffer, 2014). According to Conti & Hansman (2013), personality traits contribute to the
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association between education and health behaviors (see also Barsky et al., 1997; Picone
et al., 2004), although the direction of causality is not well-established.
Differences in health knowledge across educational groups are another explanation
that is often stressed to explain the relationship between education and health behav-
iors. Grossman (1972) and Meara (2001) emphasize the “productive efficiency” hypoth-
esis, which states that higher educated individuals make more efficient use of informa-
tion, partly due to differences in cognitive ability (Bijwaard & Van Kippersluis, 2015).
According to the “allocative efficiency” hypothesis, higher educated individuals choose
more efficient inputs into health investment (healthier lifestyles), typically thought to be
caused by better health knowledge and a more receptive attitude towards new informa-
tion. Kenkel (1991), Meara (2001) and Cutler & Lleras-Muney (2010) provide support
for the allocative efficiency hypothesis by showing that higher educated individuals have
superior knowledge on the health effects of smoking, drinking and exercise, although
this observation explains only a limited portion of the education disparities in health
behaviors.
In sum, the literature established that education is closely related to a large battery
of health behaviors, but there is no consensus about the underlying mechanisms and
their relative contributions to the association. Gaining a better understanding of the
mechanisms is important from a policy perspective. If educational differences in the
possession of health knowledge are the key to the observed disparities, then policy efforts
should be directed more towards equalizing health knowledge among people from different
educational backgrounds. On the other hand, if educational differences in cognitive skills
or personality traits are the main drivers, then, depending on the direction of causality,
more structural changes that aim to reduce differences in education, cognitive ability, and
personality traits would be needed.1
We argue that the progress and consensus on why higher educated individuals en-
gage in healthier behaviors are at least partially hampered by the exclusive reliance on
revealed preference data. This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first in the eco-
nomics literature to use a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to investigate educational
disparities in dietary behavior.2
Compared to revealed preference approach, our DCE defines, not assumes, the choice
1 From a more liberal perspective, any kind of intervention that goes beyond equalizing opportunity
would be deemed unnecessary as differences across educational groups are the result of free, albeit
constrained, choices.
2 The food demand literature that employs discrete choice experiments has mainly focused on esti-
mating the demand for novel food attributes (Adamowicz & Swait, 2011). We are aware of only one
study by Kamphuis et al. (2015) in public health literature, which aims to document socioeconomic
differences in dietary choice in a similar fashion to us. However, unlike us, they do not discriminate
between the role of health knowledge and the value of health in driving these differences.
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sets and food attributes that individuals face. In revealed preference data, one typi-
cally assumes artificial choice sets on basis of other individuals’ choices, but it is unclear
whether these are the actual choice sets, and whether the objective attributes in the ar-
tificial choice sets match the perceived attributes of the individual. Moreover, the DCE
allows us to separate preferences for tastiness from preferences for health aspects, by ex-
plicitly controlling for tastiness as a product attribute. In revealed preference data, even
if we were to observe all objectively measured food attributes like price or fat content,
when an individual is observed to choose the option with a high amount of fat over low,
it is difficult to tell whether this is due to a dismissal of negative health consequences of
high fat intake or due to the association of fat content and taste. Finally, in contrast to
revealed preference data, options in the DCE are not restricted to products that currently
exist in the market.
On top of the novel experimental design, which we view as complementary to more
conventional revealed preference approach, our study further contributes to the existing
work on the effect of information provision on diet. Downs et al. (2009) find that calorie
consumption went down in hamburger restaurants in Brooklyn but not in Manhattan
after posting calorie information became mandatory, suggesting that socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups benefit more from provision of health information. Wisdom et al.
(2010) and Bollinger et al. (2011) find that providing information on calorie content led
to significantly lower calorie consumption, yet Elbel et al. (2009) and Finkelstein et al.
(2011) find no effect of the menu labeling law on healthier food purchasing in fast-food
chains.
We contribute to the menu labelling literature by choosing a non-fast-food restaurant
setting and by investigating preferences for more health attributes like fat and sodium,
apart from calories. While menu labelling studies have almost exclusively focused on
calories (for exceptions see Mathios, 2000; Wansink & Chandon, 2006; Variyam, 2008),
overconsumption of sodium and saturated fat may be equally, or even more, harmful
to health. Furthermore, customers of fast-food chains may have a different profile, or
mindset, than customers of normal restaurants or home cooks. Conditional on the choice
to enter a fast-food restaurant, convenience and taste may be the priority rather than
calories, or health consequences in general.
Our results indicate that the education disparity in diet derives mostly from superior
health knowledge among the higher educated. When faced with health information, better
educated respondents do not change their valuation of health related product attributes,
while lower educated respondents start to put a higher value on these attributes. This
finding suggests that the lower educated are the main beneficiaries of health information,
and the education gradient in unhealthy food choice becomes smaller upon provision
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of such information. Nonetheless, even after fully equalizing health information across
education groups, the better educated tend to choose healthier diets. This suggests that
higher educated respondents place a higher marginal value on their health – i.e. they
care more about the health consequences of dietary patterns. Auxiliary analyses suggest
that at least part of these differences in the value of health derives from higher incomes
among the higher educated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we present our
economic model of food consumption and discuss its insights and predictions. Section
4.3 explains in detail the design of the DCE, and section 4.4 describes its implementation
in the LISS internet panel. Section 4.5 contains the empirical models that we estimate
whose results are presented in section 4.6. In section 4.7, we present several robustness
checks, before discussing the results in section 4.8.
4.2 A Model of Food Consumption
4.2.1 Model Formulation
The model presented here is a static formulation of the model developed by Galama &
Van Kippersluis (2010), and builds on the human capital theory of the demand for health
investment by Grossman (1972). Individuals maximize the utility function U(Ch, Cu, H),
which is concave in healthy consumption Ch, unhealthy consumption Cu, and subjective
health H. We differentiate between subjective health H, and objective health H∗, since
in practice individuals rely on a subjective perception of their health rather than their
objective health status (Ippolito, 1981; Johansson-Stenman, 2011). Subjective health is
equal to objective health multiplied by the parameter λ(E):
H = λ(E)H∗(Ch, Cu) (4.1)
λ(E) takes the value of 1 when individuals have perfect knowledge about their objective
health; while it deviates from 1 when individuals over- or underestimate their objective
health. We assume λ(E) is a function of education since the lower educated generally have
worse health knowledge than the higher educated (Kenkel, 1991; Cutler & Lleras-Muney,
2010).
Objective health is a weakly increasing function of healthy consumption, i.e. ∂H∗/∂Ch ≥
0, and a strictly decreasing function of unhealthy consumption, i.e. ∂H∗/∂Cu < 0.
Healthy and unhealthy consumption are produced by combining goods and services pur-
60
chased in the market (Xh and Xu), and own time inputs (τCh and τCu):
Ch ≡ Ch(Xh, τCh) (4.2)
Cu ≡ Cu(Xu, τCu) (4.3)
Individuals maximize utility under two constraints. The first constraint is time (Equa-
tion 4.4). The total amount of time available to an individual, Ω, is fixed, and it is divided
between work τw, time inputs into healthy consumption, time inputs into unhealthy con-
sumption, and some time is lost due to sickness s(H):
Ω = τw + τCh + τCu + s(H) (4.4)
The second constraint that individuals face is the budget constraint (Equation 4.5). The
amount of money available is determined by the product of the wage rate per hour w(E),
which is a function of education, and the number of hours worked. Expenditures include
purchases of healthy and unhealthy consumption goods and services, at their respective
prices pCh and pCu .
w(E)τw = pChXh + pCuXu (4.5)
The Lagrangian of the above described optimization problem can be written as:
= = U(Ch, Cu, H) + µ
{
w(E)
[
Ω− τCh − τCu − s(H)
]− pChXh − pCuXu} (4.6)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint, or the marginal value of
income.
4.2.2 First-order conditions
The first-order condition for healthy consumption is (see Appendix 4.A for derivations):
∂U
∂Ch
+ qH λ(E)
∂H∗
∂Ch
= µpiCh (4.7)
The left-hand side of (4.7) is the marginal benefit of healthy consumption, which is the
sum of the marginal utility from healthy consumption and the perceived health benefit
of healthy consumption. The perceived health benefit is given by the product of the
marginal value of health qH and the subjective assessment of the amount of health gained
by healthy consumption, λ(E) [∂H∗/∂Ch]. The marginal value of health is described in
(4.8) and equals to the sum of the marginal utility of health (consumption benefit) and
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the marginal effect of health on productive time (production benefit).
qH =
∂U
∂H
+ µw(E)
[
− ∂s
∂H
]
(4.8)
The right-hand side of (4.7) multiplies the marginal value of income µ with the
marginal cost of healthy consumption piCh , which is a function of the monetary price
pXh , and the opportunity cost of time w(E):
piCh ≡
pXh
∂Ch/∂Xh
=
w(E)
∂Ch/∂τCh
(4.9)
Similarly, the first-order condition for unhealthy consumption is
∂U
∂Cu
= µpiCu + qH λ(E)
[
−∂H
∗
∂Cu
]
(4.10)
where
piCu ≡
pXu
∂Cu/∂Xu
=
w(E)
∂Cu/∂τCu
(4.11)
Like in the case of healthy consumption, the left-hand side of (4.10) captures the
marginal utility that an individual derives from unhealthy consumption. The first term
on the right-hand side multiplies the marginal value of income µ with the marginal cost
of unhealthy consumption (see Equation 4.11). The second term on the right-hand side
of (4.10) is the perceived health cost of unhealthy consumption. It is the product of the
marginal value of health qH and the subjective assessment of the “unhealthiness” of the
good λ(E) [−∂H∗/∂Cu].
4.2.3 Insights from the model
The model provides a framework for understanding the trade-offs while making dietary
choices. On the one hand, individuals enjoy consuming unhealthy food, but this affects
their health negatively, and in turn leads to a reduction in both utility and productive time
in the labor market. Healthy food, on the other hand, improves health but may provide
less utility and may be more costly and time-intensive to prepare. Therefore, depending
on the relative prices, required time inputs, preferences, and subjective perceptions of
(un)healthiness, individuals choose an optimal bundle of healthy and unhealthy food
items.
The first order conditions for healthy and unhealthy consumption, given in (4.7) and
(4.10) suggest that dietary choices are mainly governed by four product attributes: (i)
taste, as reflected in the marginal utilities of consumption, ∂U/∂Ch and ∂U/∂Cu, (ii)
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the monetary price, pCh and pCu , (iii) the opportunity cost of time, w(E), and (iv) the
health consequences, ∂H∗/∂Ch and ∂H∗/∂Cu. How much value individuals attach to
these attributes is determined by parameters of the utility function (for taste), and by
the marginal value of income, µ (for the monetary price and opportunity cost of time).
Due to differences in budget and time constraints (e.g. Cutler et al., 2003; Drewnowski
& Specter, 2004), differences in the efficiency of using market inputs and own time in
production (Michael & Becker, 1973), and differences in preferences (Drewnowski, 1997),
individuals from different educational backgrounds may have a different valuation of each
attribute.
The first order conditions also illustrate that the valuation of health consequences
depends on the product of qH and λ(E). By assumption λ(E) is a function of education.
Equation (4.8) illustrates that the marginal value of health is also a function of education.
Higher educated individuals earn higher wages, and since better health enables them to
generate more earnings by increasing the time spent working, they value health more (i.e.
the higher educated have higher production benefits of health). As a result, ∂qH/∂E > 0.
In the empirical analysis, we seek to discriminate between the model parameters λ(E)
and qH that are potentially causing education disparities in unhealthy diets. Our main
question is: Are education disparities in dietary choice mainly caused by disparities in
health knowledge, i.e. driven by λ(E), or do they simply reflect disparities in the marginal
value of health, i.e. qH? A secondary question is to what extent any potential differences
in the marginal value of health are driven by education, health, the marginal value of
income, and preferences.3
Answering these questions is not straightforward and puts huge requirements on the
data. In particular, qH and λ(E) are not separately identified. Only in the special case
that λ(E) = 1, we can identify the marginal value of health. Since consumer demand
theory does not provide any credible instrumental variables (Etile´, 2011), we have to rely
on experimental variation in the amount of health information in order to separately
identify qH .
3 Equation (4.8) suggests that the marginal value of health additionally may depend on health H,
the marginal value of income µ, and preferences. Since all of these variables are likely to be correlated to
education, educational disparities in the marginal value of health may partially derive from differences
in the marginal value of income, health status, and preferences. It makes intuitive sense that preferences
include time preferences as many of the health consequences of (un)healthy consumption are realized in
the future. However, the model is unable to accommodate that due to its static nature.
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4.3 Discrete Choice Experiment
A Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) is a stated preference technique that aims at elic-
iting individual preferences for attributes of a certain (consumption) good. DCEs are
strongly grounded in Random Utility Theory (Louviere et al., 2010). In a DCE, multiple
choice sets are presented to respondents, and in each choice set respondents make a choice
between two or more alternatives. An alternative is described by a number of attributes,
each of which can take several levels. The fundamental idea is that utility is derived from
the bundles of attributes that make up the consumption goods, and not the consumption
goods per se (Lancaster, 1966).
4.3.1 Setting of the Design
The setting of our DCE is the choice for a dinner meal. In terms of dietary behavior,
dinner seems to be the most relevant setting as it contains the largest fraction of calories
(36 percent), fat (42 percent), salt (36 percent), and fiber (36 percent) in Dutch diet
(Van Rossum et al., 2011), with similar findings for the U.S. (Cutler et al., 2003, p. 101).
Moreover, the largest disparities in healthy diets across education groups seem to derive
from regular meals rather than snacks, candies and other refreshments. In our sample,
38 percent of the higher educated eat candies and snacks at least once a week, compared
with only 32 percent of the lower educated.
The question we present to respondents is “Which of the following two meals would
you eat regularly, i.e. at least twice a week?”4 By asking a general question about which
of the two meals they would prefer, we intend to avoid the dependence of the choice on
the respondent’s current appetite as well as his/her earlier food choices during the day
or the week.
An example choice set is shown in Table 4.1. The design is unlabeled with a forced
choice between the two meals. That is, we make respondents choose between “Meal A”
and “Meal B”, and do not allow them to choose neither of the two. In a labeled design
(e.g. pizza vs. mashed potatoes), individuals might have intrinsic preferences for, and
associations with, the specific alternatives. This will contaminate the estimation of the
attribute importance (Hensher et al., 2005, p. 113). The reason why we force respondents
to make a choice is that we are mainly interested in the trade-offs between the attributes,
and failure to make a choice does not convey any information on attribute importance
(Hensher et al., 2005, p. 176).
4 See Appendix 4.B for the full introductory text.
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4.3.2 Attributes and Levels
The economic model developed in Section 4.2 determines our selection of attributes. The
model postulates that taste, monetary cost, time (or opportunity) cost, and health conse-
quences are the four attributes that are influential on choice. These four attributes reas-
suringly coincide with the results from Food Choice Questionnaire developed by Steptoe
et al. (1995) who demonstrate that, out of the nine factors that emerge to be important
for food choice, sensory appeal, health, convenience and price are the most important
ones. Moreover, in a pilot study that we conducted among 87 respondents, no other
attribute was consistently mentioned to be important by more than 5 percent of the
respondents, establishing confidence in our selection of attributes. Nonetheless, to err
on the side of prudence, we added the sentence “Assume all other characteristics of the
meals are the same, e.g. they are equally filling, biological, fair-trade, contain an equal
amount of carbohydrates and proteins etc.” to the introductory text, in order to prevent
respondents from making assumptions about possibly omitted attributes.
While the attributes taste, monetary cost, and time cost all seem relatively easily
interpretable, the attribute health consequences is more difficult to operationalize. We
choose to operationalize this attribute by dividing it into three separate attributes which
we call health attributes : calories, saturated fat, and sodium. We restricted health con-
sequences to three attributes to reduce the cognitive burden on the respondents, and
consequently avoid choices made based on only a subset of the attributes (Mangham et
al., 2009).
There are three reasons why we chose calories, saturated fat and sodium as the health
attributes. First of all, the most recent Dietary Guidelines for Americans state that all
three are associated with health consequences (U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2010). Overconsumption of calories is asso-
ciated with overweight, obesity, and diabetes; overconsumption of sodium is associated
with high blood pressure and stroke; and overconsumption of saturated fat is associated
with high cholesterol and cardiovascular disease.5 Secondly, listing the amounts for these
three attributes on the Nutrition Facts label is compulsory (European Union, 2006).
Third, official guidelines prescribe a daily recommended intake for these three attributes
(U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2010). This in contrast with for example sugar, for which the daily recommended intake
5 Admittedly, there is a certain amount of uncertainty regarding the relationship between dietary
components and health. While negative health consequences of overconsumption of calories or sodium
is quite well established, we are aware of recent studies that challenge the association between saturated
fat and cardiovascular disease (e.g. Malhotra, 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2014). Nonetheless, we decided
to follow the most recent Dietary Guidelines for Americans which is prepared by two federal government
bodies with the official goal of protecting American citizens’ health.
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is not agreed upon.
The proposed levels for the attributes are:
• Price - 2 Euro, 6 Euro, 10 Euro
• Time - 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 50 minutes
• Taste - OK, Good, Very Good 6
• Calories - 800 calories, 1100 calories, 1400 calories
• Saturated Fat - 10 gram, 20 gram, 30 gram
• Sodium - 900 milligram, 1200 milligram, 1500 milligram 7
4.3.3 Experimental Design
Design size We present each individual with 18 choice sets which is seen as a practical
limit before boredom sets in (Hanson et al., 2005). Using 5 blocks of 18 choice sets ensures
that the total number of choice sets generated is 90, which gives a comfortable buffer to
identify all main effects and two-way interactions of the attribute levels.8 The blocking
of the design is performed such that the levels of every attribute are evenly divided over
the blocks.
Generating an efficient design As the example choice set in Table 4.1 illustrates,
there is an awful amount of possible combinations to generate 90 choice sets with two
alternatives. We have opted for an “efficient design” that chooses the 90 most informative
choice sets, for a given set of prior values. Efficiency is achieved by minimizing the median
“D-Error”, which is the determinant of the asymptotic variance-covariance (AVC) matrix
of the parameters (Huber & Zwerina, 1996; Hensher et al., 2005, p. 153). As a part
of statistical efficiency, efficient designs rule out the so-called dominant alternatives –
uninformative choice sets where one of the alternatives is superior to the other in all
aspects (e.g. a meal that is tastier, cheaper, quicker, and healthier than the other meal).
6 Kamphuis et al. (2015) have run pilots where they experiment with levels such as tasteless or bad
for the attribute “taste”. They have observed that respondents never choose a meal that tastes bad.
Therefore, we set “OK – neither good nor bad” as the minimum level of tastiness a meal can reach in
our experiment.
7 Refer to Appendix 4.B for a detailed motivation of the levels.
8 The number of choice sets directly determines the number of parameters that are identified. With
6 attributes, each with 3 levels, the full factorial including main effects and all interactions amounts to
36 = 729 parameters. Since three-way and higher-order interactions are unlikely to be of importance
(e.g. Hensher et al., 2005; Lancsar & Louviere, 2008), 90 choice sets allow us to identify all main effects
(12) and two-way interactions (60).
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When generating an efficient design, prior values have to be assigned to the parame-
ters. Given that all our attributes have a clear ordinal structure (e.g. a lower price always
yields a higher utility than a higher price; fewer saturated fat yields more utility than
more saturated fat for a given taste), the sign of the parameters is easily determined.
The magnitude of the parameters is less well-established, therefore we use Bayesian pri-
ors with 1000 Halton draws from a normal distribution, to ensure robustness against
misspecification (see Appendix 4.B for details).
Gradually adding health information Scenario I (or the baseline scenario or no
health information scenario) identifies the product of the model parameters qH(t) and
λ(E). This suggests that, for example, if the higher educated care more about calories,
we do not know whether this is because they know more about the possible dangers
of overconsuming calories, or because they care more about the health consequences of
overconsuming calories. In order to separate out the effect of these two parameters, we
generate two additional scenarios where we gradually add health information until the
point where λ(E) is equal to 1.
Scenario II (or health information scenario) is identical to scenario I, except for the fact
that descriptions of the health attributes in the introductory text are supplemented with
information about the adverse health effects of overconsumption, and the recommended
daily allowances for dinner. Additionally, respondents are reminded in every choice set
of the recommended intake via the sentence “The recommended intake for a dinner is
800 calories, 10 gram saturated fat, and 900 milligram sodium”. An example choice set
is given in Table 4.2.
The objective of scenario II is to see how education disparities in the value individuals
attach to the health attributes change when health information is provided. However,
while reducing potential differences in possession of health information across education
groups, scenario II still requires cognitive capabilities to process and internalize the given
health information. Therefore, in scenario III (or explicit health information scenario) we
make the health information even more explicit with the aim of fully equalizing health
information across groups, i.e. fixing λ(E) at 1. For that purpose, we replace the three
health attributes – calories, saturated fat, sodium – with the single attribute “health
consequences”:
• Health consequences - Healthy, i.e. associated with reduced risk of disease,
Health Neutral, Unhealthy, i.e. associated with increased risk of disease
An example choice set is given in Table 4.3. Despite compromising of the realism of the
choice that respondents face, scenario III makes sure that all respondents are on the same
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page in terms of health information. Hence, we ascribe any potential differences in the
valuation of the attribute “health consequences” to differences in the marginal value of
health qH(t), rather than differences in health knowledge λ(E).
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.4.1 Data
Our DCE is implemented in the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sci-
ences) panel administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). The
LISS panel is a monthly internet panel that runs since October 2007, covering 5000 house-
holds or 8000 individuals who are paid upon completing a questionnaire. The panel is
based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register by
Statistics Netherlands. Households that can not otherwise participate are provided with
a computer and internet connection.
A representative sample of 4,377 panel members have been randomly selected for the
DCE in the first wave, which took place in April 2014. We have restricted the sample
to 18+ individuals as younger ones often live with their parents, typically do not cook,
and as a consequence do not have much choice over what they eat for dinner. Each
respondent is first randomly assigned to one of the three scenarios, and then to one of
the five blocks within a scenario (see Section 4.3.3 for more detail on the scenarios and
blocks). Within a block, each respondent is presented with 18 randomly ordered choice
sets, with randomly ordered attributes (Kjær et al., 2006). Table 4.4 provides descriptive
statistics for the sample. Our respondents are between 18 and 91, with an average age of
51, and roughly equally divided between men and women. Randomization of individuals
to the different scenarios worked properly, as the means of the majority of the variables
do not differ across scenarios.9
In a second wave, in May 2014, we have collected information about the respondents’
time preferences, health knowledge (both objective and self-assessed), health valuation,
and dietary habits.10 Wave II is administered only among respondents who participated
9 Due to chance, a couple of exceptions occurred. The respondents in scenario II eat more often in a
restaurant than the respondents in scenario I (p-value=0.049), and the respondents in scenarios II and
III consume vegetables more frequently than the respondents of scenario I (p-values are 0.047 and 0.091
respectively). The respondents of scenario III have a lower level of education than the respondents of
scenario I (p-value=0.001). This does not pose any problems to our analysis of the education disparities
in dietary behavior because we either compare respondents with different levels of education within
scenarios, or respondents with the same level of education across scenarios.
10 We ask the additional questions in a separate wave, one month later than the DCE, in order to avoid
any priming and/or learning effects. It is likely that asking questions about health knowledge before
the start of the DCE will make health attribute(s) salient compared to other product attributes in the
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in wave I. After accounting for non-response (18.2 percent in the first wave and 10.5
percent in the second wave), we have 3,157 individuals who responded to both waves.
After dropping respondents with missing values for variables used in the analysis, we end
up with a final sample size of 2,869.11
4.4.2 Variables
The main variables used in the analysis are defined below. Note that all these variables
are fixed for a given respondent across choice sets, and hence cannot be controlled for
in the empirical estimation (see Section 4.5 for details). The variables do differ across
respondents, however, and we will exploit this variation by estimating the models for
different subgroups. To limit the number of subgroups, we choose to dichotomize all
respondent characteristics defined below.
Education We measure education by the highest level completed with a diploma.12
We dichotomize level of education as “lower education” referring to primary/secondary
school or lower vocational education, and “higher education” referring to higher voca-
tional education or university. 67 percent of our respondents are lower educated.
Self-reported health Self-reported health is measured by the question “How would
you describe your health, generally speaking?”, with excellent, very good, good, moderate,
and poor as possible answers. We group the first three categories as “good health”, and
the latter two as “poor health”.
Health knowledge Respondents’ health knowledge with respect to diet is measured via
12 yes/no questions, including a “I do not know” option (see Table 4.6 for the questions).
Half of the questions is about calories, saturated fat, and sodium as these are the dietary
components that we focus on in our DCE. The other half of the questions asks about other
DCE, resulting in an overestimation of the relative importance of the health attribute(s). Asking health
knowledge questions immediately after the DCE may result in an overestimation of health knowledge
among scenario II respondents, as they were provided with health information. Interestingly, when we
compare the number of correct answers given to health knowledge questions among respondents from
scenario I and scenario II, we observe no difference, suggesting that answering questions in scenario II
did not result in a lasting accumulation of health knowledge.
11 According to Lancsar & Louviere (2008), to estimate reliable models, one rarely needs more than 20
respondents per parameter. We have 12 main effects in scenarios I and II, and 8 main effects in scenario
III. Therefore our sample size gives us a very comfortable buffer to identify all main effects reliably, and
even permits estimating two-way interactions if deemed necessary.
12 Respondents between age 18 and 25 may still be attending school or university. However, when we
restrict the analyses to individuals aged 25 and above, our results remain unchanged.
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dietary components with the aim of getting an idea about the level of general knowledge
the respondent has.
We construct a dietary knowledge index by counting the number of correct answers
for 12 questions. We follow a strict scoring procedure in the sense that we count “do
not know” responses also as incorrect, as both incorrect and “do not know” responses
indicate a lack of knowledge. Then we construct a binary knowledge variable where a
person is considered to have “high health knowledge” if she has answered more questions
correctly than the median respondent, and “low health knowledge” otherwise.
Income Our economic model shows that the optimal levels of both healthy and un-
healthy consumption are influenced by µ, i.e. the marginal value of income. We use
current income to measure how tight the budget constraint is. Income is measured con-
tinuously as net monthly household income in Euros. We recode this variable into a
binary one, where “high income” corresponds to income levels above the median level of
income in the sample, and “low income” otherwise.
Future orientation Following Oreopoulos & Salvanes (2011), we have asked respon-
dents to rate their agreement with the statement “Nowadays, a person has to live pretty
much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself”, with strongly disagree, disagree,
neutral, agree and strongly agree as possible answers. We treat responses to this state-
ment as a proxy for future orientation (or time preference) where a higher degree of
agreement implies a higher level of orientation to the future. A person is defined to have
“high future orientation” if she (strongly) disagrees with the statement, and “low future
orientation” otherwise. While simplistic, we still prefer to use this measure over more
conventional ones, as it is simple for respondents to understand and respond to. Indeed,
the non-response and irrational response rate for a more classical way of measuring time
preference via money now versus money later type of comparisons is very large in our
sample (around 30 percent).13
Diet We have asked respondents whether they follow any diet, with possible dietary
restrictions for salt, cholesterol, calories, or other diets. The binary variable “diet” takes
the value of 1 if the respondent follows any kind of diet, and 0 otherwise.
13 Our future orientation measure is strongly correlated to the classic time preference question “If
offered 100 euros now or X euros in 6 months, what would be the smallest amount of money you
would accept rather than the immediately available 100 euros?”. After omitting irrational responses, i.e.
X<=100 (leaving N=1778), those who are future oriented have on average discount rates that are 30
percentage points lower (p-value < 0.01).
70
Dietary habits We have asked respondents how often they consume the following
goods, on a scale of 1 (Never) to 6 (Every day): fruit, vegetables, candy, sodas and
energy drinks, and general snacks. Using the same scale, we have also asked them to rate
how often they (i) cook at home on basis of raw ingredients, (ii) cook processed meals at
home, (iii) have a take-away or home-delivered meal, and (iv) eat out in a restaurant.
4.4.3 Descriptive Evidence of Disparities across Education Groups
Table 4.5 documents average dietary habits among the lower and the higher educated
respondents. In line with existing evidence (e.g. De Irala-Estevez et al., 2000; Cutler &
Lleras-Muney, 2010), higher educated individuals are found to engage in healthier eating
behaviors than the lower educated: They consume fruit and vegetables significantly more
frequently (p-values 0.000 and 0.004, respectively), and drink sodas significantly less often
(p-value=0.028) than the lower educated. No significant difference is found in snacking
behavior, but, interestingly, the higher educated seem to eat candies slightly more often
(p-value=0.003).
The table additionally documents educational disparities in dietary knowledge. As
indicated by a significantly larger share of respondents with high health knowledge, over-
all dietary information is more widespread among the higher educated (p-value=0.000).
Further analysis of the individual dietary knowledge questions (not shown) reveals that
for 9 out of 12 questions, the share of respondents giving a correct answer is higher among
the higher educated at 1 percent significance level. These respondents are more knowl-
edgeable about the recommended amounts of calories and saturated fat; about the health
consequences of overconsuming calories, saturated fat and sodium; and more generally
about what constitutes a healthy diet and diet-disease connections.
In the next section we will describe our empirical approach to estimate the contri-
bution of health knowledge to the reported disparities in healthy diets across education
groups.
4.5 Empirical Estimation
4.5.1 From Economic Model to Empirical Estimation
Optimal levels of healthy and unhealthy consumption, given in equations (4.7) and (4.10)
suggest that the utility individuals derive from consumption goods is a function of taste,
price, time cost, and health consequences. Translated into a Random Utility Framework
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this implies that the utility that individual i derives from meal j can be written as
Uij = x
′
ijβi + εij (4.12)
where xij is the matrix of product attributes taste, price, time, health consequences, βi
is the vector of individual specific coefficients/valuations of the attributes, and εij is an
error term.
The βi coefficients are the empirical analogues of the model parameters. In particular,
the coefficients for the health attributes in scenario I identify the product of the marginal
value of health qH and the health knowledge parameter λ(E). On the other hand, Sce-
nario III fixes λ(E) to 1, allowing us to interpret the coefficient on the attribute “health
consequences” as the empirical translation of qH , the marginal value of health. Esti-
mating the exact model parameters λ(E) and qH would however require rather stringent
functional form assumptions that we do not want to impose.
The economic model suggests that the coefficients, βi, on the product attributes are
heterogeneous. For example, according to Equation (4.8), the marginal value of health,
which is empirically translated to the coefficient on the attribute “health consequences”
in Scenario III, depends on education, the health stock, the marginal value of income, and
time preference. Therefore, we specify a mixed logit (also known as random parameters
logit) model, which allows for taste heterogeneity by letting each individual have an
individual-specific coefficient on every attribute.
4.5.2 Panel Mixed Logit
Model specification Generalizing the standard logit model, mixed logit specifies an
individual specific vector of coefficients βi as in Equation (4.12). βi follows the density
f(βi|θ), which describes the variation in tastes in the population with θ representing the
parameter set.
As in the regular logit model, the respondent compares the utility of choosing alter-
native j = 0 with the utility of choosing alternative j = 1, and chooses the alternative
with greater utility.14 What we observe is the outcome, yi = {0, 1}, of these latent utility
comparisons. The mixed logit model defines the unconditional probability of individual
14 Psychologists heavily criticize the assumption of rational economic agents who have complete and
transitive preferences, and based on these preferences, choose the option that gives them the highest
amount of utility (e.g. Simon, 1956; Krantz, 1991). They argue that preferences are constructed in the
process of elicitation rather than being fixed. They are sensitive to the way a choice problem is presented
or the mode of response (Slovic, 1995; Kahneman, 2011). Therefore, choice behavior can be better be
described by “bounded rationality” where agents aim to attain a satisfactory level of utility (but not
necessarily maximal).
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i choosing alternative j in a given choice set as
P uij(θ) =
∫ (
exijβi
1 + exijβi
)
f(βi|θ)dβi (4.13)
Hence, the unconditional probability in the mixed logit model is simply a weighted average
of standard logit probabilities for different values of βi. Respective weights for each βi
value are provided by the density f(βi|θ). Thus, the regular logit model is a special case
of the mixed logit model where βi takes a single value b for everyone and f(β) = 1 for
β = b.
The unconditional likelihood of individual i making the observed series of choices,
(yi1, yi2, ..., yi18), can be derived from his/her unconditional probabilities for every choice
situation t, and is given by
Lui (θ
∗) =
∫ 18∏
t=1
(
exijtβi
1 + exijtβi
)
f(βi|θ)dβi (4.14)
where the inner part is the conditional likelihood given the parameter values
Lci(βi) =
18∏
t=1
exijtβi
1 + exijtβi
(4.15)
and the log-likelihood function for the model is LL(θ) =
∑
i ln L
u
i (θ).
Since the loglikelihood function depends on unknown parameters, and involves an
integral (see Equation 4.14) that cannot be solved analytically, exact maximum likelihood
estimation is not possible. Instead a distribution is specified for the density f(βi|θ) with
given values of the parameter set θ. In our case, we choose to specify a normal distribution.
A value of βi is drawn from the normal density and in turn standard logit probabilities
are calculated for each choice set. The product of the standard logit probabilities are used
to calculate the conditional likelihood given in (4.15). This process is repeated for many
draws and the average of the resulting conditional likelihoods is used to approximate the
unconditional likelihood:
SLui (θ) = (1/R)
∑
r=1,...,R
Lci(β
r
i |θ) (4.16)
where R is the number of draws, βri |θ is the rth draw from f(βi|θ), and SLui (θ) is the
simulated likelihood of individual i’s sequence of choices.
The simulated log-likelihood function is constructed as SLL(θ) =
∑
i ln SL
u
i (θ) and
is maximized to find a consistent estimator of the true parameter vector θ (see Train,
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2009 for a complete discussion).
Extracting individual-level coefficients Mixed logit model allows for random coef-
ficients whose distribution in the population, f(βi|θ), is estimated. Revelt & Train (2000)
show that, by using a respondent’s choices, it is possible to determine the position of her
preferences in the overall distribution of preferences. To that end, one should distinguish
between f(βi|θ) and h(βi|y˜i1, y˜i2, ..., y˜i18; θ) which is the distribution of coefficients among
the subpopulation of people who made a particular sequence of choices y˜i1, y˜i2, ..., y˜i18.
By Bayes’ rule:
h (β|y˜i1, y˜i2, ..., y˜i18; θ) = P (y˜i1, y˜i2, ..., y˜i18|β) f (βi|θ)
P (y˜i1, y˜i2, ..., y˜i18|θ) (4.17)
where P (y˜i1, y˜i2, ..., y˜i18|θ) =
∫
P (y˜i1, y˜i2, ..., y˜i18|βi)f(βi|θ) dβi is the choice probability
integrated over all possible value of βi. Since, this integral does not have an analytical
solution, again we resort to simulation, and for each individual compute the mean of the
distribution h (βi|y˜i1, y˜i2, ..., y˜i18; θ).
We are particularly interested in the individual specific preferences for the product
attribute “health consequences” in scenario III, which can be interpreted as the empirical
analogue of the marginal value of health. Looking at individual specific preferences will
give us the opportunity to explore heterogeneity in the marginal value of health, i.e. to
what extent do education disparities in the marginal value of health reflect differences in
income, time preference, and health. It will additionally allow us to gauge the validity
of the stated preference data, by comparing the individual specific stated preferences for
health with the reported food choices.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Results on the Full Sample
Table 4.7 presents the parameter estimates, estimated separately for each scenario. All
attributes have a statistically significant impact on food choice with the expected sign.
A higher price and longer preparation time make an alternative less likely to be chosen.
On the other hand, tastier and healthier alternatives are more likely to be chosen.15
The estimated standard deviations are highly significant for the majority of attributes,
indicating that there is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the valuation of these
15 A robustness check has shown that replacing the attribute name “taste” with “sensory appeal”,
which additionally connotes smell and visual appearance, does not make a difference for our results, and
if anything it makes individuals care less about the attribute.
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attributes across respondents. In the following sections, we will have a closer look at the
sources of this heterogeneity, educational attainment in particular.
Because coefficients from a mixed logit model are not directly interpretable, we report
the average marginal effect of each attribute level on the choice probability for all scenarios
in Table 4.8. For example, when the price of an alternative increases from 2 Euros to
10 Euros, the probability of choosing that alternative is reduced by 17 to 24 percentage
points, ceteris paribus. Likewise, when the calorie content of a meal increases from 800
calories to 1400 calories, the probability of that meal being chosen goes down by 16
to 18 percentage points. The price, taste, and calories seem to be the most important
product attributes in the baseline scenario (scenario I), yet one should still be careful with
comparing the relative importance of different attributes as the variation in attribute
levels is hard to compare (e.g. “taste” varies from OK to Very Good, while “price” varies
from 2 to 10 Euros).16
Scenario II is identical to scenario I except for the fact that it informs respondents
about diet-disease connections and daily recommended amounts of calories, saturated
fat and sodium. Comparing results from the two scenarios reveal that valuation of the
health attributes is higher among respondents of scenario II. In other words, people place a
higher value on the health attributes when faced with health information.17 Interestingly,
respondents in scenario II place a relatively lower value on the price and taste compared
to their peers in scenario I. This suggests that when faced with new health information,
individuals are willing to trade off part of the taste and price, but not time, for a healthier
meal.
4.6.2 Disparities across Education Groups and the Role of Health
Knowledge
In this section we explore heterogeneity in the valuation of health attributes by level of
education. Table 4.9 presents average marginal effects, estimated separately for lower and
higher educated respondents (first and second columns for each scenario, respectively).18
The third column shows the difference between the two marginal effects.
In the baseline scenario, i.e. without any externally provided health information,
16 Willingness to pay estimates reported in Appendix Table 4.D.1 give similar findings. In the baseline
scenario, respondents are willing to pay the highest price to switch from a meal that contains 1400
calories to one that has 800 calories, ceteris paribus, or from a meal that tastes just OK to one that is
very tasty.
17 One should be careful when comparing the absolute size of the coefficients/marginal effects across
scenarios as different scenarios can have different error scales. Against this possibility, willingness to pay
estimates in Appendix Table 4.D.1, which are insensitive to scaling adds confidence to our finding by
showing that willingness to pay for health attributes is higher under scenario II than scenario I.
18 Refer to Appendix Table 4.D.2 for the full set of marginal effects.
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higher educated individuals put a higher emphasis on the health attributes while making
food choices. Differences are statistically significant at 5 percent level for calorie level
1400, for both levels of saturated fat, and for sodium level 1200 mg.19
Having shown the presence of educational disparities in valuation of health attributes,
the next question to ask is whether higher educated make healthier food choices because
they know more about the consequences of unhealthy consumption. The experimen-
tal design permits answering this question by comparing the education disparity among
respondents randomly assigned to scenarios I and II. Our results indicate that all dif-
ferences observed in the baseline scenario in the valuation of health attributes between
the lower and the higher educated respondents disappear upon provision of information
on recommended daily intake levels and health consequences under scenario II. We also
observe that, while the higher educated hardly change their valuation (column 2 versus
column 5), the lower educated start to care significantly more about calories, saturated
fat and sodium when exposed to health information (column 1 versus column 4).20 For
example, among lower educated respondents, increasing the sodium content from 900 mg.
to 1200 mg. reduces the choice probability by 8.3 percentage points under scenario II, in
comparison to only 4.6 percentage points under scenario I. This implies that lower edu-
cated respondents are the main beneficiaries of health information, and supply of health
information have rendered the educational disparities statistically insignificant.
4.6.3 Disparities across Education Groups and the Role of Value
of Health
In scenario III, we give respondents the most explicit health information available, that
is, we tell them whether a meal is “healthy”, “health neutral”, or “unhealthy”. This
equalizes all health information across respondents, enabling us to attribute any potential
education disparity in the valuation of the attribute “health consequences” entirely to a
difference in marginal value of health between the lower and the higher educated. The
final three columns of Table 4.9 show that, under the most explicit health information
available, there is a small and statistically insignificant difference in how much the lower
and higher educated value “health consequences”. This is consistent with our earlier
finding that a large part of the education disparity in diet is driven by health knowledge.
19 It should be noted that one’s level of caloric intake is proportional to her energy need. Since lower
educated individuals engage more often in physically demanding jobs (60 percent of the lower educated
in contrast to 30 percent of the higher educated in our sample), difference in energy need may partially
be responsible for the difference in preference for calories between the two groups.
20 The fact that it is the lower, not the higher educated, who have changed behavior rules out any
potential differences in the ability to process or internalize information favoring the higher educated as
a possible explanation for our findings.
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Despite lack of statistical significance, Table 4.9 shows that even with the most explicit
health information, the lower educated concern themselves slightly less with the health
consequences of their choices than the higher educated, suggesting the existence of an
educational difference in the valuation of health. In order to gain more insight into
this difference, we extract the individual level coefficients for the attribute level “Health
consequences = Healthy” as a proxy for the value of health, and use them as the dependent
variable in a cross-sectional regression on education, income, health, and preferences,
among respondents of scenario III.21
Table 4.10 shows that, conditional on a standard set of demographic variables – age,
age-squared and gender – and diet status, higher educated individuals put a significantly
higher value on their health (p-value=0.069). Given that standard deviation of the de-
pendent variable is estimated as 0.93 in Table 4.7 (last column), moving from lower to
higher education is associated with a 0.13 standard deviation increase in the marginal
value of health. Table 4.10 further shows that women place a higher value on health, and
there is positive relationship between age and value of health up to the age of 60.
Moving across columns shows that, while adding a proxy for time preference or self-
reported health does not significantly change the coefficient on education, the addition of
income renders it insignificant. This suggests that at least part of the education disparities
in the value of health derives from higher income among the higher educated. This is
consistent with Galama & Van Kippersluis (2010) who argue that, at higher levels of
income, due to diminishing marginal utility of consumption, people start to care more
about other goods, in particular health leading to a higher marginal value of health among
the rich.
4.7 Robustness Checks
Assessing the predictive validity of stated preferences As we have also men-
tioned in Section 4.4, wave II has presented respondents with questions about their di-
etary habits, i.e. how often they consume certain dietary components, how often they
cook at home etc. Such questions are not only common ways to measure dietary intake
(Thompson & Subar, 2008, p. 11), but also established to be predictive for actual food
intake (e.g. Willett et al., 1985). For every respondent in scenario III, we observe (i) their
reported actual food choices, and (ii) their stated preferences with respect to healthy
meals as measured by the individual-level coefficient on the attribute level “Health con-
21 In this analysis we ignore the uncertainty around the individual level coefficients and treat them as
deterministic variables. Without adjustment for this fact, it is likely that we get an underestimate of the
standard errors.
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sequences=Healthy”. By using these two pieces of information it is possible to assess the
predictive validity of the stated preferences for the reported food choices.
Table 4.11 shows that the stated preferences for hypothetical healthy food options
are highly correlated with the actual choice of healthy food options. Respondents with a
higher valuation or stated preference for healthy alternatives tend to consume more fruit
and vegetables, and less soda, candies and snacks. They also cook more at home, and
eat processed or take-away meals less often. To have an idea about the magnitude of
the relationship, compare the 47 percent probability of eating fruit everyday for someone
with an average valuation of healthy alternatives with the 56 percent probability for
someone whose valuation of healthy alternatives is one standard deviation above the
average. Results are similar for vegetables and other options building confidence that the
stated preference data have external validity for actual choices, i.e. revealed preferences.
The second panel of Table 4.11 shows that stated preferences are equally predictive
for actual choices irrespective of educational attainment.22 While we are wary of many
potential biases that remain in terms of the exact size of the coefficients from stated pref-
erence data (e.g. WTP is notoriously overstated in SP data due to hypothetical response
bias) we argue that these biases are unlikely to differ systematically by educational attain-
ment. Therefore, we conclude that the sign, and the relative magnitude across education
groups, of stated preference coefficients contain useful and reliable information.
Priming effects Despite the evidence presented above which is in line with the impor-
tance of health knowledge for educational disparities in dietary behavior, one can argue
that when faced with health information individuals start to care more about health at-
tributes only because provision of such information makes health attributes salient, i.e.
draws attention to these attributes. In order to investigate this possibility, we have gen-
erated an additional three-scenario DCE and implemented this among 892 respondents
residing in the U.S. via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).23 The first two scenarios are
identical to the original DCE where respondents are given no external health information
in the first scenario, and provided with information about diet-disease relationships and
recommended daily allowances in the second. The third scenario is constructed identi-
cally to the first two scenarios but the attribute “time” is made more salient via addition
22 Only for fruit, vegetables, and ready-cooked meals, the magnitude of the relationship between stated
and actual choices differ significantly between the higher and the lower educated. However, for fruit and
vegetables the relationship is stronger among the higher educated, while for ready-cooked meals it is
weaker. Hence, no systematic patterns are discernible.
23 MTurk is an online survey instrument. The randomization of respondents across scenarios has
worked properly, with no statistically significant differences at 5 percent level with respect to age, gender,
race, household size, education, and income across scenarios. See Appendix 4.C for details of the exact
implementation.
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of the uninformative sentence “If you spend t minutes on preparing food, you cannot
do anything else in those t minutes”. Since individuals are randomly assigned to the
scenarios, and the information provided is completely useless, any difference in the value
that scenario I (no information) and scenario III (time information) respondents attach
to the time attribute would be due to salience.
Table 4.12 presents average marginal effects from mixed logit models estimated for
each scenario. Column III shows the difference in the valuation of health attributes
under the no health information scenario (column I) and health information scenario
(column II). In line with our previous results, respondents attach a higher value to the
health attributes when faced with health information. The differences are statistically
significant for levels 1100 cals. and 1400 cals. for attribute “calories”, and for level 30
gr. for attribute “saturated fat”. Furthermore, comparing no time information scenario
(column IV) with the time information scenario (column V) reveals that the importance
of attribute “time” does not differ significantly (column VI). These results corroborate
our main finding from Section 4.6.2 that individuals start to care more about health
attributes when presented with health information, and that the information content,
not salience, is the driving force behind behavior change.
Other robustness checks While the mixed logit model provides a flexible way of
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, one may be worried that the results are driven
by the assumption on the distribution of individual specific coefficients in the population,
f(βi|θ). Additional analyses have shown that all average marginal effects are very similar
when using a log-normal instead of the current normal distribution or when estimating
a fixed effects logit model where coefficients are assumed to be fixed across respondents.
Another issue is possible differences in error scale between models estimated for the
low and high educated within the same scenario. It might be the case that higher educated
individuals make fewer errors while filling out the survey resulting in smaller error variance
and larger parameter estimates for the higher educated. To account for this possibility,
we have estimated the generalized multinomial logit model of Fiebig et al. (2010) and got
similar results.
The randomization of the order in which the choice sets and the attributes are pre-
sented to the respondents makes it very unlikely that there is any systematic bias in the
answers of respondents. Still, the results may suffer from what is known as “left-right
bias” meaning that some respondents systematically prefer the left option, i.e. meal
A. We have included an intercept in our mixed logit models to check whether this is
the case. In all scenarios the constant term has turned out to be insignificant (results
available upon request) suggesting that left-right bias is not an issue for our results.
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Finally, the results may be different across demographic variables such as gender, age,
and the size of the household. We find that men, younger individuals, and those living
on their own generally care less about the health consequences, and that educational
disparities are larger within those population groups. Nonetheless, also among women,
individuals above 50, and among those living in larger households we observe educational
disparities that become considerably smaller upon the provision of health information.
This suggests that while demographic characteristics are important determinants of food
choice, our main results hold irrespective of the population subgroup (results available
upon request).
4.8 Discussion
While it is established that health behaviors such as diet contribute to the gap in health
and life expectancy across education groups, why the higher educated eat healthier diets
is unclear (Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to adopt a stated preference Discrete Choice Experiment to understand
education disparities in (un)healthy food choices. While somewhat unconventional, and
potentially subject to hypothetical response bias, we argue that stated preference data
can be complementary to revealed preference data in revealing mechanisms, and is even
essential to separate individual preferences for health and taste.
We have two main messages. First, a large of part of education disparities in diet
derives from differences in health knowledge. Higher educated individuals have superior
knowledge on the adverse health consequences of overconsuming salt, fat and calories, and
therefore value the health consequences of food more than lower educated individuals.
When confronted with health information regarding the health consequences of the health
attributes and the recommended allowance, higher educated individuals hardly changed
their valuation of the attributes, while lower educated individuals strongly responded.
Providing health information substantially reduced the disparities in the valuation of
the health attributes, and suggests that health information/health knowledge is a key
contributor to education disparities in diet.
The second message that derives from our results is that, even conditional on the most
explicit health information (that is, individuals know exactly which meal is healthy and
which one is unhealthy), and conditional on the price and time inputs in meal preparation,
higher educated individual still have a higher valuation of the health consequences. In
other words, conditional on health knowledge, higher educated individuals simply care
more about their health. Auxiliary analyses suggest that at least part of these differences
in the marginal value of health derive from higher incomes among the higher educated.
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This result is consistent with theory, where higher educated individuals earn higher wages,
accumulate more income, and because of diminishing marginal utility of consumption,
start putting a higher marginal value on their health.
One major concern of stated preference data is hypothetical response bias (Loomis,
2011; Hausman, 2012). While this is an unavoidable limitation of any stated preference
approach, we argue that the specific criticism applies mostly to the exact size of the
estimated coefficients, and does not interfere with our aim of understanding education
disparities in diet. Firstly, the mixed logit model we apply in our estimations allows
extracting the individual-level stated preferences for healthy food attributes. Correlating
these individual stated preferences to actual healthy food choices shows strong predictive
power: stated preferences are predictive for revealed preferences. Second, we are careful
not to interpret the actual size of the coefficients and implied WTP values, as these are
likely to be biased. We do compare the relative magnitudes of the coefficients, which
is less problematic since there is no evidence for systematic differences in hypothetical
biases across education groups.
The food choice setting we investigate is the choice for a dinner meal. Arguably,
the time lapse between the choice and actual consumption of dinner is sufficiently long
for our rational decision framework to be applicable. In contrast, for snacks and in fast
food contexts, it is established that impulses, self-control, and craving play an important
role (e.g. Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). In these contexts, our rational model could serve
as the ‘long-run self’ or ‘cool state’, while an additional ‘short-run self’ or ‘hot state’
(Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Fudenberg & Levine, 2006) would have to be added in order
to accommodate the temptations associated with the consumption of snacks and other
fast food.
We do not attempt to estimate the causal effect of education on diet. Hence, the
education disparities in diet, and variations in health knowledge and the value of health,
are likely to reflect variables correlated to educational attainment, such as cognitive and
non-cognitive abilities (e.g. Conti et al., 2010). Instead, the analysis in this paper reveals
mechanisms through which education, and its correlates, impact on food choices, which
is an essential input into any policy discussion on encouraging healthy diets.
The implications of our results are threefold. First, with the caveat that the point
estimates should be interpreted with caution, the results allow for some counterfactual
simulations to gauge what it requires to make the lower educated eat healthier diets.
There exists a widespread notion that healthy meals are expensive, inconvenient, and
usually not very tasty. In contrast, unhealthy meals are generally cheap, tasty and
convenient. One interesting counterfactual is what the tax should be on an unhealthy,
tasty, and convenient meal in order to make lower educated individuals switch to a healthy
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and inconvenient meal that is not so tasty. Our results suggest that the price of the
unhealthy alternative should be at least 6 Euros, representing an enormous 200 percent
additional tax compared with an assumed baseline price of 2 Euros. If healthy meals
were more convenient (that is, reducing the preparation time from 50 to 10 minutes),
the indifference price would still have to be 4 Euros, which implies a 100 percent tax.
Therefore, our results suggest that while taxes on unhealthy food and the availability of
convenient healthy food would make healthier options more attractive for lower educated
individuals, the required taxes and time gains would have to be implausibly large to make
these options equally attractive as a tasty, cheap, quick and unhealthy meal.
Second, the provision of health information significantly increased the marginal value
attached to the health consequences of food, especially among lower educated individu-
als. The assumption of perfect information is clearly rejected by the data. This is in line
with the results of Downs et al. (2009), Roberto et al. (2010), Wisdom et al. (2010) and
Bollinger et al. (2011), who all find that calorie labeling reduced the amount of calories
ordered and consumed. Arguably, disparities in diet that result from lack of information,
jointly with the large external medical costs of obesity (Cawley & Meyerhoefer, 2012),
and potential self-control issues (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991), could give a justification
for policy intervention. The first movements in this regard are already made (e.g. Guid-
ingstars.com). The findings of this study suggest that health warnings may be a more
promising alternative than the introduction of taxes to promote healthy diets among the
lower educated, not just in terms of calories, but also in terms of salt and fat, and outside
of fast-food settings.
A third implication is that, even with the most explicit health information possible,
education disparities in food choices will remain. The empirical finding that conditional
on health information, and a standard set of demographic characteristics, higher educated
individuals value health consequences more is consistent with the theoretical prediction
that the marginal value of health is positively influenced by educational attainment.
The disparities in food choice, as well as more general health behavior, that derive from
disparities in the marginal value of health are the result of free, albeit constrained, choices.
For the part of disparities that results from disparities in the marginal value of health,
policy intervention is unlikely to be successful. In fact, it may even be welfare reducing,
unless the deeper causes of variation in the marginal value of health are tackled, which
seems a heroic task.
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Tables
Table 4.1: Example choice set – Scenario I
Meal A Meal B
Price 2 Euro 6 Euro
Time 10 min. 30 min.
Taste OK Very good
Calories 1400 calories 800 calories
Saturated Fat 10 gr. 30 gr.
Sodium 1200 mg. 900 mg.
Table 4.2: Example choice set – Scenario II
Meal A Meal B
Price 2 Euro 6 Euro
Time 10 min. 30 min.
Taste OK Very Good
Calories 1400 calories 800 calories
Saturated Fat 10 gr. 30 gr.
Sodium 1200 mg. 900 mg.
The recommended intake for a dinner is 800 calo-
ries, 10 gram saturated fat, and 900 milligram
sodium.
Table 4.3: Example choice set – Scenario III
Meal A Meal B
Price 6 Euro 10 Euro
Time 50 min. 30 min.
Taste Very Good Good
Health consequences Unhealthy Health Neutral
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Table 4.4: Distribution of respondent characteristics across scenarios
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Age 51.25 50.94 51.89
Male 0.47 0.48 0.47
Education=High 0.37 0.33 0.30
Health=Good 0.81 0.81 0.80
Health knowledge=High 0.45 0.46 0.44
Income=High 0.50 0.52 0.47
Future orientation=High 0.41 0.44 0.43
Currently on (any kind of) diet 0.15 0.16 0.14
Frequently go to a restaurant 0.00 0.01 0.00
Frequently eat fruits 0.82 0.81 0.81
Frequently eat vegetables 0.94 0.96 0.96
Frequently eat candy 0.35 0.33 0.34
Frequently drink soda 0.31 0.28 0.29
Frequently snack 0.16 0.15 0.13
No. of respondents 974 917 978
Notes: Mean values are reported. High education refers to having completed higher
vocational education or university with a diploma. Good health is self reported health
as very good or excellent (measured in a separate wave, number of respondents is 736,
683 and 725 in scenarios I, II and III, respectively). High health knowledge is having
answered a higher number of health knowledge questions correctly than the median re-
spondent. High income refers to an income level above that of the median respondent
in the sample. High future orientation indicates (strong) disagreement with the state-
ment “Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take
care of itself”. Frequently is defined as at least 3-4 times per week.
Table 4.5: Distribution of dietary habits and health knowledge across education
groups
Low educated High educated
Dietary habits
Frequently eat fruits 0.79 0.86
Frequently eat vegetables 0.95 0.97
Frequently eat candy 0.32 0.38
Frequently drink soda 0.31 0.27
Frequently snack 0.14 0.16
Health knowledge
Health knowledge=High 0.39 0.58
No. of correct answers to health questions 7.54 8.61
No. of respondents 1,916 953
Notes: Mean values are reported. We define frequently as at least 3-4 times per week. High
health knowledge is having answered more than the median number of questions correctly.
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Table 4.6: Health and dietary knowledge items - Percentage of respondents reporting the
correct answer
Low educated High educated
Even in the absence of overweight, poor diet is associated
with cardiovascular disease, hypertension, and type 2 dia-
betes. (True)
89.35% 91.50%
There are health benefits of limiting those foods which con-
tain high levels of added sugar such as soft drinks, cordial
and biscuits. (True)
87.42% 92.24%
Overconsumption of sodium can lead to hypertension and
heart diseases. (True)
77.09% 87.09%
Depending on age and physical activity level, experts rec-
ommend that an adult male should consume around 2500
calories, and an adult female should consume around 2000
calories, per day. (True)
68.89% 78.80%
Consumption of fruits and vegetables is associated with re-
duced risk of many chronic diseases. (True)
68.68% 79.01%
Sodium is a form of sugar. (False) 64.41% 81.43%
Meat, chicken, fish and eggs should make up the largest part
of our diet. (False)
64.87% 79.01%
Experts advise to eat a variety of vegetables, especially dark
green, red and orange vegetables. (True)
66.49% 65.06%
Choosing wholemeal bread provides no health benefits.
(False)
62.00% 71.14%
A high intake of saturated fat can protect against heart dis-
eases. (False)
49.32% 64.74%
According to experts around 30 percent of the calories in a
day should come from saturated fat. (False)
36.01% 50.05%
For a healthy adult it is recommended to limit sodium intake
at dinner to at most 1500 mg. (False)
19.26% 20.99%
No. of respondents 1,916 953
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Table 4.7: Coefficient estimates from mixed logit models with all normally distributed
coefficients
No health info. Health info. Explicit health info.
Price – Baseline is 2 Euro
6 euro Mean coefficient -0.516∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗ -0.682∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.383∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.088)
10 euro Mean coefficient -1.341∗∗∗ -1.121∗∗∗ -1.797∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.074)
Std. dev. of coefficient 1.190∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗ 1.511∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.056)
Time – Baseline is 10 minutes
30 min. Mean coefficient -0.087∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.133∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.064
(0.069) (0.076) (0.069)
50 min. Mean coefficient -0.537∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗ -0.987∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.054) (0.055)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.935∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.046)
Taste – Baseline is “OK”
Good Mean coefficient 0.661∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.129∗∗ 0.057 0.004
(0.057) (0.053) (0.057)
Very good Mean coefficient 1.066∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.744∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.043) (0.048)
Calories – Baseline is 800 cals.
1100 calories Mean coefficient -0.447∗∗∗ -0.632∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.026 0.013
(0.049) (0.050)
1400 calories Mean coefficient -0.967∗∗∗ -1.179∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.044)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.753∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗
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(0.040) (0.042)
Saturated Fat – Baseline is 10 gram
20 gram Mean coefficient -0.210∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.043 0.054
(0.043) (0.048)
30 gram Mean coefficient -0.488∗∗∗ -0.629∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.034)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.243∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.052)
Sodium – Baseline is 900 milligram
1200 mg. Mean coefficient -0.330∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.016 0.002
(0.046) (0.045)
1500 mg. Mean coefficient -0.695∗∗∗ -0.971∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.037)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.561∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.042)
Health consequences – Baseline is “Unhealthy”
Health neutral Mean coefficient 2.611∗∗∗
(0.061)
Std. dev. of coefficient 0.168∗∗
(0.067)
Healthy Mean coefficient 3.771∗∗∗
(0.093)
Std. dev. of coefficient 1.182∗∗∗
(0.056)
No. of observations 35,064 33,012 35,208
No. of respondents 974 917 978
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Table 4.8: Average marginal effects calculated from mixed logit models with all
normally distributed coefficients
No health info. Health info. Explicit health info.
Price=6 euro -0.084∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Price=10 euro -0.206∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Time=30 min. -0.014∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Time=50 min. -0.090∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Taste=good 0.106∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Taste=very good 0.172∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Calories=1100 cals. -0.072∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Calories=1400 cals. -0.156∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011)
Saturated fat=20 gr. -0.034∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Saturated fat=30 gr. -0.079∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Sodium=1200 mg. -0.053∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Sodium=1500 mg. -0.113∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009)
Health conseq.=neutral 0.334∗∗∗
(0.009)
Health conseq.=healthy 0.454∗∗∗
(0.013)
No. of observations 35,064 33,012 35,208
No. of respondents 974 917 978
Notes: Omitted categories: Price: 2 euro, Time: 10 min., Taste: OK, Calories: 800 cals., Satu-
rated fat: 10 gr., Sodium: 900 mg., Health: Unhealthy. Standard errors are obtained by using
100 bootstrap iterations and reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4.10: Determinants of the value of health
Base W/ Income W/ Future W/ Health Full Base r/s
Education 0.118∗ 0.083 0.108∗ 0.129∗ 0.090 0.133∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Age 0.020∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.020∗ 0.012 0.010 0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Age-squared -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.167∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Diet 0.072 0.061 0.065 0.123 0.106 0.113
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Income 0.209∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.069)
Future 0.080 0.057
(0.060) (0.069)
Health 0.119 0.116
(0.086) (0.086)
No. of observations 978 978 978 725 725 725
Notes: Dependent variable is the vector of individual-specific coefficients on the attribute level “Healthy” from
the mixed logit model, estimated for scenario III. Column “Base” refers to the baseline specification which in-
cludes demographic variables, education, age and gender, and diet status. Columns “W/ Income”, “W/Future”,
“W/Health” add income, measure of future orientation and self-reported health status to the base specification,
respectively. Column “Full” is the full specification which includes all controls at the same time. Since self-
reported health is not available for everyone, column “Base r/s” estimates the base model for the sub-sample of
respondents whose health status is available. See Section 4.4.2 for all variable descriptions. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Appendix 4.A First-order conditions
Associated with the Lagrangian (equation 4.6) we have the following conditions:
∂=
∂Xh
= 0⇒
∂U
∂Ch
= µ
pXh
∂Ch/∂Xh
− λ(E) ∂H
∗
∂Ch
[
∂U
∂H
− µw(E) ∂s
∂H
]
, (4.18)
∂=
∂τCh
= 0⇒
∂U
∂Ch
= µ
w(E)
∂Ch/∂τCh
− λ(E) ∂H
∗
∂Ch
[
∂U
∂H
− µw(E) ∂s
∂H
]
(4.19)
∂=
∂Xu
= 0⇒
∂U
∂Cu
= µ
pXu
∂Cu/∂Xu
− λ(E) ∂H
∗
∂Cu
[
∂U
∂H
− µw(E) ∂s
∂H
]
, (4.20)
∂=
∂τCu
= 0⇒
∂U
∂Cu
= µ
w(E)
∂Cu/∂τCu
− λ(E) ∂H
∗
∂Cu
[
∂U
∂H
− µw(E) ∂s
∂H
]
(4.21)
Equations (4.18) and (4.19) provide the first-order condition for healthy consumption
(4.7). Similarly, equations (4.20) and (4.21) provide the first-order condition for unhealthy
consumption (4.10).
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Appendix 4.B Experimental design
Selection of attribute levels
All attributes have three evenly-spaced levels, with the objective of drawing a balance
between cognitive burden on the respondents and flexibility while estimating attribute
importance (Mangham et al., 2009). Selected levels should not only be realistic, but also
their range should be as wide as possible in order to prevent respondents from ignoring
certain attributes due to insufficient variation in their levels (Hensher, 2006).
For attribute “price”, the lowest level, 2 Euros, is consistent with a cheap but still
realistic home-cooked dinner. The average price per person for a home-cooked meal in a
2-person household is calculated as 2.37 Euro in the Netherlands (NIBUD, 2014). The
middle category, 6 Euros, reflects either a more luxurious home-cooked meal or a ready-
to-serve processed meal from the supermarket. According to the authors’ calculations
on the basis of the website of the largest Dutch supermarket Albert Heijn (www.ah.nl),
processed meals at Dutch supermarkets typically cost between 3 and 6 Euros. The top-
level, 10 Euros, would correspond to a home-cooked meal prepared with very luxurious
ingredients or more typically to a standard take-away meal. Authors’ calculations from
the main Dutch food delivery website (www.thuisbezorgd.nl) reveal the average price of
take-away or home-delivery meals in the Netherlands to be around 10 Euros.
We follow Kamphuis et al. (2015) while determining the levels for attributes “taste”
and “time”. Kamphuis et al. (2015) have experimented with different levels for the
attribute “taste” in pilot studies and concluded that setting the level of taste for an
option to “non-tasty” causes all other attributes of this option to be ignored. This can
be because individuals require a meal that is at least “OK” in terms of taste before
starting to consider other attributes. Therefore, we choose “OK‘” as the minimum level
of tastiness a meal can have in our experiment.
Kamphuis et al. (2015) divide attribute “time” into two components as travel time (to
the grocery store) and preparation time. Their analyses have proven this distinction to be
relatively unimportant. Therefore we decide to combine travel time and preparation time
into one attribute and determine the levels on basis of the sum of travel and preparation
time.
Regarding the health attributes we equate the lowest level for each attribute to its
respective recommended intake level since the Dutch population is known to overconsume
calories, saturated fat and sodium, on average (Van Rossum et al., 2011). The middle
levels coincides roughly with the average intake levels, while the highest levels fall within
the 95th percentile of the regular intake distribution. For “calories”, we choose the
levels 800 calories, 1100 calories, and 1400 calories. The daily recommended intake is
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2000 calories for women, and 2500 calories for men. Given that dinner, on average,
makes up for 36 percent of total calorie consumption (Van Rossum et al., 2011), the
recommended caloric intake for dinner is about 720 calories for women and 900 calories
for men. Taking an average implies an average recommended caloric intake of 800 for
dinner, which comprises our lowest level. 1100 calories corresponds to an average dinner,
while 1400 calories represents a high-calorie dinner, but is still realistic and corresponds
roughly to the 95th percentile (total calories for men in the 95th percentile are around
3,700, of which 36 percent is between 1,300 and 1,400 calories for dinner Van Rossum et
al., 2011).
For attribute “saturated fat”, we choose the levels 10 gram, 20 gram, and 30 gram.
The recommended daily intake of saturated fat is 24 gram for an average 2200 total
calorie intake (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 2005), yet saturated fat is highly overconsumed. At dinner, 42 percent of
fat is consumed (Van Rossum et al., 2011). 42 percent of 24 gram implies around 10
gram, which forms our lowest level. To generate wide, evenly-spaced, but still realistic
levels the remaining levels are set at 20 and 30 gram (the 95th percentile for Dutch men
is 56 gram of saturated fat per day, Van Rossum et al., 2011). For “sodium” the daily
recommended intake is currently 2400 milligram (U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
2012). Around 36 percent of salt is consumed for dinner, which implies (2400*0.36)
around 900 milligram, which is set as our lowest level. Average daily intake for Dutch
men and women is around 3500 milligram of sodium, which corresponds to around 1200
milligram at dinner, which comprises our middle level. Using evenly spaced levels, the
highest level is correspondingly set at 1500 milligram, which is still realistic.
Design inputs and priors
In this subsection the experimental design is presented, with a discussion of the choices
regarding input and priors.
Scenarios I and II We generate a design with two alternatives (alt1 and alt2), with
in total 90 choice sets (rows) divided in 5 blocks. We use a Multinomial Logit Model
(mnl) to generate the design. While ideally the design reflects the ultimate model to be
estimated, the generation of 90 choice sets using a panel mixed logit specification with
Bayesian priors is infeasible given the computational complexity (Bliemer & Rose, 2010,
p. 732; Rose & Bliemer, 2013). Instead, we opt for the cross-sectional multinomial logit
model with Bayesian priors to generate our design. While this seems like a large departure
from a panel mixed logit model, numerous case studies and simulations show that there
is only a slight loss in efficiency, and the performance of cross-sectional multinomial logit
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is better than cross-sectional mixed logit if the true model is panel mixed logit (Bliemer
& Rose, 2010).24
The algorithm minimizes the median D-error, uses row swapping, and we set the
convergence criterion such that convergence is achieved if no improvement is found in
60 minutes. Since one iteration takes around 0.5 seconds, this implies that 60 minutes
handles around 7200 iterations.
Table 4.B.1: Prior specification for Scenario I and II
Price – Base: 10 Euros
2 Euros N(0.64; 0.068)
6 Euros N(0.32; 0.034)
Taste – Base: OK’
Very Good N(0.06; 0.012)
Excellent N(0.26; 0.052)
Time – Base: 50 minutes
10 minutes N(0.4; 0.043)
30 minutes N(0.2; 0.021)
Calories – Base: 1400
800 calories N(0.2; 0.021)
1100 calories N(0.1; 0.011)
Sodium – Base: 1500 milligram
900 milligram N(0.1; 0.011)
1200 milligram N(0.05; 0.005)
Saturated Fat – Base: 30 gram
10 gram N(0.1; 0.011)
20 gram N(0.05; 0.005)
Notes: N(µ;σ) refers to a normal distribution with
mean µ and standard deviation σ.
Since we have an unlabeled design, all parameters are generic across the alternatives,
and there is no constant specified (Hensher et al., 2005, p. 151). The prior values of
the parameters are set using bayesian priors using 1000 Halton draws from a normal
distribution given in Appendix Table 4.B.1. The mean values are, where possible, based
on Kamphuis et al. (2015). For price they use a continuous specification with coefficient
-0.08. Using 10 Euro as the baseline category, this translates into a prior of 0.64 for 2
Euro and 0.32 for 6 Euro. The standard deviations of the priors are set such that the
24 Bliemer & Rose (2010) explain this finding by noting that cross-sectional multinomial logit assumes
all observations are from the same person, while cross-sectional mixed logit assumes that all observations
are from distinct individuals. The panel mixed logit model is in between, where a single respondent
answers a subset of the questions. In our case the subset of questions answered by a given respondent
is pretty large, 18, so theoretically the panel mixed logit is better approximated by the cross-sectional
multinomial logit rather than the cross-sectional mixed logit model.
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order of the levels U [price = 2] > U [price = 6] > U [price = 10] is maintained in 99.9
percent of the cases. The critical value of the normal distribution corresponding to 99.9
percent certainty is z0.999 = 3.1. Since it seems plausible that the standard deviation is
proportional to the mean, for price this implies finding the minimum value k that satisfies
0.64− 3.1× 0.64
k
> 0.32− 3.1× 0.32
k
> 0
which gives k = 9.4. Therefore, the standard deviation for 2 Euro is set at 0.64/9.4 =
0.068 and for 6 Euro it is set at 0.32/9.4 = 0.034.
With respect to time, Kamphuis et al. (2015) used the separate attributes travel time
(coefficient -0.02) and preparation time (coefficient 0.00). We have one attribute for time,
and decided to take the average of the coefficients, -0.01. Taking 50 minutes as baseline
category, 10 minutes has a prior mean of -0.4, while 30 minutes has a prior of -0.2. With
respect to taste, we could directly incorporate the estimates of 0.26 and 0.06, respectively.
The standard deviations are set in a similar way as for price.
The priors for the three attributes calories, sodium and saturated fat are more un-
certain, and we cannot base them on previous literature. Our prior was that calories
are deemed more important compared to saturated fat and sodium, since apart from the
health consequences calories may be associated with a weight control motive (Cawley,
2004; Lakdawalla & Philipson, 2009). Therefore, the priors for calories are set slightly
higher than the ones for sodium and saturated fat, with standard deviations set following
the practice for price.
Scenario III Scenario III contains 4 attributes, each with 3 levels. This implies that
the full factorial requires 34 = 81 choice sets. Using 90 choice sets divided into 5 blocks of
18 implies that for scenario III we are able to identify the full factorial, if necessary. Since
scenario III is very similar to the study by Kamphuis et al. (2015), we set the mean of
our Bayesian prior values equal to their parameter estimates, while standard deviations
are again set such that sign reversals are avoided, and the ordering of attribute levels is
maintained, in 99.9 percent of the cases.
The priors for price, time, and taste are set equal to their levels in scenario I. The
priors for health consequences are mean 1.17 and standard deviation 0.244 for “healthy”
and mean 0.24 and standard deviation 0.05 for “health neutral”. All standard deviations
are set such that the logical order of the attribute levels is maintained in 99.9 percent of
the cases, as explained for the coefficient of price in scenario I and II.
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Introductory text
Scenario I In this questionnaire we try to understand your food choice behavior. Please
respond as honestly as possible and avoid socially desirable answers.
Imagine it is a typical day and you are going to have a usual dinner at home. Depend-
ing on your habits, you can cook, you can order take out, or you can buy ready-made
food from the grocery store. Eating out is no option. If you often visit a restaurant,
we ask you to imagine a day where you would eat dinner at home. In the remainder of
this questionnaire we will present you 18 times two meals, and we would like to know:
“Which of these two meals would you eat regularly, i.e. at least twice a week?”
The two meals differ in terms of their taste, price, preparation time, calorie content,
saturated fat content, and sodium content. These attributes are explained below.
1. Taste: How does the meal taste? Is it (i) ok, i.e. does not taste distinctly good or
bad, (ii) good, i.e. tastes pretty good, or (iii) very good, i.e. tastes very good?
2. Price: How much does the meal cost per person? Think about the total cost of
the ingredients if it is a self-made dish. Consider the total amount you pay if it is
take-out or ready-made food. Cost per person can be (i) 2 Euros, (ii) 6 Euros, or
(iii) 10 Euros.
3. Time: How much time does it take before the meal is on your plate – include both
travel to the grocery store and preparation time? Total preparation time can be (i)
10 minutes, (ii) 30 minutes, or (iii) 50 minutes.
4. Calories: What is the energy content of the meal in terms of calories? The meal
can contain (i) 800 calories, (ii) 1100 calories, or (iii) 1400 calories.
5. Saturated Fat: How many grams of saturated fat does the meal contain? The meal
can contain (i) 10 gram, (ii) 20 gram, or (iii) 30 gram of saturated fat.
6. Sodium: How many grams of sodium does the meal contain? The meal can contain
(i) 900 milligram, (ii) 1200 milligram, or (iii) 1500 milligram of sodium.
Assume all other characteristics of the meals are the same, e.g. they are equally filling,
biological, fair-trade, contain equal amount of carbohydrates and proteins etc. Below you
find an example choice set. You do not have to answer this one.
Scenario II Scenario II is identical to scenario I except that descriptions of health
attributes – calories, saturated fat, sodium – are supplemented with some health infor-
mation:
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4. Calories: What is the energy content of the meal in terms of calories? Intake of too
much calories can lead to overweight, cardiovascular diseases, and type II diabetes.
The average recommended intake for calories is around 800 for a dinner meal. The
meal can contain (i) 800 calories, (ii) 1100 calories, or (iii) 1400 calories.
5. Saturated Fat: How many grams of saturated fat does the meal contain? Eating too
many grams of saturated fat is bad for one’s health, and can lead to cardiovascular
diseases and high cholesterol. The recommended intake for saturated fat at a dinner
is at most 10 gram. The meal can contain (i) 10 gram, (ii) 20 gram, or (iii) 30 gram
of saturated fat.
6. Sodium: How many grams of sodium does the meal contain? Salt contains sodium.
Eating too much sodium is bad for health and can lead to high blood pressure and
cardiovascular disease. The recommend intake for dinner is at most 900 milligram.
The meal can contain (i) 900 milligram, (ii) 1200 milligram, or (iii) 1500 milligram
of sodium.
Scenario III Scenario III follows scenario I yet replaces the three health attributes
with the single attribute “health consequences”:
4. Health consequences: How healthy is the alternative? The meal can be (i) healthy,
i.e. associated with reduced risk of disease, (ii) health neutral, or (iii) unhealthy,
i.e. associated with increased risk of disease.
Appendix 4.C Design for Amazon Mechanical Turk
The design of Amazon Mechanical Turk survey is the same as the original survey design
as explained in the previous section, apart from some slight differences. First of all, since
we are only interested in identifying the main effects, we generated an efficient design
which picks the 18 – instead of 90 as in the original design – most informative choice
sets, based on the criteria explained in Section 4.3.3. After careful consideration of the
differences between the Netherlands and the United States in terms of price level and
consumption habits, we decided to keep all attribute levels as they are, and only replaced
euros with dollars.
We generated four different scenarios, each with 18 identical choice sets. The first two
scenarios are identical to the original design where we provide respondents in the first
scenario (“no information”) with no information, and in the second scenario (“health
information”) with health information on the recommended daily amounts of calories,
saturated fat and sodium. In the third scenario (“time information”), we supplemented all
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Table 4.C.1: Example choice set MTurk Scenario III
Meal A Meal B
Price 2 dollars 6 dollars
Time 10 min 50 min
Taste Very good OK
Calories 1400 calories 1100 calories
Sodium 1500 mg 1200 mg
Saturated Fat 10 gram 30 gram
If you spend 10(50) minutes on preparing food, you cannot
do anything else in those 10(50) minutes.
choice sets with the uninformative sentence “If you spend 10/30/50 minutes on preparing
food, you can not do anything else in those 10/30/50 minutes”. Appendix Table 4.C.1
illustrates an example choice set. The idea behind the time information scenario is making
the time attribute salient by giving the respondents a sentence about time, but keeping
the information content of the sentence at zero. Comparison of the three scenarios will
tell us the driving source behind our main result: salience or information.
In the last scenario, we replaced the name of the attribute taste with sensory Appeal
to see whether it makes a difference to describe sensory appeal of the meal in broader
terms. We described this new attribute in the introductory text as the following:
1. Sensory appeal: How does the meal taste, look and smell? Is it (i) OK (not distinctly
good or bad) (ii) Good (iii) Very good?
To monitor whether our respondents are indeed paying attention and not speeding
through questions, we added two attention checks to our survey – one after the 9th choice
set, and one, at the end, after the 18th choice set. The first attention check is shown in
Appendix Table 4.C.2, and takes the form of a choice set with an objectively dominant
alternative. Meal B is cheaper, tastier, and takes less time to prepare. Health related
attributes are kept the same for both meals to avoid heterogeneity in dietary preferences
leading to controversy over which alternative is dominant. Respondents who chose Meal
A are not shown the rest of the survey and their responses have been discarded.
The second attention check tests whether respondents read the instructions, and goes
as follows:
Recent research on decision making shows that choices are affected by con-
text. Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and experi-
ence, and their environment can affect choices. To help us understand how
people make decisions, we are interested in information about you. Specif-
ically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the
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Table 4.C.2: Attention check for Scenario I
Meal A Meal B
Price 10 dollars 6 dollars
Time 30 min 10 min
Taste OK Good
Calories 1100 calories 1100 calories
Sodium 1200 mg 1200 mg
Saturated Fat 20 gram 20 gram
directions; if not, some results may not tell us very much about decision
making in the real world. To show that you have read the instructions,
please ignore the question below about how you are feeling and instead
check only the ”none of the above” option as your answer. Thank you very
much.
Please check all words that describe how you are currently feeling.
• Interested
• Distressed
• Excited
• Upset
• Strong
• Guilty
• Scared
• Hostile
• Enthusiastic
• Proud
• Irritable
• Alert
• Ashamed
• Inspired
• Nerveous
• Determined
• Attentive
• Jittery
• Active
• Afraid
• None of the above
Respondents who fail to choose “none of the above” or choose other other options
besides none of the above are screened out of the survey and their responses are discarded.
At the end of the survey, we collected background information on the respondents’
gender, race, level of education and income, household size.
MTurk respondents come from 190 different countries, India and United States being
the two biggest pools. Thinking that the U.S., rather than India, is more similar to
the Netherlands in terms of price levels and life styles, we chose to restrict our pool of
respondents to individuals residing in the United States. To keep the original and MTurk
samples as similar as possible, we did not let respondents below the age of 18 participate
in our survey. Each respondent is randomly assigned to one of the four scenarios, where
(s)he answers 18 randomly presented choice sets. We prevented the same individual from
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participating in more than one scenario. Moreover respondents who fail an attention
check were not allowed to come back again.
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Appendix 4.D Additional Tables
Table 4.D.1: WTP estimates derived from mixed logit models with non-random
price coefficient
No health info. Health info. Explicit health info.
Time=10 min. 2.90 3.74 4.30
(0.27) (0.31) (0.20)
Time=30 min 2.64 2.59 2.87
(0.24) (0.27) (0.17)
Taste=good 4.29 3.77 1.94
(0.23) (0.25) (0.15)
Taste=very good 6.84 6.23 4.16
(0.32) (0.33) (0.19)
Calories=800 cals. 6.23 8.83
(0.32) (0.44)
Calories=1100 cals. 3.15 3.90
(0.21) (0.25)
Saturated fat=10 gr. 3.10 4.69
(0.24) (0.32)
Saturated fat=20 gr. 1.78 3.13
(0.20) (0.25)
Sodium=900 mg. 4.91 7.27
(0.30) (0.42)
Sodium=1200 mg. 2.35 3.26
(0.21) (0.25)
Health conseq.=neutral 11.94
(0.33)
Health conseq.=healthy 17.52
(0.49)
No. of observations 35,064 33,012 35,208
No. of respondents 974 917 978
Notes: Estimates obtained from a mixed logit model where attribute “price” enters linearly
and has a fixed coefficient. The WTP is the ratio of the coefficient on the relevant attribute to
the coefficient on the price attribute (e.g. Train, 2009). Omitted categories: Time: 50 minutes.,
Taste: OK., Calories: 1400 cals., Saturated fat: 30 gr., Sodium: 1500 mg., Health: Unhealthy.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Chapter 5
Behavioral Response to Chronic
Health Conditions
Chronic diseases are the most common and costly of all the problems. Upon diagnosis,
basic lifestyle changes such as quitting smoking, cutting back on alcohol, losing weight and
getting physically active are strongly recommended by health care providers to alleviate
future medical consequences. In this paper we use 8 biennial waves of the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1999 and 2013 to study the short- and long-term
evolution of smoking, alcohol consumption, physical exercise and weight status in response
to a new diagnosis with high blood pressure, diabetes, cardiovascular disease and cancer.
Our findings suggest that diagnosed individuals only partially adapt their lifestyles to
recommended changes. For the majority of the chronic diseases that we study, people
quit smoking and stop drinking after a diagnosis. However, we do not observe that they
lose weight (except for diabetes) and increase their physical activity level.
This chapter is based upon:
Hullegie, P. and Koc¸, H. (2015). Behavioral Response to Chronic Health Conditions. (Mimeo).
Erasmus University Rotterdam.
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5.1 Introduction
This paper examines whether people change their health behaviors after having been diag-
nosed with a new chronic condition, like diabetes or hypertension. In 2012, an estimated
38 million deaths or 68 percent of all deaths were due to chronic diseases, making them the
leading cause of death around the globe (World Health Organization, 2014). According
to the World Health Organization, more than 40 percent of these deaths were premature,
and most of the time preventable. Medical evidence demonstrates that mortality and
morbidity from chronic conditions can be greatly reduced via lifestyle modifications like
quitting smoking, limiting alcohol consumption, increasing physical activity, and chang-
ing dietary composition (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1990; Mancia
et al., 2013).
Given the benefits, a new diagnosis with a chronic condition comes with a consider-
able amount of information/advice on health promoting lifestyle changes. For example,
individuals newly diagnosed with hypertension are advised by their doctors to lower their
sodium intake, exercise regularly and maintain a healthy weight (American Heart Associ-
ation, 2014b). Similarly, newly diagnosed diabetics are advised to lower their calorie and
fat intake, quit smoking, decrease alcohol consumption, and increase physical activity
(Franz et al., 2002).1 Moreover, the information conveyed through doctors is personal-
ized. It is directed specifically to the patient in a face-to-face consultation, and is tailored
to his needs whenever possible (such as setting a target weight or making a smoking ces-
sation plan). It is also repetitive due to regular contact with the health care system
for check-ups. It has been demonstrated that better knowledge on the relation between
health behaviors and health outcomes leads to a healthier lifestyle (Kenkel, 1991), there-
fore the recommendations highlight the role of health behaviors in shaping future health
outcomes. Apart from lifestyle recommendations, a new diagnosis informs an individual
about his true health status. For instance, after a heart attack, an individual may realize
he is not as healthy as he thought and take this as a wake-up call for change. As a result
of the diagnosis, an individual may also update his beliefs about the health consequences
of his past health behaviors (K. V. Smith et al., 2001; Khwaja et al., 2006). Altogether,
diagnosis of a new chronic illness can be thought of as a strong information treatment at
the individual level which carries the potential to trigger a behavioral response.
However, besides information, there may be two additional factors that might influ-
ence health behaviors after a new diagnosis: (i) the physical constraints and physiological
1 These lifestyle modifications are evidence based and endorsed by independent expert panels like the
United States Preventive Services Task Force. However, there may be heterogeneity among doctors in
recommendation behavior (Frank & Kunovichfrieze, 1995). We do not have information on what happens
during a doctor-patient consultation.
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changes arising from the condition and (ii) medication. For example, an individual who
had a (severe) stroke or cancer may be physically limited in the amount of exercise that
he can carry out. It is also well known that certain commonly prescribed drugs to treat
chronic disease may induce weight loss/gain (Leslie et al., 2007). These alternative ex-
planations may be more relevant for some health behaviors, such as BMI and exercise,
than for others, such as smoking and alcohol consumption as the latter requires less health
capital. Despite these alternative explanations, the existing literature, in particular Slade
(2012) and Oster (2015), emphasize the role of information in generating behavior change
after a new diagnosis.
Analyzing two repeated cross sections of the NHANES from 1976–1980 and 1988–
1994, Kahn (1999) concludes that diagnosed diabetics are in general making healthier
choices compared to diabetics who are not yet aware of their condition, highlighting the
value of information. He finds that diagnosed diabetics smoke and drink less, consume
fewer sugar products and drink more diet drinks than their non-diagnosed counterparts.
Clark & Etile (2002) use the British Household Panel between 1991 and 1997 to study
changes in smoking behavior in response to health changes. They find that smokers who
experienced a deterioration in their own self-assessed health are more likely to quit or
lower cigarette consumption in the future. However, there is no response when other
smoking members of the household start to have health problems. The authors take this
finding as a sign for the larger potential of personalized, targeted information in pro-
moting change rather than providing impersonal, aggregate level information. Using the
1992 to 2008 biennial waves of HRS, Slade (2012) evaluates the role of a new diagnosis
and medication in inducing behavioral change among diabetics 50 years and older. He
finds that relative to pre-diabetics, i.e., non-diagnosed individuals with elevated levels of
blood sugar, diagnosed diabetics initially increase exercise, lose weight, and curb smok-
ing and drinking. However, the increase in exercise and the reduction in weight are only
temporary. Oster (2015) employs household scanner data to investigate the effect of a
diabetes diagnosis on food purchases. She estimates that households engage in minor,
although statistically significant calorie reductions in response to a new diagnosis. During
the month immediately after the diagnosis, individuals adjust their purchases in accor-
dance with the doctor’s advice: i.e. an increase in fruits and vegetables consumption
and a decrease in unhealthy foods. In the longer term, the decrease in unhealthy food
consumption persists, while the increase in healthy food consumption does not.
In this paper we study the short- and long-term evolution of smoking, alcohol con-
sumption, physical exercise and weight status, in response to a new diagnosis with high
blood pressure, diabetes, cardiovascular disease – heart attack, heart disease and stroke –
and cancer. A key challenge in identifying the effect of a new chronic disease is the issue
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of whether the diagnosis can be considered as an unanticipated event. J. P. Smith (1999)
argues that much of the actual realization and especially the timing of the diagnosis is
unanticipated. However, he also adds that, to increase confidence in such an analysis,
predictors of new diagnoses should be included in the model. We therefore analyze the
effects of a new diagnosis with a chronic disease in the context of an individual-level
fixed effects model. The individual fixed effects help in controlling for permanent unob-
servable characteristics that determine who experiences an onset, such as family history,
and (conditional on onset) who receives a diagnosis, such as health consciousness. We
further control for time-varying characteristics, such as age, and pre-diagnosis health be-
haviors. The identifying assumption here is that, given the set of controls, diagnosis of
a new chronic condition is an unanticipated health shock. Under this assumption, we
evaluate whether people respond to a new diagnosis of a chronic disease by modifying
their lifestyle. Although our aim is to identify the role of information in driving change,
we acknowledge that it is practically very difficult to single out the effect of information.
Therefore, as discussed previously, our results will be a mixture of the effect of (i) the
information received after a diagnosis, (ii) the physical and physiological changes arising
from the condition, and (iii) medication.2
Our data come from the biennial waves of Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
between 1999 and 2013, a longitudinal survey of a nationally representative sample of
the whole United States (U.S.) population. By contrast, most previous work used data
from 50+ populations with the justification that chronic disease incidence is higher in
this age group (Kahn, 1998; Falba, 2005; Slade, 2012). However, for many chronic condi-
tions incidence among the younger population is comparable to that among the elderly
(see Figure 5.1). For example, an almost equal share of respondents in our sample were
diagnosed with diabetes when aged 40-49 and 50-59 years (around 25 percent). Alter-
natively, more than half (62 percent) of our respondents were already diagnosed with
high blood pressure before turning 50. Furthermore, not engaging in behavior change
might be more costly for the young and chronically ill due to forgone productivity and
more years in the disease state. Health returns to lifestyle modifications might also be
smaller for individuals who are diagnosed at a later age. Therefore, the first contribution
of this paper is to expand the analysis to younger populations and observe the behavioral
impact of a new diagnosis over the life-cycle. The second contribution comes from the
variety of conditions studied. Several papers in the literature examined the behavioral
2 Even in the case where one compares a group of individuals that has the condition and a diagnosis
with a group that has the condition but not diagnosed yet, differences in health behaviors could be
explained by the combined effect of information and medication. Moreover, the physiological changes
experienced by the undiagnosed group may be less “severe” than those experienced by the diagnosed
group. To isolate the effect of medication, one would ideally conduct an experiment which assigns
medication status randomly among diagnosed patients. Such an experiment is obviously infeasible.
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response to a diabetes diagnosis (Kahn, 1999; Slade, 2012; Oster, 2015). Looking at dif-
ferent conditions provides information about the type and extent of lifestyle changes in
the face of different diseases. Such information can be useful in designing better targeted
policies. Finally, the panel nature of our data allow us to study behavior change in the
long-run. Much of the existing literature provides evidence based on cross-sectional data
which can only inform us about the short-run. However, adopting a lifelong approach to
chronic disease management is crucial for survival. Therefore, it is necessary to study the
evolution of health behaviors in the long-term.
Our results suggest that individuals who are diagnosed with a chronic condition par-
tially adopt recommended lifestyle changes. For the majority of the chronic diseases that
we study, people quit smoking and stop drinking after a diagnosis. However, we do not
find that they lose weight (except for diabetes) and increase their physical activity level.
One possible explanation for this finding is that providing people with information about
possible health outcomes is not always sufficient in generating behavioral change.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides background
information on chronic diseases and their management. Section 5.3 describes the data
and construction of the sample. Section 5.4 illustrates our estimation method and iden-
tification strategy. Section 5.5 presents the results and section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Background on Chronic Diseases and Chronic
Disease Management
5.2.1 Background
High blood pressure (or hypertension) is a common and serious condition, in which the
blood exerts too much pressure on the walls of the arteries. If left untreated, high
blood pressure can lead to a heart attack, a stroke, kidney damage, and many other
complications. High blood pressure affected one out of three adults in the U.S. in 2012
(Nwankwo et al., 2013). However, not everyone who carries the disease is aware of it,
because, except in the most extreme cases, high blood pressure has no signs or symptoms.
It is estimated that, in 2012, one out of five American adults had high blood pressure
without being aware of it. Around 65,000 American deaths (2.5 percent of all deaths) in
2011 had high blood pressure as the leading cause (Mozaffarian et al., 2015). High blood
pressure is estimated to have cost the American economy $46 billion in 2011 in terms of
health care services, medication and missed days of work (Mozaffarian et al., 2015).
Diabetes is a metabolic disorder in which the body does not produce insulin at all
(type I) or is not able to use insulin effectively (type II). Type I diabetes is usually
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diagnosed in children and young adults, and accounts for 5 percent of all diabetes cases
among adults. Since the body is unable to produce any insulin, management of type I
diabetes mainly includes insulin injections. Type II diabetes is the most common type
of diabetes and makes up almost all of the rest of the cases among adults. It is treated
with changes in lifestyle, oral medications, and (in the severest case) insulin. If left
untreated (or poorly managed) diabetes may affect several parts of the body and lead
to serious complications like heart disease, stroke, blindness, kidney failure and lower-
limb amputation. In 2012, one out of 10 individuals in the U.S. had diabetes (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). Like hypertension, diabetes can also develop very
slowly and, as a result, often remain undetected for years until serious damage to the body
has already been done. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2014) estimates
that, as of 2012, one out of three people with diabetes in the U.S. are undiagnosed. In
2011, diabetes killed around 74,000 people (3 percent of all deaths) and was the seventh
leading cause of death in the United States (Heron, 2015). The total cost of diabetes to
American economy was $245 billion in 2012 (Mozaffarian et al., 2015).
Cardiovascular disease is the collection of diseases that involve the heart and blood
vessels. The most common types are heart disease, heart attack and stroke. Cardiovascu-
lar disease is caused by the build-up of fat, cholesterol and other substances in the walls of
the arteries, making it difficult for blood to flow through. An estimated one out of twenty
American adults have a cardiovascular disease, excluding hypertension (Mozaffarian et
al., 2015). It is the number one cause of death in the U.S., killing about 600,000 people
every year which comprises around a quarter of all deaths (Heron, 2015). Cardiovascular
disease is also a leading cause of disability in the United States (Autor & Duggan, 2006;
Mozaffarian et al., 2015). The American economy spent $320 billion on cardiovascular
disease (including high blood pressure) in 2011 (Mozaffarian et al., 2015).
Cancer is a group of diseases characterized by abnormal cells that grow uncontrollably
and invade other parts of the body to destroy normal tissue. In 2012, around one out of
twenty Americans had a history of cancer (American Cancer Society, 2014). Cancer is
the second leading cause of death in the United States. In 2011, about 580,000 individ-
uals died of cancer which comprises 23 percent of all deaths (Heron, 2015). The Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) estimates that the total of all health care
expenditures for cancer in the U.S. in 2011 were $88.7 billion (American Cancer Soci-
ety, 2015). The National Cancer Institute predicts that, in 2020, the number of cancer
survivors will reach 18.1 million (an increase of 30 percent compared to 2010), and the as-
sociated cost of cancer care will be $160 billion in 2010 dollars (National Cancer Institute,
2011).
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5.2.2 Chronic Disease Management
The lifestyle modifications that are recommended to keep each of the above mentioned
four chronic diseases under control are essentially the same: quit smoking, limit alcohol
consumption, lose weight and be physically active.
Hypertensive patients and diabetics are advised to quit smoking to reduce their ele-
vated risk of cardiovascular disease (Chobanian et al., 2003; Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2014). Among survivors of a heart attack or a cardiac surgery, the prob-
ability of death is reduced by at least one third among the ones who stop smoking relative
to those who do not (Critchley & Capewell, 2003). Cancer patients are recommended to
abstain from smoking because it increases the number and severity of treatment related
complications, and the risk of disease progression (Hayashi et al., 1999; Johnston-Early
et al., 1980; Kawahara et al., 1998).
Moderate alcohol consumption has been shown to have a protective effect on the
heart (Opie & Lecour, 2007). Therefore, drinking is allowed among the chronically ill
who choose to drink conditional that the amount is limited to at most one glass per day
for women (10 gr. alcohol) and two glasses per day for men (20 gr. alcohol).
In all chronic diseases, patients are recommended to follow a healthy diet and main-
tain a healthy weight. Typically, a healthy diet limits consumption of salt, trans- and
saturated fat, and emphasizes fruits, vegetables, low-fat dairy products and whole grains.
Weight loss in overweight or obese patients with hypertension and diabetes have favorable
effects on blood pressure, dyslipidemia (an abnormal amount of lipids, i.e. cholesterol
and/or fat, in the blood) and blood glucose, and may reduce cardiovascular risk (Neter
et al., 2003; Evert et al., 2013; Mancia et al., 2013). Both overweight and obesity are
associated with increased mortality from cardiovascular disease (Prospective Studies Col-
laboration, 2009; Berrington de Gonzalez et al., 2010). Obesity is associated with recur-
rence among breast and prostate cancer survivors (Rock & Demark-Wahnefried, 2002;
Freedland et al., 2004).
Finally, all individuals with a chronic disease are encouraged to engage in regular
physical activity. For hypertensive patients, physical activity is shown to be inversely
related with cardiovascular and all-cause mortality (Rossi et al., 2012). Regular aerobic
physical activity such as brisk walking is recommended at least for 30 minutes on most
days of the week (Chobanian et al., 2003). Regular physical exercise not only helps to
lose weight but it also reduces long-term blood sugar levels and risk of complications
in diabetics (Boule´ et al., 2001; Sigal et al., 2004). The American Diabetes Association
recommends aerobic and resistance training at moderate intensity on at least 2-3 times
per week (Sigal et al., 2004). In the case of cardiovascular disease, the recommended level
of exercise is mostly personalized. In general, for patients with low-risk, 30 minute aerobic
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exercise training of moderate to vigorous intensity 3-5 times per week is recommended.
Even in severe cases, small amounts of training can help patients keep their independence
and counteract depressive symptoms (Mancia et al., 2013). Among breast and colorectal
cancer survivors, post-treatment physical activity is shown to reduce the relative risk of
recurrence, and disease-specific and all-cause mortality (Holmes et al., 2005; Haydon et
al., 2006).
It should be noted that lifestyle modifications are also recommended to patients under
medication. Following a healthy lifestyle may enhance the efficacy of the drug treatment
or reduce the dosage (Chobanian et al., 2003; Mancia et al., 2013). Therefore medication
and lifestyle changes should be seen as complements rather than substitutes.
5.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
5.3.1 Data
Our analysis uses 8 biennial waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) be-
tween 1999 and 2013. The PSID is a longitudinal survey of a nationally representative
sample of the U.S. population. It covers nearly the entire life cycle of individuals, from
early adulthood through old age, and collects rich data on demographic characteristics,
economic variables, health outcomes and behaviors.
Key to our analysis is information on the diagnosis status and timing of the diagnosis
(if applicable) of the four chronic diseases that we consider in this paper: high blood
pressure, diabetes, cardiovascular disease – heart disease, stroke, heart attack – and
cancer. The PSID has been collecting these data since 1999. Specifically, respondents are
asked: “Has a doctor ever told you that you have or had ...”. If the response is positive,
then a follow-up question about the date of first diagnosis is asked. In the 1999, 2001,
and 2003 waves, this information was obtained by asking “How long have you had this
condition?” As of 2005 the question changed into “How old were you when you were first
diagnosed with ...?” In Appendix 5.A we describe how we merged the information from
these two questions to determine the date of diagnosis. The PSID additionally gathers
data on health behaviors. Respondents are asked whether they smoke, drink and their
frequency of exercise. Self-reported measures of height and weight are also collected.
In the PSID, the household head answers the questions on the diagnosis status and
the timing of the diagnosis on behalf of himself and his spouse. J. P. Smith (2007)
checks for possible differences in the accuracy of the response to the questions about the
timing of the diagnosis when the household head answers for himself and for his spouse.
He finds that household heads are more likely to give focal responses – like five, ten,
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fifteen years ago – when they are asked about the diagnosis dates of their spouses. This
tendency is greater for less serious conditions like hypertension and diabetes compared
to more serious conditions like stroke or cancer. Given the importance of the accuracy
of the timing information for our analysis, we therefore choose to restrict our sample to
household heads only.
Before turning to a discussion of the behavioral response to the onset of a new chronic
condition, we briefly look at trends in the incidence and prevalence of chronic diseases in
the United States. To represent the American population as closely as possible, we base
our calculations on all PSID household heads. Furthermore, we correct for inconsistencies
in reporting behavior by defining a person as chronically ill in the year of onset (as com-
puted) and all subsequent years. Finally, disease prevalence statistics are age-adjusted to
the U.S. Census 2000 population by the direct method. Table 5.1 presents our findings
for each of the PSID waves between 1999 and 2013. High blood pressure is the most
common chronic condition in the U.S. across all years. Age-adjusted prevalence of high
blood pressure among American adults rose continuously between 1999 and 2013, from
18 percent to 28 percent. A similar story holds true for diabetes. The share of diabetics
in the American population increased almost steadily from 6 percent in 1999 to 9 percent
in 2013. In comparison to other chronic conditions, high blood pressure and diabetes
saw the largest increase (50 percent) in the age-adjusted prevalence during the period
1999–2013. In contrast, the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases – stroke, heart attack
and heart disease – remained relatively stable. This is an interesting observation given
the accompanying increase in the prevalence of the biggest behavioral risk factors, i.e.
hypertension and diabetes. This is suggestive of the success in keeping these risk factors
under control, via medication or behavioral change or both, and preventing heart related
complications. Finally, we see a constant increase in the share of American adults diag-
nosed with cancer between 1999 and 2009, followed by a moderate decrease between 2009
and 2013.3 A possible explanation for this increase in cancer prevalence is the success in
treating cardiovascular diseases (Honore´ & Lleras-Muney, 2006).4
Table 5.1 also reports the average age at first diagnosis, which has been significantly
decreasing for all conditions considered. For example, in 1999 people became diabetic
3 At first sight it may seem odd that we observe a decrease in age-adjusted prevalence rates given
the way we construct them, i.e. once diagnosed, always diagnosed. This is possible due to compositional
differences across PSID waves resulting from entry, for example by getting married with a PSID member,
or exit, for example by death.
4 Our estimates for the age-adjusted disease prevalence are quite similar to those documented by
Andreski et al. (2009) who calculate the yearly prevalence of six specific conditions (stroke, hypertension,
diabetes, cancer, heart attack and asthma) by using the PSID and the National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS). The NHIS is the most widely used nationally representative health survey. It increases our
confidence in the quality of the health data collected by the PSID to see that our estimates are similar
to those calculated based on the NHIS.
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at an average age of 53 in comparison to 50 in 2013. In another example, average age
for a stroke was 62 in 1999, while it reduced to 53 in 2013. Figure 5.1 further shows
that a considerable share of the PSID respondents got their first diagnosis of a chronic
condition at their prime-age, i.e. 25-54 years old. Repercussions of these developments
for the economy are large. The Milken Institute calculated that the total cost of the seven
most common chronic conditions to the U.S. were $1.3 trillion in 2003. 80 percent of this
amount results from output losses due to absenteeism and reduced productivity at work.
If current trends in health behaviors and treatment continue, total costs are projected to
reach $4.2 trillion in 2023 (DeVol et al., 2007).
The final set of rows in Table 5.1 documents trends in health behaviors. To begin
with, we see a decline in the smoking rates over time, especially in 2011 and 2013. This
finding is in line with Cawley & Ruhm (2011) who document a constant decreasing trend
in smoking prevalence in the U.S. since 1974. However, we do not observe such a favorable
trend in other health improving behaviors. For example, the share of overweight/obese
individuals in the adult American population increased continuously from 49 percent in
1999 to 55 percent in 2013. According to World Health Organization, excess weight is the
third most health damaging behavior in high-income countries, responsible for 8 percent
of deaths (World Health Organization, 2009). It is also associated with high levels of
morbidity as a large risk factor for many chronic diseases like diabetes, cardiovascular
disease, high blood pressure etc. The share of individuals who exercise frequently, i.e.
at least 3 times a week reduced from 52 percent in 1999 to 46 percent in 2007, but
started to rise again afterwards, reaching 51 percent in 2013. Finally, we observe alcohol
consumption gaining prevalence between 1999 and 2013. It should be noted that we do
not distinguish between heavy versus light drinking where the latter may have health
improving effects (Opie & Lecour, 2007). Therefore, it is difficult to argue with certainty
about the overall health impact of the observed positive trend in alcohol consumption.
The main conclusion from the discussion above is that in the U.S. the chronic disease
burden is increasing and people are diagnosed with a chronic disease at much younger
ages than they were 15 years ago. Meanwhile, results are mixed in the health behaviors
front. We observe a health improving, negative trend in smoking prevalence, combined
with a noticeable increase in the prevalence of overweight/obesity and decrease in physical
activity.
5.3.2 Sample Selection
To analyze the behavioral impact of a new diagnosis, we construct a separate sample for
each of the four chronic conditions that we study in this paper. Additionally, we create a
“general” sample where we consider a respondent to be chronically ill if he is diagnosed
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with at least one of those conditions. In this case we take the diagnosis date of the first
diagnosed condition as the relevant date of diagnosis, i.e. the “diagnosis event”. In all
samples, we exclude respondents who fail to report their diagnosis status for any of the
diseases in any of the years in the sampling period, as well as those who did not report
their date of diagnosis despite being diagnosed. We do this in order to be able to account
for co-morbidities.
Since we study possible changes in health behaviors after a diagnosis, in every sample
we require respondents who have been diagnosed with the disease of interest to have at
least one observation before and one after the diagnosis. This implies that, in each sample,
respondents who were diagnosed with the disease of interest in 1999 or 2013 are dropped.
We further require all respondents to have at least three observations. Finally we drop
observations with missing covariates like gender and education, and missing outcomes.
5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics of several demographic and health variables for
the general sample. Separate statistics are calculated for respondents who have never
been diagnosed with high blood pressure, diabetes, cardiovascular disease or cancer, and
for respondents who were diagnosed with at least one of those conditions between 2000
and 2012. For the latter group, pre- and post-diagnosis statistics are reported. Table 5.2
shows that two thirds of the respondents in the general sample have never been diagnosed
with a chronic condition. These respondents are more likely to be young, white, and have
at least a college diploma in comparison to the chronically ill. In the pre-diagnosis period,
a statistically higher share of the (to be) chronically ill were current smokers and had
excess weight than the never diagnosed. They were also less likely to exercise and consume
alcohol.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.2 shows a comparison of the pre- and post-diagnosis pe-
riods among respondents who were diagnosed with at least one chronic condition during
their time in the PSID. Individuals are most likely to be diagnosed with high blood pres-
sure and diabetes. A considerable share (16 percent) is also diagnosed with cardiovascular
disease.
The evolution of health behaviors in response to a diagnosis is mixed. We observe
a tendency towards healthier behaviors on some dimensions, but not others. Respon-
dents tend to quit smoking and refrain from alcohol after being diagnosed with a chronic
condition. However, they stop with being physically active and put on weight.5 While
interpreting these findings, one should bear in mind that health behaviors like smoking
5 All pre- and post-diagnosis differences in health behaviors are statistically significant at the 1 percent
level.
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and drinking do not require any health capital to carry out in contrast to exercise, for
example. Therefore, it could be the case that the chronically ill find it easier to change
their smoking and drinking habits while they may simply not be healthy enough to keep
their existing exercise rhythm, let alone increase it, even if they want to. Weight gain
could be a consequence of the decrease in the level of physical activity. It could also
be a side effect of medication. For example, taking insulin is known to increase weight
(Ma¨kimattila et al., 1999).
Table 5.3 documents the summary statistics for disease specific samples. Statistics
reported under the columns headed by “never” are based on data from respondents who
have never been diagnosed with the corresponding disease. The columns headed by “pre”
and “post” present the pre- and post-diagnosis statistics for respondents who were diag-
nosed with the corresponding chronic condition between 2000 and 2012. The differences
in demographics and pre-diagnosis health behaviors between those never diagnosed and
the chronically ill that we observed in the general sample are also visible in the disease
specific samples. Irrespective of the condition, people diagnosed with a chronic condition
are older, more often non-white, and have lower family income and educational attain-
ment compared to those who have never been diagnosed with that condition. Moreover,
they are statistically more likely to smoke in the case of high blood pressure and car-
diovascular disease, and be overweight or obese for all conditions except cancer, before
diagnosis than those who never received a dignosis. In the post-diagnosis period, we see
a significant reduction in the share of smokers for all conditions (e.g. from 26 percent to
17 percent among cancer patients). After the receipt of a diagnosis with any of the condi-
tions, smoking prevalence goes even below the level among those who did not receive such
a diagnosis. In the case of diabetes and cancer, such reaction to smoking is accompanied
by a modest, but not significant, reduction in the prevalence of overweight/obesity after
diagnosis. While all these are positive developments, we also see a large, significant drop
in the prevalence of exercise. For all conditions, the chronically ill, who were already less
physically active in the pre-diagnosis period than the never diagnosed, reduce their level
of physical activity even further in the post-diagnosis period.
Finally, Table 5.3 reveals that there is large number of co-morbidities to each condi-
tion. For example, before being diagnosed, the (to be) diabetics already had a higher
prevalence of high blood pressure (42 percent) and cardiovascular disease (15 percent)
relative to those never diagnosed with diabetes. After the diagnosis, the prevalence of
co-morbid conditions increases (to 73 percent for high blood pressure and 28 percent
for cardiovascular disease in the case of diabetes). In fact, we can find several cases
where prevalence doubles after having been diagnosed. These observations highlight the
importance of controlling for co-morbid conditions in our models.
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5.4 Empirical Implementation
A natural starting point to estimate the impact of a new diagnosis on health behaviors is
to compare average health behaviors of individuals who experienced a diagnosis event to
the average among all individuals who did not experience such an event. This comparison
would provide an unbiased estimate of a new diagnosis only if receipt of it was randomly
distributed in the population. However, as shown in Section 5.3.3, chronically ill people
are systematically different from people who are not aﬄicted with a chronic disease in
several aspects which make them more likely to experience the onset of a disease. They
are, on average, older, less educated, and engage more often in unhealthy behaviors.
They smoke more, exercise less and have a higher BMI. In addition, conditional on onset,
individuals who get diagnosed may be systematically different than individuals who do
not. The former group may be better educated, contact with the healthcare sector more
often and more health conscious than the latter. Therefore, a simple comparison of
health behaviors between the diagnosed and non-diagnosed populations does not provide
an unbiased estimate of how health behaviors respond to the receipt of a new diagnosis.
However, by conditioning on a set of genetic, behavioral and socioeconomic factors –
including past health behaviors and pre-existing conditions – J. P. Smith (1999) argues
that it may still be possible to isolate the random element in the receipt of a new diagnosis.
Therefore, we estimate a model which controls for pre-diagnosis health behaviors as well
as fixed and time-varying individual characteristics:
Yit = αi + γt + β
′Xit +
M∑
k=−m
δkD
k
it + it. (5.1)
In Model 5.1, Yit represents the binary outcomes of interest, αi the individual fixed
effect that helps in controlling for time-invariant factors – such as family history, race,
education or health consciousness – that determine who experiences an onset and gets a
diagnosis, and the γ’s are time dummies for each calendar year in the sample period that
capture the general evolution of health behaviors over time. The vector Xit consists of
time-varying covariates like age, marital status, self-reported health, family income, and
other diagnosed chronic conditions. In Model 5.1, Dkit is an event time indicator, with
Dkit = 1 if, in year t it has been k years since individual i was diagnosed (with the disease
of interest). If k is negative, Dkit = 1 means that year t precedes the year of diagnosis by
k years. These dummy variables, Dkit, k = −m, . . . , 0, . . . ,M , jointly represent the event
of diagnosis and the corresponding δk are the parameters of main interest. For those who
are not diagnosed, for all k, Dkit = 0. We assume that health behaviors older than 6 years
prior to the diagnosis have no predictive power for a diagnosis event. Therefore, we group
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all years that precede the diagnosis more than 6 years in the reference dummy. Our last
event time dummy includes all years more than 6 years after diagnosis.6
Identification of the δ parameters rests on the assumption that, given the set of
controls, having been diagnosed with a new chronic condition is a random health event.
More specifically, conditional on all controls, a new diagnosis does not have to be an
unanticipated event at the time of diagnosis but at more than 6 years before the diagnosis.
This implies that health behaviors among the diagnosed would follow the same “post-
diagnosis” trend with the non-diagnosed, had they not received a diagnosis.
The identifying assumption is violated if there are omitted variables that are correlated
both with the outcome variable and the receipt of a new diagnosis. Individual fixed effects
control for time-invariant variables like gender, race and socioeconomic status that are
known to be important correlates of health behaviors, chronic disease onset and, given
onset, receipt of a diagnosis (Carson et al., 2011; Mackenbach, 2006) . We also explicitly
control for other important time-varying correlates, such as age, insurance status and
presence of other chronic conditions. Thus, our estimated impact of a new diagnosis on
health behaviors will be biased only if there are unobserved, time-varying factors that
are excluded from our model. In case the identifying assumption holds, δk gives us an
estimate of how health behaviors would differ at k periods from the diagnosis relative
to the counterfactual case of no diagnosis. The δk parameters can also be interpreted as
the change in health behaviors in period k compared to the reference period more than
6 years before the diagnosis.
As explained in the introduction, the effect we identify might be a mixture of (i)
the information provided by the diagnosis, (ii) the physical constraints and physiological
changes arising from the condition, and (iii) medication. For example, diabetes drugs
may induce weight loss/gain (Ma¨kimattila et al., 1999). Beta blockers, commonly used
in treatment of high blood pressure, may reduce anxiety, which in turn may affect the
need for smoking and alcohol consumption (Katzung et al., 2012). Patients who are under
cancer treatment may experience weight loss/gain due to treatment (Doyle et al., 2006).
Survivors of a severe stroke or cancer may be physically constrained in their capacity
to increase exercise. However, it should be noted that behavior change is recommended
despite such possible adverse effects. In fact, patients who suffer from side effects of med-
ication and/or treatment are advised to take extra measures, such as dietary counseling,
to keep their lifestyles in line with the guidelines. Exercise intensity and frequency can
6 Because the PSID is a biennial survey, our event time indicators span two years. This does not
track the evolution of the behavioral response in as much detail as a one-year interval. However, using
one-year intervals would divide identification into two groups: the response in even numbered years
would be identified from those individuals diagnosed in “PSID survey years” (1999, 2001, ...), whereas
odd numbered years would be identified from those individuals diagnosed in “non-PSID survey years”
(2000, 2002, ...). A two-year interval avoids this issue.
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be tailored to the specific condition of each patient.
5.5 Results
We first discuss the short- and long-term behavioral response among household heads who
have been diagnosed with any of the following chronic conditions: high blood pressure,
diabetes, cardiovascular disease or cancer. More specifically, we evaluate the response
to the first condition that is diagnosed. In this case the comparison group consists of
household heads who are not diagnosed with any of the mentioned conditions during
the sample period. Figure 5.2 plots the estimated trajectory of all four health behaviors
against years since diagnosis (i.e. the δ-coefficients from model (5.1); Appendix Table
5.B.1 presents the coefficient estimates).
Panel 5.2a shows that an average household head’s propensity to smoke is about 2
percentage points lower immediately following his diagnosis compared to the case where
he had not been diagnosed. Size of this reduction remains similar and statistically differ-
ent from zero over the next five years, but it loses its statistical significance from the sixth
year onwards. The results can be alternatively interpreted as a drop in the head’s propen-
sity to smoke by 2 percentage points during the first five years following the diagnosis
relative to the period that precedes the diagnosis more than 6 years.
A slightly different picture emerges when we move to Panel 5.2b, which presents the
evolution of alcohol consumption. There is a 3 to 4 percentage points decrease in the
probability to consume any alcohol among diagnosed household heads in the aftermath of
the diagnosis. However, in contrast to smoking, this reduction is not realized immediately.
Only two years after the diagnosis, a statistically and economically significant decrease
is observed in the probability to drink. There is no sign of recidivism as the reduction
remains stable both in terms of magnitude and significance during the coming years.
The evolution of overweight or obesity, as shown in Panel 5.2c, reveals that chronically
ill household heads tend to lose weight at an increasing magnitude as they move further
away from the point of diagnosis. Compared to household heads who have not experienced
a diagnosis event, prevalence of overweight/obesity is 2 percentage points lower among
the chronically ill heads in the first 2 to 3 years following diagnosis. Weight loss continues
in the long-run with the probability of being overweight/obese going down by almost 3.5
percentage points in the 6 to 13th year of diagnosis.
Finally, Panel 5.2d illustrates that, in the face of a diagnosis, chronically ill household
heads do not shift their behavior towards (more) frequent exercise (at least three times
a week). Taken together with the results on weight status, this suggests that weight loss
is achieved mainly through adjusting dietary behavior rather than taking up exercise.
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Our findings suggest that, the chronically ill behave overall in compliance with the
guidelines: They quit smoking and drinking, and lose weight. Diagnosis gives the chron-
ically ill a stimulus to engage in more healthy behaviors to prevent future complications.
The fact that we do not observe any statistically significant differences in any of the
outcomes prior to diagnosis elevates confidence in our identifying assumption that, con-
ditional on our controls, a new diagnosis with a chronic condition is an unexpected event.
5.5.1 Do Effects Differ by Chronic Condition
So far we have examined the evolution of health behaviors after a diagnosis with a chronic
condition without making a distinction between conditions. However, it may be that a
patient who is diagnosed with diabetes responds differently to the diagnosis than a patient
who is diagnosed with high blood pressure, for example because not adhering to behavioral
guidelines in case of diabetes may be (or perceived to be) much more consequential for
the patient’s health. Another reason why the response may differ across diseases is the
difference in the frequency of feedback. For example, diabetics or hypertensive patients
frequently receive information on the progression of their disease through doctor visits
and self-monitoring, whereas patients with cardiovascular disease are likely to get updated
about their current health status less frequently (American Heart Association, 2014a). In
this section, we therefore examine heterogeneity in the response across chronic conditions.
High blood pressure
Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of health behaviors before and after a diagnosis with high
blood pressure (see Appendix Table 5.B.2 for the coefficient estimates), which is by far
the most common chronic condition among the American population (see Table 5.1).
According to Panel 5.3a, there is hardly a response in terms of smoking. None of the
estimated coefficients for the post-diagnosis period are statistically different from zero, in
addition to being very small in size.
Panel 5.3b shows that, conditional on controls, prior to the diagnosis, prevalence of
any alcohol consumption is no different between household heads who are going to be
diagnosed with high blood pressure in the future and those who are not. The situation
is similar also in the year of diagnosis or the years afterwards. Only as of the second
year of diagnosis alcohol prevalence goes down among high blood pressure patients, by 3
percentage points. A possible explanation for the lack of an immediate response might be
the binary nature of our measure of alcohol consumption, i.e. any alcohol or otherwise.
High blood pressure patients may gradually reduce the amount of alcohol they consume,
instead of quitting abruptly. The reduction in alcohol consumption persists in the fol-
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lowing few years, but not throughout. As of the sixth year of diagnosis, the reduction in
prevalence falls back to 2 percentage points, suggesting that some household heads take
up drinking again.
Panels 5.3c and 5.3d reveal that individuals with high blood pressure do not succeed
in making changes in their weight status and level of physical activity, either in the
short- or long-run. This finding is consistent with Slade & Kim (2014) who fail to find an
economically and statistically significant reduction in total energy intake among diagnosed
hypertensive patients.
These results suggest that a high-blood-pressure diagnosis does not lead to substantial
lifestyle modifications, with the exception of drinking. This is an interesting finding given
the strength of the (medical) evidence on the effectiveness of behavior change on lowering
blood pressure and cardiovascular disease risk (see Mancia et al. (2013) and the references
therein). One possible explanation is that the success of anti-hypertensive medications in
treating high blood pressure could give patients a false feeling of safety and deter them
from making costly changes in their habits, despite the fact that medication should only
be seen as a complement to behavior change rather than a substitute (Chobanian et al.,
2003). In a recent article, Slade & Kim (2014) show that individuals who have high blood
pressure for a long time and use anti-hypertensive medication consume more sodium than
individuals who do not have high blood pressure but are at risk for it. Evaluating the
impact of statin use on health behaviors among high cholesterol patients, Kaestner et al.
(2014) report that statin use worsened diet, increased alcohol consumption and led to
higher obesity rates. Moreover, as high blood pressure usually causes no symptoms and
anti-hypertensive medication does not have serious side effects, it seems unlikely that the
lack of behavioral change is a result of physical limitations arising from the condition
or side effects of the medication. Hence, it can be inferred that high blood pressure
patients choose not to adhere to doctor recommendations, which may indeed be due to
the belief that the negative consequences of their non-compliance will be counterbalanced
by medication.
Diabetes
Figure 5.4 plots the trajectory of the four health behaviors for household heads who
are diagnosed with diabetes (Appendix Table 5.B.3 presents the coefficient estimates).
According to panel 5.4a, the propensity to smoke is 4 percentage points lower among
newly diagnosed diabetics relative to the situation had they not been diagnosed. In
subsequent years, some household heads fall back to old habits and start smoking again
but the prevalence of smoking remains significantly lower in the long-run.
We also see from Panel 5.4b that the likelihood of consuming any alcohol is 6 per-
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centage points lower among household heads who have been diabetic for 2-3 years in
comparison to those who have not been diagnosed with diabetes. As mentioned above,
the lack of a significant response immediately following the diagnosis might be an artifact
of the binary alcohol consumption variable. It seems that diabetics manage to abstain
from alcohol throughout the whole post-diagnosis period in the PSID, the reduction in
prevalence reaching to 7 percentage points during 6 to 13 years from diagnosis. It is inter-
esting to observe that the behavioral response to drinking is stronger than the response
to smoking, since the latter can lead to more serious complications than the former.
Panel 5.4c reveals that diagnosed diabetics are also able to significantly reduce their
weight, both in the short- and the long-run. The likelihood of being overweight or obese
falls by 4 percentage points among diabetics immediately after diagnosis compared to the
case where had they not been diagnosed. The decrease in weight continues in the long-
run, reaching to a 6 percentage point reduction in the prevalence of overweight/obesity
among household heads with diabetes. This is likely to be due to a reduction in the
amount of calories consumed, since diagnosed diabetics are not increasing the amount of
exercise as can be seen from Panel 5.4d. Oster (2015) presents evidence supportive of
this hypothesis by showing that, after a diabetes diagnosis, household heads engage in
reductions in caloric intake sufficient to lose 6 to 11 pounds per year. Our findings are
also broadly in line with Slade (2012), who finds a decline among diabetics in smoking,
drinking and weight. However, according to his results weight loss is achieved only for
a temporary period and individuals put on weight in the long-run. Finally, our findings
are consistent with Kahn (1999), who observes that diagnosed diabetics are more likely
to make dietary changes (including drinking) rather than behavioral changes (including
smoking and exercise).
Some of the weight loss observed among the newly diagnosed diabetics can be at-
tributed to physiological activities of the medication. Some diabetes drugs like met-
formin can induce weight loss. Therefore, it is not possible to say with certainty that a
new diagnosis with diabetes serves as an impetus for losing weight among the diabetic
population who are usually overweight or obese at the point of diagnosis. We are not
aware of any relationship between diabetes medication and the remaining outcomes. It
is also unlikely that diabetes interferes with fitness of the body to the extent that one
cannot smoke, drink or exercise. Therefore, we argue that the reduction in smoking and
drinking propensity among the newly diagnosed household heads can be attributed to
the health information obtained during diagnosis. With respect to exercise, diabetics fail
to follow the doctor’s recommendation despite proven effectiveness of mild to moderate
exercise in lowering blood sugar.
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Cardiovascular disease
Figure 5.5 displays the estimated trajectory of the four health behaviors in response to a
diagnosis with cardiovascular disease (see Appendix Table 5.B.4 for the coefficient esti-
mates). According to Panel 5.5a, prevalence of smoking goes down by 4 to 5 percentage
points during the first five years following the diagnosis. However, not all of this favor-
able reduction in smoking can be sustained in the long-run. Six to thirteen years later,
household heads with a history of cardiovascular disease are only 2 percentage points less
likely to smoke than household heads who does not have a cardiovascular disease history.
A similar story holds true also for drinking alcohol. The 4 to 6 percentage point
reduction, observed over the next 5 years following the diagnosis, partially vanishes during
6 to 13 years after diagnosis (Panel 5.5b).
When it comes to weight status and regular exercise, Panels 5.5c and 5.5d reveal that
survivors of cardiovascular disease neither lose weight nor take up regular exercise. In
fact, if anything, they even reduce their level of exercise in the long-run. In the case of a
heart attack or a stroke, it is expected that we do not directly observe an increase in the
level of physical activity because patients may not be fit enough or may be under risk
of an exercise-related complication. However, in the long-run patients are expected to
recover and go on with their usual rythm. In contrast, we see a reduction in the share of
household heads who frequently exercise after a diagnosis with a cardiovascular disease.
While this can be due to non-compliance with the doctor’s recommendations, it can also
be an artifact of our measure regular exercise, i.e. moderate to vigorous exercise at least
three times per week. Patients with a cardiovascular disease history may have their own
exercise rhythms that can not be captured by our definition of exercise. Inability to lose
weight can be a consequence of the exercise routine or the side effect of the medications
used to treat cardiovascular disease. As we also mentioned in section 5.1, one does not
need a large stock of health capital to smoke or drink alcohol. Therefore we argue that
the doctor’s advice generated the positive response with respect to these two behaviors
in the short-run but in the long-run this response could not be sustained.
Cancer
Finally, Figure 5.6 illustrates the evolution of the four health behaviors after a cancer
diagnosis (see Appendix Table 5.B.5 for the coefficient estimates). We see from Panel
5.6a that cancer patients manage to stay away from smoking, both in the short- and long-
run after receiving a cancer diagnosis. It is worthwhile noting that the magnitude of the
response in terms of smoking is stronger after a diagnosis with cancer or cardiovascular
disease than with diabetes or high blood pressure. This observation can be explained with
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reference to K. V. Smith et al. (2001) who find that smokers respond most dramatically
to smoking-related health shocks. U.S. Surgeon General identifies cardiovascular diseases
and several of the most common cancers, like lung and bladder, as conditions related to
smoking, while diabetes and high blood pressure are not in this category.
When it comes to alcohol consumption we see from Panel 5.6b that cancer survivors
also manage to abstain from alcohol in the short- and long-run. We see a downward trend
in the share of household heads who consumes any alcohol in the post-diagnosis period,
although magnitude of the reduction is never statistically different from zero except for
4 to 5 years after diagnosis. This is possibly due to the small number of cancer diagnoses
observed in the sample.
According to Panel 5.6c, there is a 3 percentage points reduction in the share of
overweight/obese household heads in the year of cancer diagnosis and the year thereafter.
It is likely that weight loss is a side effect of cancer treatment. This possibility is supported
by the observation that in the following years – which can be considered as recovery and
post-recovery periods – cancer patients are as likely to be overweight/obese as household
heads who do not suffer from cancer.
Finally, Panel 5.6d shows a significant rise in the prevalence of frequent exercise during
the year of diagnosis or the year following it. However, in the coming years we see
noticeable decline in regular physical activity. As for cardiovascular disease survivors,
the absence of an effect for physical exercise may be due to a lack of behavior change,
or, alternatively, be an artifact of our measure of regular exercise unable to capture the
special exercise routines of cancer survivors.
5.5.2 Do Effects Differ by Educational Attainment or Age
In this section we check whether there is any heterogeneity in response by education
and age to a new diagnosis with any of the four chronic conditions. Higher educated
individuals may be more successful in implementing lifestyle changes for a number of
reasons. First, education may improve one’s understanding of the consequences of the
disease and the necessity of behavioral modifications. Second, not engaging in behavioral
change may be more costly for the higher educated due to lost productivity/wages. Third,
higher educated individuals may be better able to comply with the recommendations
(e.g., see Goldman & Smith, 2002 for the case of diabetes). However, according to our
results (which are not shown), there is no difference in response between those with
high education, i.e. college degree or more, and low education, i.e. less than college
degree. This may be due to selection: if individuals with high education are generally
healthier, then those highly educated who develop a chronic condition may have worse
unobservable characteristics which make them less likely to adopt behavioral change. It
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is interesting to look at heterogeneity by age because younger individuals may be more
likely to make behavioral changes because the (health) returns to changes are higher for
them as they are expected to live for more years with the disease. Furthermore, younger
individuals may be physically and/or mentally better able to manage a chronic disease
through lifestyle modifications. However, also in this case we do not find any difference
in response behavior between those who are 50 years or older at diagnosis and those who
are younger.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the short- and long-term effects of chronic disease incidence on
health behaviors. Our results indicate that individuals fall broadly in line with doctor’s
recommendations about quitting smoking and abstaining from alcohol after a diagnosis.
However, we do not observe any changes in weight status (except for diabetes) and exercise
behavior despite the large potential benefits.
It has been widely documented that smoking rates respond dramatically to new,
aggregate level, information. The demand for cigarettes dropped significantly in the
face of new scientific evidence linking smoking to lung cancer in the 1950s. Cigarette
consumption further dropped as a result of health warning labels on packages, mass media
anti-smoking campaigns, and other public health efforts that disseminate information
about health risks of smoking (Chaloupka & Warner, 2000). However, it has also been
shown that smokers are too optimistic when it comes to their own longevity expectations
K. V. Smith et al. (2001); Khwaja et al. (2007). Therefore, one reason why we estimate a
reduction in smoking prevalence could be that a diagnosis makes individuals more likely
to internalize information about the harms of smoking.
The share of overweight/obese individuals went down only after a diabetes diagnosis.
It is interesting that we do not find a similar reaction for cardiovascular disease and cancer,
which are both considered to be more serious conditions than diabetes. This can be due
to the fact that diabetics are confronted with their disease on a daily basis. They must
engage in high quality self-management persistently, which includes balancing medication
dosage with food intake and physical activity. Additionally, they need to measure their
blood sugar levels regularly which provides them with high frequency feedback on whether
they are managing the disease effectively. In the case of cardiovascular disease, individuals
are not reminded of the consequences of their actions so frequently. Annual or biannual
check-ups can bring individuals with a history of cardiovascular disease in contact with the
medical system and update them about the current status of their disease and associated
risks. For cancer survivors, behavioral change may play less of a role in comparison to
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medical treatment in health promotion. Moreover, in the case of cancer, medical evidence
that links nutrition and physical activity related lifestyle changes to improved survival is
scarce. Therefore, doctors may be reluctant to encourage their patients to make these
changes.
One caveat to our findings is the possibility that our estimates do not only result from
new information about underlying health status and healthy lifestyles, but also from phys-
ical constraints arising from the condition, and medication. Although medications may
have adverse effects that interfere with the intended lifestyle modifications, physicians
aim to minimize such side effects by adjusting the prescribed drug and/or dosage. More-
over, for a given disease, different medications may have side effects working in opposite
directions, which could cancel each other out. For example, while some medications for
diabetes induce weight gain, others induce weight loss. Physical constraints may be more
relevant in the case of cardiovascular disease and cancer. Patients may be too weak to
exercise immediately following a diagnosis. However, after an initial recovery period, ab-
sence of a response is more likely to reflect either a failure in following the guidelines or
the inability of our measure of regular exercise to capture personalized exercise patterns.
One potential limitation to our analysis is the use of self-reports on past diagnoses and
its timing. Unfortunately, PSID respondents do not always consistently report whether
they have been diagnosed with a certain chronic condition, nor do they always report
the same year of onset. A possible source of such measurement error is that individuals
with a lower socioeconomic status may have limited access to medical care and hence are
less likely to be diagnosed. Moreover, it is well known that some individuals may report
to have health problems as a justification for economic inactivity. It is unclear in which
direction our estimates may be biased.
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Figures
Figure 5.1: Distribution of age at diagnosis for each chronic condition
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Notes: Each graph pools data from all years on the household heads who are diagnosed with the relevant
condition.
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Figure 5.2: Evolution of health behaviors after diagnosis of a chronic condition
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Notes: Figures show coefficients from fixed effects linear probability models. The models control for
individual and year fixed effects, age, age-squared, marital status, quartiles of family income, health
insurance status and self-reported health. Error bars show 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of health behaviors after high blood pressure diagnosis
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cancer. Error bars show 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 5.4: Evolution of health behaviors after diabetes diagnosis
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and cancer. Error bars show 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 5.5: Evolution of health behaviors after cardiovascular disease diagnosis
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Figure 5.6: Evolution of health behaviors after cancer diagnosis
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132
Tables
Table 5.1: Summary statistics
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Disease prevalence
High blood pressure 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.40
Diabetes 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
Stroke 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Heart attack 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Heart disease 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09
Cardiovascular disease 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13
Cancer 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Age of onset
High blood pressure 47.36 46.72 45.83 45.25 44.54 43.87 43.41 43.00
Diabetes 51.33 51.12 50.50 49.98 49.40 49.05 48.39 47.56
Stroke 61.81 60.64 59.49 57.83 56.64 55.82 54.26 52.25
Heart attack 56.62 55.94 55.43 55.29 54.34 53.73 52.96 52.32
heart disease 55.03 54.27 53.45 52.77 51.95 51.47 50.60 49.62
Cardiovascular disease 54.61 53.60 52.88 52.01 51.12 50.56 49.39 48.38
Cancer 57.83 56.77 55.75 55.17 54.27 53.66 52.21 51.13
Health behaviors
Currently smokes 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21
Currently drinks any alcohol 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.65
Overweight or obese 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.72
Frequent exercise 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65
Notes: In each year, summary statistics for disease prevalence and age at diagnosis are calculated
based on the PSID household heads who are currently diagnosed with the relevant condition, ex-
cept the ones who report the age at diagnosis for high blood pressure, diabetes, cardiovascular
disease or cancer as younger than 20 or older than 90 in any of the years. We additionally include
household heads who are not diagnosed with any of the mentioned conditions while calculating
the summary statistics for health behaviors. Frequent exercise is defined as moderate to vigorous
exercise at least three times per week.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for the general sample by diagnosis status
Diagnosed during PSID
Whole sample Never diagnosed Pre-diagnosis Post-diagnosis
Demographics
Age (in years) 41.75 38.32 43.30 50.76
Female 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.28
White 0.61 0.64 0.57 0.57
Black 0.33 0.31 0.37 0.37
Other race 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
Less than high school 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.18
High school or some college 0.56 0.55 0.58 0.56
College or more 0.29 0.31 0.25 0.26
Married 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.59
Good health 0.90 0.94 0.90 0.79
Family income (tens of thousands) 6.84 6.86 6.04 7.40
Health insurance 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.92
Disease prevalence
Diabetes 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.20
High blood pressure 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.81
Stroke 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05
Heart attack 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05
Heart disease 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10
Cardiovascular disease 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.16
Cancer 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.11
Health behaviors
Currently smokes 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.22
Currently drinks any alcohol 0.67 0.71 0.64 0.61
Overweight or obese 0.67 0.61 0.73 0.77
Frequent exercise 0.67 0.70 0.66 0.61
Number of observations 36,053 22,626 5,806 7,621
Number of respondents 6,074 4,113 1,916 1,916
Notes: Never diagnosed refers to respondents who have not been diagnosed with high blood pressure, dia-
betes, cardiovascular disease or cancer prior to or during their time in the PSID. Frequent exercise is defined
as moderate to vigorous exercise at least three times per week
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Appendix 5.A: Measurement of Chronic Illness
In this appendix we describe how we construct the date of onset of a chronic disease.
The PSID collects detailed information on disease diagnosis status, and timing of the
diagnosis since 1999. Specifically, the PSID asks respondents: “Has a doctor ever told
you that you have or had ...” for a number of chronic conditions. If the response is
affirmative, then a follow-up question about the date of first diagnosis is asked. In the
1999, 2001, and 2003 waves this information was obtained by asking “How long have you
had this condition?”. The respondent could answer in days, weeks, months, and years.
From 2005 and onwards, the question became “How old were you when you were first
diagnosed with ...?”.
We take the following approach to infer the date of onset. For each chronic condition
and survey wave in the period 1999–2003, we first transform the number of days, weeks,
months, and years that a respondent reports to have the condition into the number of
days. This number is then subtracted from the interview date to determine the date and
year of first diagnosis. For the 2005-2013 period, the difference between the current age
and the age at first diagnosis, which roughly equals the number of years since diagnosis,
is subtracted from the year of the interview.
At this point it should be noted that respondents who have stayed for more than one
wave in the PSID may have reported different dates of onset across different waves. To
come up with a single date of onset in such cases, we followed Chung (2013). For each
chronic disease reported during the 1999–2003 surveys, if the reported number of days
since the onset of the disease is less than 365 days, then this date is considered to be the
“true” onset date. For the 2005–2013 surveys, if the age at the time of the interview is the
same as the reported age of onset, then the corresponding calender year is considered to
be the “true” onset year. At the end, if a respondent still has more than one onset date,
than the earliest one is taken as the true onset date. For respondents who fall outside
of this rule (i.e. reported number of days since diagnosis is greater than 365 or reported
age of onset is different than the age during the interview), we assume that the mode of
reported dates is the “true” onset date. If there is more than one mode, then we take
the earliest one.
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Appendix 5.B: Full Sets of Coefficient Estimates
Table 5.B.1: Behavioral response to diagnosis of a chronic condition
Smoking Any alcohol consumption Overweight/Obesity status Frequent exercise
Years since diagnosis
-6/-5 0.001 -0.010 -0.008 0.001
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016)
-4/-3 -0.010 0.005 -0.015* -0.010
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
-2/-1 0.007 0.000 -0.004 0.005
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
0/1 -0.018∗∗ -0.004 -0.014 -0.003
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
2/3 -0.015* -0.031*** -0.020** -0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
4/5 -0.018* -0.041*** -0.026** -0.026
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017)
6/13 -0.012 -0.031** -0.034** 0.001
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018)
Calendar years
1999 base base base base
2001 -0.026** 0.002 0.053*** -0.004
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.021)
2003 -0.052** -0.011 0.099*** -0.036
(0.021) (0.030) (0.024) (0.039)
2005 -0.081*** -0.018 0.152*** -0.082
(0.031) (0.043) (0.036) (0.056)
2007 -0.115*** -0.031 0.199*** -0.098
(0.041) (0.057) (0.047) (0.075)
2009 -0.139*** -0.022 0.243*** -0.088
(0.051) (0.071) (0.059) (0.093)
2011 -0.176*** -0.022 0.288*** -0.094
(0.061) (0.085) (0.071) (0.111)
2013 -0.207*** -0.035 0.316*** -0.087
(0.071) (0.099) (0.082) (0.130)
Demographics
Age (in years) 0.011** 0.006 0.009 0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Age (in years) squared -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.023*** -0.036*** 0.025*** -0.059***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Low income -0.000 -0.047*** -0.003 -0.010
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Low-middle income -0.009* -0.011* -0.004 -0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
High-middle income base base base base
High income -0.004 0.008 -0.003 0.016*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Health insurance -0.008 0.020** 0.010 0.029***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Poor health -0.005 -0.071*** -0.007 -0.182***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025)
Fair health 0.022*** -0.010 0.013 -0.100***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
Good health 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.025*** -0.055***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Very good health 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.020*** -0.014*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Excellent health base base base base
Constant -0.062 0.512** 0.567*** 0.570*
(0.175) (0.245) (0.204) (0.317)
Number of observations 36,053 36,053 36,053 36,053
Number of respondents 6,074 6,074 6,074 6,074
Notes: Coefficients from fixed effects linear probability models are reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5.B.2: Behavioral response to high blood pressure diagnosis
Smoking Any alcohol consumption Overweight/Obesity status Frequent exercise
Years since diagnosis
-6/-5 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011 0.004
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016)
-4/-3 -0.009 0.002 -0.013 -0.009
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
-2/-1 0.001 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
0/1 -0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.005
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
2/3 -0.008 -0.032*** -0.001 0.003
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015)
4/5 -0.009 -0.036*** -0.006 -0.021
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017)
6/13 0.002 -0.020 -0.016 0.013
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018)
Calendar years
1999 base base base base
2001 -0.025** -0.010 0.053*** -0.004
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020)
2003 -0.051** -0.031 0.096*** -0.035
(0.020) (0.029) (0.023) (0.037)
2005 -0.080*** -0.050 0.143*** -0.078
(0.029) (0.042) (0.034) (0.054)
2007 -0.112*** -0.070 0.186*** -0.097
(0.039) (0.056) (0.045) (0.072)
2009 -0.139*** -0.069 0.225*** -0.089
(0.049) (0.069) (0.056) (0.089)
2011 -0.175*** -0.075 0.267*** -0.090
(0.058) (0.083) (0.067) (0.107)
2013 -0.207*** -0.096 0.292*** -0.083
(0.068) (0.096) (0.078) (0.124)
Demographics
Age (in years) 0.010** 0.011 0.011* 0.010
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Age (in years) squared -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.020** -0.035*** 0.025*** -0.059***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
Low income -0.001 -0.040*** -0.006 -0.007
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Low-middle income -0.008* -0.009 -0.007 -0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
High-middle income base base base base
High income -0.005 0.005 0.001 0.011
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Health insurance -0.007 0.016* 0.012* 0.028***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Poor health 0.003 -0.064*** -0.002 -0.187***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023)
Fair health 0.022*** -0.014 0.017** -0.108***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013)
Good health 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.026*** -0.053***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Very good health 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.019*** -0.014*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Excellent health base base base base
Comorbid conditions
Diabetes -0.023* -0.026 -0.070*** 0.017
(0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.019)
Cardiovascular disease -0.046*** -0.039** -0.003 -0.033*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
Cancer -0.057*** -0.029 -0.034** 0.005
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023)
Constant -0.054 0.355 0.519*** 0.539*
(0.171) (0.245) (0.199) (0.313)
Number of observations 39,744 39,744 39,744 39,744
Number of respondents 6,693 6.693 6,693 6,693
Notes: Coefficients from fixed effects linear probability models are reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5.B.3: Behavioral response to diabetes diagnosis
Smoking Any alcohol consumption Overweight/Obesity status Frequent exercise
Years since diagnosis
-6/-5 0.006 -0.014 -0.010 0.019
(0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.025)
-4/-3 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.010
(0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.024)
-2/-1 -0.014 -0.007 0.003 -0.017
(0.011) (0.017) (0.010) (0.024)
0/1 -0.040*** -0.023 -0.037*** 0.013
(0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.022)
2/3 -0.026* -0.057*** -0.055*** 0.003
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.024)
4/5 -0.026* -0.044* -0.056*** 0.021
(0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.027)
6/13 -0.031* -0.072*** -0.056*** 0.031
(0.018) (0.023) (0.017) (0.027)
Calendar years
1999 base base base base
2001 -0.028*** -0.007 0.051*** -0.007
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019)
2003 -0.056*** -0.026 0.089*** -0.032
(0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.035)
2005 -0.086*** -0.045 0.129*** -0.077
(0.027) (0.038) (0.031) (0.050)
2007 -0.123*** -0.067 0.169*** -0.094
(0.036) (0.051) (0.041) (0.067)
2009 -0.150*** -0.064 0.206*** -0.084
(0.045) (0.063) (0.052) (0.083)
2011 -0.192*** -0.073 0.242*** -0.086
(0.053) (0.076) (0.062) (0.099)
2013 -0.225*** -0.090 0.262*** -0.076
(0.062) (0.088) (0.072) (0.115)
Demographics
Age (in years) 0.011** 0.012* 0.012** 0.012
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Age (in years) squared 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.019*** -0.029*** 0.028*** -0.058***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Low income 0.003 -0.031*** -0.005 0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Low-middle income -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
High-middle income base base base base
High income -0.003 0.008 0.001 0.011
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Health insurance -0.009 0.016** 0.009 0.029***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
Poor health 0.002 -0.064*** -0.020 -0.183***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019)
Fair health 0.017*** -0.014 0.017** -0.107***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
Good health 0.023*** 0.014** 0.023*** -0.051***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Very good health 0.017*** 0.013** 0.018*** -0.014**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Excellent health base base base base
Comorbid conditions
High blood pressure -0.004 -0.010 0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Cardiovascular disease -0.041*** -0.031** -0.001 -0.013
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
Cancer -0.058*** -0.030* -0.022 0.015
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020)
Constant -0.119 0.313 0.504*** 0.504*
(0.165) (0.235) (0.192) (0.306)
Number of observations 46,996 46,996 46,996 46,996
Number of respondents 7,907 7,907 7,907 7,907
Notes: Coefficients from fixed effects linear probability models are reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5.B.4: Behavioral response to cardiovascular disease diagnosis
Smoking Any alcohol consumption Overweight/Obesity status Frequent exercise
Years since diagnosis
-6/-5 -0.012 -0.045** -0.018 0.025
(0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.027)
-4/-3 -0.018* -0.029* 0.004 -0.044*
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.023)
-2/-1 0.010 -0.015 -0.001 0.003
(0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.023)
0/1 -0.046*** -0.066*** -0.003 0.000
(0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.023)
2/3 -0.052*** -0.067*** -0.008 -0.033
(0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.025)
4/5 -0.042** -0.044* -0.008 -0.024
(0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029)
6/13 -0.019 -0.033 0.006 -0.046
(0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.030)
Calendar years
1999 base base base base
2001 -0.031*** 0.002 0.049*** -0.007
(0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019)
2003 -0.059*** -0.011 0.087*** -0.031
(0.019) (0.027) (0.021) (0.035)
2005 -0.088*** -0.022 0.126*** -0.072
(0.028) (0.039) (0.031) (0.051)
2007 -0.126*** -0.036 0.163*** -0.089
(0.037) (0.052) (0.042) (0.068)
2009 -0.155*** -0.028 0.199*** -0.081
(0.045) (0.065) (0.052) (0.084)
2011 -0.196*** -0.027 0.234*** -0.083
(0.054) (0.078) (0.062) (0.101)
2013 -0.229*** -0.040 0.253*** -0.073
(0.063) (0.090) (0.072) (0.117)
Demographics
Age (in years) 0.011** 0.008 0.012** 0.010
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Age (in years) squared -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.019** -0.035*** 0.029*** -0.055***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Low income 0.003 -0.036*** -0.004 -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Low-middle income -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
High-middle income base base base base
High income -0.003 0.010* 0.001 0.013*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Health insurance -0.010* 0.016** 0.013** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
Poor health 0.007 -0.074*** -0.013 -0.181***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020)
Fair health 0.022*** -0.016 0.016** -0.097***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
Good health 0.024*** 0.014** 0.021*** -0.053***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Very good health 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.018*** -0.017**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Excellent health base base base base
Comorbid conditions
Diabetes -0.026** -0.037** -0.055*** 0.024
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.017)
High blood pressure -0.001 -0.008 0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Cancer -0.049*** -0.032* -0.020 0.018
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
Constant -0.126 0.467** 0.503*** 0.529*
(0.165) (0.236) (0.189) (0.304)
Number of observations 45,617 45,617 45,617 45,617
Number of respondents 7,680 7,680 7,680 7,680
Notes: Coefficients from fixed effects linear probability models are reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5.B.5: Behavioral response to cancer diagnosis
Smoking Any alcohol consumption Overweight/Obesity status Frequent exercise
Years since diagnosis
-6/-5 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.013
(0.012) (0.020) (0.016) (0.029)
-4/-3 -0.004 0.010 -0.024 0.020
(0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.026)
-2/-1 0.009 -0.004 0.004 0.033
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.025)
0/1 -0.051*** -0.032* -0.032* 0.052*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.027)
2/3 -0.042** -0.026 -0.016 0.008
(0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.030)
4/5 -0.049** -0.051** -0.026 0.005
(0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.032)
6/13 -0.058** -0.048* -0.016 0.031
(0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.032)
Calendar years
1999 base base base base
2001 -0.030*** -0.001 0.053*** -0.011
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019)
2003 -0.060*** -0.016 0.093*** -0.042
(0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.035)
2005 -0.091*** -0.033 0.135*** -0.092*
(0.027) (0.038) (0.031) (0.050)
2007 -0.129*** -0.048 0.177*** -0.116*
(0.036) (0.051) (0.041) (0.067)
2009 -0.157*** -0.042 0.217*** -0.114
(0.044) (0.064) (0.051) (0.083)
2011 -0.201*** -0.046 0.254*** -0.120
(0.053) (0.076) (0.061) (0.100)
2013 -0.234*** -0.061 0.275*** -0.115
(0.062) (0.088) (0.071) (0.116)
Demographics
Age (in years) 0.011** 0.010 0.010* 0.016*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Age (in years) squared 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.018** -0.030*** 0.026*** -0.060***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Low income 0.003 -0.033*** -0.007 -0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Low-middle income -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
High-middle income base base base base
High income -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.014*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Health insurance -0.010* 0.019** 0.010 0.031***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
Poor health 0.007 -0.066*** -0.014 -0.184***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.018)
Fair health 0.018*** -0.009 0.019*** -0.105***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
Good health 0.023*** 0.016** 0.022*** -0.051***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Very good health 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** -0.015**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Excellent health base base base base
Comorbid conditions
Diabetes -0.026** -0.042*** -0.057*** 0.019
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.017)
High blood pressure -0.007 -0.009 0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Cardiovascular disease -0.040*** -0.036** -0.004 -0.001
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
Constant -0.147 0.387 0.575*** 0.375
(0.164) (0.236) (0.190) (0.307)
Number of observations 47,810 47,810 47,810 47,810
Number of respondents 8,051 8,051 8,051 8,051
Notes: Coefficients from fixed effects linear probability models are reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis consists of four studies that seek to understand different aspects of prevention
and health behaviors from a health economist’s perspective.
The first study evaluates the impact of the Dutch breast cancer screening program
on breast cancer and all-cause mortality. This program is a typical example of the
population-based organized screening programs that were initiated in the late 1980s and
early 1990s in many European countries to combat rising mortality rates from breast
cancer. The results show that in the Dutch case the program has successfully reduced
mortality from breast cancer. At the end of a follow-up period of 17 years, women who
had a delay of at least 24 months in receiving the first invitation for a mammography from
the program, and consequently received, on average, one less screen in a lifetime, are more
likely to die from breast cancer than their same-aged peers who experienced a shorter
delay in their first invitation. This study adds to a polarized literature divided between
proponents of screening, who claim that regular screening saves lives, and opponents,
who argue that there is not enough reliable evidence to make such a claim. Opponents
additionally argue that, in the modern era, i.e. the period after the introduction of
adjuvant systemic therapy, early detection has become less important mainly due to
advances in cancer treatment (Bleyer & Welch, 2012).1 By following the same cohort of
women over time, the analysis in this study accounts for the role of improved treatment
in reducing breast cancer mortality and concludes that screening itself contributes to a
lower death rate from breast cancer.
The results are less favorable when it comes to the impact of the screening program on
mortality from all causes. The study finds no statistically significant difference between
the overall mortality rate of women who waited for at least 24 months before entering
1 In the Netherlands, adjuvant therapy was introduced in the early 1980s for women with node-positive
breast cancer. However, women with node-negative disease did not receive it before 2000 (Otto et al.,
2003).
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the program and that of women waited for less than 24 months. Then the question is
which outcome, all-cause mortality or cancer-specific mortality, should we use to judge
the effectiveness of cancer screening programs. Penston (2011) argues that all-cause
mortality is a more reliable outcome as accuracy of disease specific mortality depends
on the correct identification of the cause of death. Black et al. (2002) support this
argument by claiming that in screening trials deaths from other causes are more likely
to be falsely attributed to the target cancer among the screened group as they are more
likely to be diagnosed with target cancer relative to the non-screened group. On the
other hand, the target cancer is less likely to be assigned as a cause of death among the
non-screened group since the target cancer had not been previously diagnosed. These
two different misclassifications combined would exert downward bias on the estimated
benefit of screening when cancer-specific mortality is used as an outcome. Moreover, use
of all-cause mortality can accommodate possible harms of screening. Fatal complications
may arise during an invasive procedure carried out to assess a suspicious screening result
further. While such deaths from screening are not included in cancer-specific mortality
figures, they are certainly relevant for the evaluation of benefits of screening. Another
relevant point is mortality from treatment of early disease which mainly concerns the
cases of over-diagnosis who would have never received the treatment that killed them
had there be no screening. Gøtzsche & Olsen (2000) document that in RCTs from
Malmo and Stockholm, both surgery and radiotherapy were more common among women
screened for breast cancer. According to Early Breast Cancer Trialists’ Collaborative
Group (2000), use of radiotherapy in women with early detected breast cancer increases
overall mortality in the long-run, mainly due to an elevated risk of cardiovascular death.
As long as screening and treatment related deaths are not counted in cancer-specific
mortality, using it as an outcome will overestimate the benefits of screening. However
such deaths will be reflected in all-cause mortality figures, making overall mortality a
more comprehensive outcome to look at.
On the other hand, deaths from even common cancers make up a very small portion
of the total number of deaths. Therefore, Steele & Brewster (2011) argue that it would
take impractically large RCTs to show a statistically significant reduction in all-cause
mortality due to cancer screening. Of course, this is more of practical issue rather than
an argument for the superiority of cancer-specific mortality over all-cause mortality as an
outcome. Maybe a more appealing argument is that cancer screening is not designed to
reduce overall mortality. If all medical interventions were to be evaluated with respect
to their impact on all-cause mortality, then some of the medical interventions used today
would perhaps be given a second thought as well.
Although all-cause mortality is admittedly a stringent outcome to look at while evalu-
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ating cancer screening programs, it reflects the policy maker’s ultimate goal of improving
overall survival. Maybe what is worthwhile is to take additional outcomes into account,
such as the rate of overdiagnosis and false-positives, stage at diagnosis and life expectancy.
These statistics would provide the policy maker with a middle ground by giving her the
chance to look beyond cancer-specific mortality without being as stringent as overall mor-
tality. For example, improved stage at diagnosis, i.e. detection of cancer at an earlier
stage, might be a beneficial outcome if treatment is less costly at earlier stages relative
to later stages. Then depending on the cost of the program compared to treatment costs,
a policy maker may be in favor of keeping the program despite its lack of effect on over-
all mortality. As for life expectancy, it can be that the program does not reduce the
cumulative number of deaths at the end of a given time period but it extends life.
The second and third studies can be unified under the theme of educational dispar-
ities in health with a special focus on preventive care and health behaviors as potential
mechanisms. The second study documents that there are no educational differences in
breast cancer screening uptake in the Netherlands where a population-based organized
screening program invites women of a certain age group for a free screening. In contrast
to the Netherlands, there are large differences in take-up rate in the United States which
does not operate such a program. The reason why higher educated women in the United
States are more likely to get screened seems to be that they earn a higher income and
have better insurance coverage relative to the lower educated. Perhaps contrary to ex-
pectations, educational differences in information possession (e.g. benefits and harms of
mammograms) and risk perceptions (e.g. expected probability of getting breast cancer)
seem to play only a minor role in generating the education gradient. Therefore, the
study concludes that, based on evidence from the Netherlands and the United States,
educational disparities in access to medical care rather than in awareness/knowledge is
the main driver behind educational disparities in screening participation.
In contrast to the second study, the third study underlines the large role that dif-
ferences in nutrition knowledge plays in driving differences in dietary behavior across
education groups. Higher educated individuals have better knowledge than the lower ed-
ucated on the adverse health consequences of unhealthy consumption and choose healthier
options. Providing nutrition information (e.g. diseases associated with the overconsump-
tion of calories and the recommended daily amount of calories) largely eliminates these
education differentials suggesting that what makes the lower educated make poor food
choices is lack of information. The finding that knowledge carries a larger importance
in explaining the education gradient in food choice relative to breast cancer screening
might be because information on breast cancer is more widespread than information on
dietary behavior. Moreover there is more uncertainty surrounding healthy eating pat-
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terns compared to breast cancer risk factors and screening methods. These factors might
give the higher educated a comparative advantage as they are more efficient than the
lower educated in collecting and processing information. Nonetheless, even after level-
ling off all knowledge differentials between education groups, the higher educated tend
to choose healthier diets suggesting that they value their health more. Auxiliary analy-
ses suggest that at least part of these differences in the valuation of health derives from
higher incomes among the higher educated.
The finding that the lower educated lack relevant information while making dietary
choices implies that there is room for government intervention. One option is that the
government supplies the missing information or requires the food producers to do so. A
widely considered alternative to information provision is introducing a tax on unhealthy
food items to make consumers internalize the costs (e.g. health care costs associated with
obesity, cardiovascular disease etc.) that they impose on themselves and on the society.
A small counterfactual analysis suggests that while taxes on unhealthy food would make
healthier options more attractive for lower educated individuals, the required taxes would
have to be implausibly large, i.e. as high as 200 percent, to make these options equally
attractive as a tasty, cheap, quick and unhealthy meal. Thus, the results from this study
suggest that interventions such as calorie labeling, health warnings that aim to distribute
nutrition knowledge carry more potential than introducing taxes in inducing the lower
educated to eat more healthily.
The last study illustrates the potential of information provision in encouraging healthy
behaviors for a particular subset of the population: the chronically ill. Based on the recog-
nition that physicians provide information and advice, along with medical care, the study
uses a new diagnosis with a chronic condition to evaluate the impact of information on
reducing smoking and alcohol consumption, losing weight and engaging in physical ac-
tivity. Following the physician’s recommendation, individuals abstain from smoking and
drinking, both in the short- and long-run, after being diagnosed with a chronic condi-
tion, irrespective of the severity of the condition. However, in terms of losing weight
and getting physically active, there is hardly any response, if not a tendency towards the
opposite of what is recommended. The behavioral response does not differ by education
level possibly due a selection effect: individuals who get a chronic condition despite the
protective effect on health of their higher education might have unobserved characteris-
tics which separate them from the other higher educated individuals. Findings of this
study should be interpreted with caution as they do not reflect the pure effect on health
behaviors of information provision but a mixture of the effect of information, medication
and physical constraints that come altogether with a diagnosis.
Although the findings of this thesis improved our understanding of prevention and
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health behaviors, it is possible to identify several directions for future research. First,
more research is required to shed light on the differing impact of the Dutch breast cancer
screening program on breast cancer and all-cause mortality as found in the second study.
An estimate of the level of over-diagnosis and false-positives in the program should give
us an indication of the role of harms of screening in explaining this difference. Second,
the third study shows that there are information differences by education in nutrition
knowledge but these differences alone cannot fully account for the education gradient in
dietary choice. What are possible explanations, in addition to the value of health, for
the part of the gradient that is not related with information? Peer effects and the degree
of self-control can be fruitful areas to explore. Third, why do the higher educated value
their health more? Auxiliary analyses carried out in the third study should be expanded
to answer this question. Finally, how can we encourage the chronically ill behave more
healthily? What are the possible interventions that can induce these individuals to adopt
a healthy diet and physical activity?
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Samenvatting
Chronische ziekten vormen e´e´n van ’s werelds grootste gezondheidsuitdagingen. Zo zijn
ze de belangrijkste doodsoorzaak: In 2000 stierven wereldwijd 31 miljoen mensen aan
een chronische ziekte, in 2012 waren dat er 38 miljoen (World Health Organization,
2014). Bijna de helft van deze sterfgevallen waren voorbarig, d.w.z. ze troffen mensen
jonger dan 70 jaar oud (World Health Organization, 2014). Chronische ziekten zijn niet
alleen verantwoordelijk voor een groot aantal sterfgevallen, ze hebben ook een signifi-
cant negatief effect op de economie. Zo wordt geschat dat in 2003 chronische ziekten de
economie van de Verenigde Staten 1.3 biljoen hebben gekost aan behandelingskosten (20
procent) en aan afgenomen arbeidsaanbod en productiviteit (80 procent; DeVol et al.,
2007). In 2011 leidde erkenning van de stijgende problematiek ertoe dat wereldleiders
hun handtekening zetten onder een VN-verklaring over niet-overdraagbare aandoenin-
gen. In deze verklaring committeerden wereldleiders zich tot het opstellen en versterken
van nationale beleidsplannen ter preventie en bestrijding van chronische ziekten (United
Nations General Assembly, 2011).
In de ge¨ındustrialiseerde wereld bestrijkt preventie een breed scala aan interventies,
van informatiecampagnes die gezondheidsbevorderende activiteiten stimuleren tot inter-
venties die erop gericht zijn ziektes in een vroegtijdig stadium op te sporen. Dit laatste
type interventie wordt veelvuldig georganiseerd door middel van bevolkingsonderzoeken
waarbij inwoners van een land zich gratis of tegen lage kosten kunnen laten screenen
(voorbeelden zijn de mammografie voor borstkanker en de colonoscopie voor darmkanker).
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift – hoofdstukken twee en drie – roept twee vragen op
over georganiseerde screening of bevolkingsonderzoeken in hoge-inkomenslanden in het
algemeen: (i) zijn ze effectief in het terugdringen van sterfte als gevolg van chronische
ziekten, (ii) kunnen zij de breed gedocumenteerde sociaal-economische verschillen in het
gebruik van preventieve zorg verklaren (Fletcher & Frisvold, 2009; Mullahy, 1999; Cutler
& Lleras-Muney, 2010), en zo ja, hoe?
Hoofdstuk twee evalueert het effect van het Nederlandse bevolkingsonderzoek naar
borstkanker, zowel op borstkankersterfte als totale sterfte. De empirische strategie maakt
gebruik van de geleidelijke uitbreiding van het programma over gemeenten tussen 1995 en
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1997 – dat ertoe leidde dat sommige vrouwen van een bepaalde leeftijd hun eerste uitn-
odiging voor deelname eerder ontvingen dan andere vrouwen – om het causale effect van
het bevolkingsonderzoek op borstkankersterfte en totale sterfte te schatten. De resultaten
geven aan dat het programma erin is geslaagd om het aantal sterftegevallen als gevolg van
borstkanker terug te dringen: aan het einde van 2011 zijn er onder vrouwen woonachtig
in gemeenten die tenminste 24 maanden later begonnen met screenen 170 meer doden
per 100,000 vrouwen. Deze vrouwen ontvangen gemiddeld genomen e´e´n uitnodiging voor
het bevolkingsonderzoek minder. Aan de andere kant laat het onderzoek geen effect zien
op de totale sterfte.
Hoofdstuk drie bestudeert of er verschillen bestaan in het gebruik van borstkanker-
screening tussen mensen met een ander opleidingsniveau. Hierbij wordt gekeken naar
Nederland – dat een bevolkingsonderzoek kent – en de Verenigde Staten – dat geen bevolk-
ingsonderzoek kent. In Nederland bestaan er, onder vrouwen die worden uitgenodigd
voor een gratis mammografie in het kader van het bevolkingsonderzoek, geen verschillen
in mammografie-gebruik tussen opleidingsniveaus. In de Verenigde Staten bestaan deze
verschillen echter wel. Verder onderzoek duidt erop dat het verschil in mammografie-
gebruik tussen vrouwen met ander opleidingsniveaus vooral gerelateerd is aan verschillen
in inkomen, verzekeringsdekking en toegang tot medische zorg.
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift – hoofdstukken vier en vijf – staan gezonde
leefstijlen centraal. Volgens Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009) zijn roken,
drinken, fysieke inactiviteit en een ongezond dieet verantwoordelijk voor een groot deel
van arbeidsongeschiktheid, morbiditeit en sterfte als gevolg van chronische ziekten in
de Verenigde Staten. Een vergelijkbaar beeld bestaat ook voor alle andere ontwikkelde
landen (World Health Organization, 2009). Hierdoor dringt de vraag zich op waarom
mensen zich, ondanks de schadelijke gevolgen, zo ongezond gedragen, en vervolgens hoe
wij hen kunnen overtuigen gezonder te gaan leven? Ongezond gedrag komt met name
voor onder mensen met een lage sociaal-economische status. (Cutler & Lleras-Muney,
2010) laten bijvoorbeeld zien dat mensen met een laag opleidingsniveau vaker roken,
drinken, overgewicht hebben in vergelijking met hoger opgeleiden.
Een van de meest voorkomende verklaringen voor de waargenomen verschillen in
gezond gedrag of het gebruik van preventieve zorg is gezondheidskennis. Grossman (1972)
stelt dat hoger opgeleiden efficie¨nter zijn in het produceren van gezondheid. Een mogeli-
jke reden hiervoor is de “allocatieve efficie¨ntie” hypothese, die stelt dat hoger opgeleiden
een grotere kennis over gezond gedrag hebben en daarom beter in staat zijn om gezon-
dere keuzes te maken. Een alternatieve verklaring is “productieve efficie¨ntie” hypothese,
die stelt dat hoger opgeleiden efficie¨nter gebruik maken van een gegeven hoeveelheid
kennis. Hoofdstuk drie onderzoekt of de allocatieve efficie¨ntie hypothese kan verklaren
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waarom er geen gradie¨nt over opleidingsniveaus bestaat in het gebruik van een mammo-
grafie in Nederland, terwijl een dergelijke gradie¨nt wel bestaat in de Verenigde Staten.
De veronderstelling is dat een bevolkingsonderzoek het belang van eventuele verschillen
in informatie reduceert. Echter, uit de analyse blijkt dat conditioneren op subjectieve
beoordelingen van het screeningsrisico en van het risico op borstkanker nauwelijks van
invloed is op de gradie¨nt over opleidingsniveaus in de Verenigde Staten. Dit suggereert
dat verschillen in informatie tussen opleidingsniveaus hooguit een kleine rol spelen in het
begrijpen van de onderwijsgradie¨nt.
In de literatuur zijn slechts een paar studies te vinden die de allocatieve efficie¨nte hy-
pothese expliciet testen, omdat data over zowel gezondheidskennis als levensstijlen schaars
zijn (Kenkel, 1991; Lange, 2011). Hoofdstuk vier lost dit probleem op door gebruik te
maken van een zelf ontworpen discreet-keuze experiment om zo de vraag te beantwoor-
den waarom hoger opgeleiden een gezonder dieet volgen dan lager opgeleiden. Deelnemers
aan het experiment werden willekeurig toegewezen aan groepen die ieder een verschillende
hoeveelheid informatie ontvingen. Hierdoor kan er onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen
gezondheidskennis en gezondheidswaardering. De resultaten van het experiment duiden
erop dat hoger opgeleiden een gezonder dieet volgen dan lager opgeleiden, omdat hoger
opgeleiden een veel betere gezondheidskennis hebben. Op het moment dat lager opgelei-
den informatie krijgen over de negatieve gevolgen van een ongezond dieet en informatie
over de dagelijks aanbevolen hoeveelheden, zoals over het aantal caloriee¨n, gaan ze ook
gezondere keuzes maken. Extra informatie heeft echter nauwelijks gevolgen voor de keuzes
van hoger opgeleiden. Desalniettemin blijven lager opgeleiden ongezondere keuzes maken
in vergelijking met hoger opgeleiden, zelfs als ze exact dezelfde hoeveelheid informatie
ontvangen. Dit suggereert dat lager opgeleiden minder belang hechten aan een goede
gezondheid.
Hoofdstuk vijf onderzoekt het potentieel van informatievoorziening in het aanzetten
tot gezond gedrag onder chronisch zieken. Patie¨nten krijgen na de diagnose van een
chronische ziekte een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid informatie. Aan de ene kant krijgen ze
het advies van hun arts om hun levensstijl te verbeteren, wat de relatie tussen gezond-
heidsuitkomsten en gedrag benadrukt. Aan de andere kant informeert een diagnose de
patie¨nt over haar/zijn daadwerkelijke onderliggende gezondheid, wat een wake-up call
kan zijn voor sommige patie¨nten. Een diagnose kan daarom gezien worden als een sterke
“information treatment” op het individuele niveau. De resultaten geven aan dat, in
overeenstemming met de aanbevelingen van artsen, mensen zich na een diagnose van een
chronische ziekte onthouden van roken en drinken, zowel op de korte als lange termijn.
Dit geldt zowel voor patie¨nten met hart- en vaatziekten als voor diabetici. Hierbij moet
worden opgemerkt dat de daling van het aantal rokers sterker is onder patie¨nten met
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hart- en vaatziekten. Echter, mensen verliezen nauwelijks gewicht en gaan nauwelijks
meer bewegen.
Dit proefschrift bevat waardevolle inzichten voor beleidsdiscussies. Ten eerste, de
bevinding dat het Nederlandse bevolkingsonderzoek naar borstkanker sterfte als gevolg
van borstkanker vermindert is van groot belang in het kader van twijfels over de effec-
tiviteit van dergelijke programma’s. De bevinding is gebaseerd op een solide identificatie
strategie en is dus een waardevolle bijdrage aan het huidige, zeer gefragmenteerde, debat
over screening, waar niet al het gepresenteerde bewijs van gelijke kwaliteit is. Het ont-
breken van een effect van het bevolkingsonderzoek naar borstkanker op totale sterfte laat
enige twijfel bestaan over het effect van het bevolkingsonderzoek op de gezondheid van
de gehele bevolking. Het in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde bewijs duidt erop dat de rol
van gezondheidskennis in het cree¨ren van sociaal-economische verschillen afhangt van het
gedrag in kwestie. Hierdoor is het succes van interventies die gezondheidskennis willen
bevorderen teneinde sociaal-economische ongelijkheden terug te dringen afhankelijk van
het gedrag waarop de interventie is gericht.
150
References
Adamowicz, V. W. L., & Swait, J. D. (2011). Discrete Choice Theory and Modeling. In
J. L. Lusk, J. Roosen, & J. F. Shogren (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics
of Food Consumption and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Allcott, H. (2015). Site Selection Bias in Program Evaluation. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics , 130 (3), 1117–1165.
American Cancer Society. (2011). Global Cancer Facts & Figures. 2nd Edition (Tech.
Rep.). Atlanta, GA: American Cancer Society.
American Cancer Society. (2012a). Breast Cancer Facts & Figures 2011-2012 (Tech.
Rep.). Atlanta, GA: American Cancer Society.
American Cancer Society. (2012b). Breast Cancer Prevention and Early Detection (Tech.
Rep.). Atlanta, GA: American Cancer Society.
American Cancer Society. (2014). Cancer Facts & Figures 2014 (Tech. Rep.). Atlanta,
GA: American Cancer Society.
American Cancer Society. (2015). Cancer Facts & Figures 2015 (Tech. Rep.). Atlanta,
GA: American Cancer Society.
American Heart Association. (2014a). Home Blood Pressure Monitor-
ing. http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/HighBloodPressure/
SymptomsDiagnosisMonitoringofHighBloodPressure/Home-Blood-Pressure
-Monitoring UCM 301874 Article.jsp.
American Heart Association. (2014b). Prevention & Treatment of High Blood
Pressure. http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/HighBloodPressure/
PreventionTreatmentofHighBloodPressure/Prevention-Treatment-of-High
-Blood-Pressure UCM 002054 Article.jsp.
151
Andreski, P., McGonagle, K., & Schoeni, R. (2009). An Analysis of the Quality of the
Health Data in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID Technical Series Paper No.
09-02). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.
Autor, D. H., & Duggan, M. G. (2006). The Growth in the Social Security Disability
Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding. The Journal of Economic Perspectives , 20 , 71–96.
Avitabile, C., Jappelli, T., & Padula, M. (2011). Cognitive Abilities, Healthcare and
Screening Tests. Journal of Population Ageing , 4 (4), 251–269.
Barsky, R. B., Kimball, M. S., Juster, T. F., & Shapiro, M. D. (1997). Preference
Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health
and Retirement Survey. The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 112 (2), 537–579.
Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., & Hansen, C. (2014). Inference on Treatment Effects
after Selection among High-Dimensional Controls. The Review of Economic Studies ,
81 (2), 608–650.
Bergman, L., Beelen, M. L., Gallee, M. P., Hollema, H., Benraadt, J., van Leeuwen, F. E.,
& the Comprehensive Cancer Centers’ ALERT Group. (2000). Risk and Prognosis of
Endometrial Cancer after Tamoxifen for Breast Cancer. The Lancet , 356 (9233), 881–
887.
Bernheim, B. D., & Rangel, A. (2004). Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes.
American Economic Review , 94 (5), 1558–1590.
Berrington de Gonzalez, A., Hartge, P., Cerhan, J. R., Flint, A. J., Hannan, L., MacInnis,
R. J., . . . Thun, M. J. (2010). Body-Mass Index and Mortality Among 1.46 Million
White Adults. New England Journal of Medicine, 363 (23), 2211–2219.
Bijwaard, G., & Van Kippersluis, H. (2015). Efficiency of Health Investment: Education
or Intelligence? (Working paper No. TI-15-004/V). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
Black, W. C., Haggstrom, D. A., & Welch, G. H. (2002). All-Cause Mortality in Ran-
domized Trials of Cancer Screening. Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 94 (3),
167–173.
Bleyer, A., & Welch, H. G. (2012). Effect of Three Decades of Screening Mammography
on Breast Cancer Incidence. New England Journal of Medicine, 367 (21), 1998–2005.
Bliemer, M. C. J., & Rose, J. M. (2010). Construction of Experimental Designs for Mixed
Logit Models Allowing for Correlation across Choice Observations. Transportation
Research Part B: Methodological , 44 (6), 720–734.
152
Bollinger, B., Leslie, P., & Sorensen, A. (2011). Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy , 3 (1), 91–128.
Borstkanker Vereniging Nederland. (2005). Rapport Onderbehandeling van Borstkanker-
Patie¨nten met Uitgezaaide HER2-Positieve Tumoren (Tech. Rep.). Utrecht:
Borstkanker Vereniging Nederland.
Boule´, N. G., Haddad, E., Kenny, G. P., Wells, G. A., & Sigal, R. J. (2001). Effects of
Exercise on Glycemic Control and Body-Mass in Type-2 Diabetes Mellitus: A Meta-
Analysis of Controlled Clinical Trials. Journal of the American Medical Association,
286 (10), 1218–1227.
Carman, K. G., & Kooreman, P. (2014). Probability Perceptions and Preventive Health
Care. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , 49 (1), 43–71.
Carson, A. P., Howard, G., Burke, G. L., Shea, S., Levitan, E. B., & Muntner, P. (2011).
Ethnic Differences in Hypertension Incidence Among Middle-Aged and Older Adults
The Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis. Hypertension, 57 (6), 1101–1107.
Cawley, J. (2004). An Economic Framework for Understanding Physical Activity and
Eating Behaviors. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 27 (3), 117–125.
Cawley, J., & Meyerhoefer, C. (2012). The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An Instru-
mental Variables Approach. Journal of Health Economics , 31 (1), 219–230.
Cawley, J., & Ruhm, C. J. (2011). The Economics of Risky Health Behaviors. In
M. V. Pauly, T. G. McGuire, & P. P. Barros (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics
(Vol. 2). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
CentER Data. (2011). LISS Panel. http://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2009). The Power of Prevention: Chronic
Disease, the Public Health Challenge of the 21st Century (Tech. Rep.). Atlanta, GA:
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2014). National Diabetes Statistics Report:
Estimates of Diabetes and its Burden in the United States, 2014 (Tech. Rep.). Atlanta,
GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Chaloupka, F. J., & Warner, K. E. (2000). The Economics of Smoking. In A. J. Culyer
& J. P. Newhouse (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics (Vol. 1). Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
153
Chapman, J.-A. W., Meng, D., Shepherd, L., Parulekar, W., Ingle, J. N., Muss, H. B.,
. . . Goss, P. E. (2008). Competing Causes of Death from a Randomized Trial of
Extended Adjuvant Endocrine Therapy for Breast Cancer. Journal of the National
Cancer Institute, 100 (4), 252–260.
Chobanian, A. V., Bakris, G. L., Black, H. R., Cushman, W. C., Green, L. A., Izzo Jr,
J. L., . . . the National High Blood Pressure Education Program Coordinating Com-
mittee (2003). The Seventh Report of the Joint National Committee on Prevention,
Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure: The JNC 7 Report.
Journal of the American Medical Association, 289 (19), 2560–2571.
Chowdhury, R., Warnakula, S., Kunutsor, S., Crowe, F., Ward, H. A., Johnson, L., . . .
Di Angelantonio, E. (2014). Association of Dietary, Circulating, and Supplement Fatty
Acids with Coronary Risk: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis. Annals of Internal
Medicine, 160 (6), 398-406.
Chung, Y. (2013). Chronic Health Conditions and Economic Outcomes (Mimeo).
Clark, A., & Etile, F. (2002). Do Health Changes Affect Smoking? Evidence from British
Panel Data. Journal of Health Economics , 21 (4), 533–562.
Cohen, J. T., Neumann, P. J., & Weinstein, M. C. (2008). Does Preventive Care Save
Money? Health Economics and the Presidential Candidates. New England Journal of
Medicine, 358 (7), 661–663.
Collette, H. J. A., Rombach, J. J., Day, N. E., & De Waard, F. (1984). Evaluation of
Screening for Breast Cancer in a Non-Randomized Study (the DOM project) by Means
of a Case-Control Study. The Lancet , 323 (8388), 1224–1226.
Commission of the European Countries. (1990). Europe against Cancer Programme:
Report on the Implementation of the First Plan of Action, 1987-1989. Communica-
tion from the European Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee (Tech. Rep.). Brussells: EU Commission.
Conti, G., & Hansman, C. (2013). Personality and the Education-Health Gradient: A
Note on “Understanding Differences in Health Behaviors by Education”. Journal of
Health Economics , 32 (2), 480–485.
Conti, G., Heckman, J., & Urzua, S. (2010). The Education-Health Gradient. American
Economic Review , 100 (2), 234-38.
154
Cornfield, J. (1951). A Method of Estimating Comparative Rates from Clinical Data.
Applications to Cancer of the Lung, Breast, and Cervix. Journal of the National Cancer
Institute, 11 , 1269–1275.
Critchley, J. A., & Capewell, S. (2003). Smoking Cessation for the Secondary Prevention
of Coronary Heart Disease. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews(CD003041).
Cutler, D. M. (2008). Are We Finally Winning the War on Cancer? The Journal of
Economic Perspectives , 22 (4), 3–26.
Cutler, D. M., Glaeser, E. L., & Shapiro, J. M. (2003). Why have Americans Become
more Obese? The Journal of Economic Perspectives , 17 (3), 93-118.
Cutler, D. M., & Lleras-Muney, A. (2010). Understanding Differences in Health Behaviors
by Education. Journal of Health Economics , 29 (1), 1–28.
Cutler, D. M., Lleras-Muney, A., & Vogl, T. (2011). Socioeconomic Status and Health:
Dimensions and Mechanisms. In S. Glied & P. C. Smith (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of
Health Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Irala-Estevez, J., Groth, M., Johansson, L., Oltersdorf, U., Prattala, R., & Mart´ınez-
Gonza´lez, M. A. (2000). A Systematic Review of Socioeconomic Differences in Food
Habits in Europe: Consumption of Fruit and Vegetables. European Journal of Clinical
Nutrition, 54 (9), 706–714.
DeVol, R., Bedroussian, A., Charuworn, A., Chatterjee, A., Kim, I. K., Kim, S., & Klow-
den, K. (2007). An Unhealthy America: The Economic Burden of Chronic Disease.
Charting a New Course to Save Lives and Increase Productivity and Economic Growth
(Project report). Santa Monica, CA: Milken Institute.
Dodd, G. D. (1992). American Cancer Society Guidelines on Screening for Breast Cancer:
An Overview. CA: A Cancer Journal for Clinicians , 42 (3), 177–180.
Downs, J. S., Loewenstein, G., & Wisdom, J. (2009). Strategies for Promoting Healthier
Food Choices. The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings , 99 (2), 159–
164.
Doyle, C., Kushi, L. H., Byers, T., Courneya, K. S., Demark-Wahnefried, W., Grant, B.,
. . . Andrews, K. S. (2006). Nutrition and Physical Activity During and After Cancer
Treatment: An American Cancer Society Guide for Informed Choices. CA: A Cancer
Journal for Clinicians , 56 (6), 323–353.
155
Drewnowski, A. (1997). Taste Preferences and Food Intake. Annual Review of Nutrition,
17 (1), 237-253.
Drewnowski, A., & Specter, S. E. (2004). Poverty and Obesity: The Role of Energy
Density and Energy Costs. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 79 (1), 6–16.
Early Breast Cancer Trialists’ Collaborative Group. (2000). Favourable and Unfavourable
Effects on Long-Term Survival of Radiotherapy for Early Breast Cancer: An Overview
of the Randomized Trials. The Lancet , 355 (9217), 1757–1770.
Elbel, B., Kersh, R., Brescoll, V. L., & Dixon, L. B. (2009). Calorie Labeling and Food
Choices: A First Look at the Effects on Low-Income People in New York City. Health
Affairs , 28 (6), w1110–w1121.
Etile´, F. (2011). Food Consumption and Health. In J. L. Lusk, J. Roosen, & J. F. Shogren
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Food Consumption and Policy. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
European Union. (2006). Regulation (EC) No. 1924/2006 of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Nutrition and Health Claims Made on Foods.
Evert, A. B., Boucher, J. L., Cypress, M., Dunbar, S. A., Franz, M. J., Mayer-Davis,
E. J., . . . others (2013). Nutrition Therapy Recommendations for the Management of
Adults With Diabetes. Diabetes Care, 36 (11), 3821–3842.
Falba, T. (2005). Health Events and the Smoking Cessation of Middle Aged Americans.
Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 28 (1), 21–33.
Ferlay, J., Steliarova-Foucher, E., Lortet-Tieulent, J., Rosso, S., Coebergh, J. W. W.,
Comber, H., . . . Bray, F. (2013). Cancer Incidence and Mortality Patterns in Europe:
Estimates for 40 Countries in 2012. European Journal of Cancer , 49 (6), 1374–1403.
Fiebig, D. G., Keane, M. P., Louviere, J., & Wasi, N. (2010). The Generalized Multi-
nomial Logit Model: Accounting for Scale and Coefficient Heterogeneity. Marketing
Science, 29 (3), 393-421.
Fielder, H. M., Brook, D., Cuzick, J., Warwick, J., & Duffy, S. W. (2004). A Case-
Control Study to Estimate the Impact on Breast Cancer Death of the Breast Screening
Programme in Wales. Breast Cancer Res , 6 (Suppl 1), 1–2.
Finkelstein, E. A., Strombotne, K. L., Chan, N. L., & Krieger, J. (2011). Mandatory Menu
Labeling in One Fast-Food Chain in King County, Washington. American Journal of
Preventive Medicine, 40 (2), 122–127.
156
Fletcher, J. M., & Frisvold, D. E. (2009). Higher Education and Health Investments:
Does more Schooling Affect Preventive Health Care Use? Journal of human capital ,
3 (2), 144–176.
Frank, E., & Kunovichfrieze, T. (1995). Physicians? Prevention Counseling Behaviors:
Current Status and Future Directions. Preventive medicine, 24 (6), 543–545.
Franz, M. J., Bantle, J. P., Beebe, C. A., Brunzell, J. D., Chiasson, J.-L., Garg, A., . . .
Wheeler, M. (2002). Evidence-Based Nutrition Principles and Recommendations for
the Treatment and Prevention of Diabetes and Related Complications. Diabetes Care,
25 (1), 148–198.
Freedland, S. J., Aronson, W. J., Kane, C. J., Presti, J. C., Amling, C. L., Elashoff,
D., & Terris, M. K. (2004). Impact of Obesity on Biochemical Control after Radical
Prostatectomy for Clinically Localized Prostate Cancer: A Report by the Shared Equal
Access Regional Cancer Hospital Database Study Group. Journal of Clinical Oncology ,
22 (3), 446–453.
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (2006). A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control. The
American Economic Review , 96 (5), 1449–1476.
Galama, T., & Van Kippersluis, H. (2010). A Theory of Socioeconomic Disparities
in Health over the Life Cycle (Working paper No. 773). Santa Monica, CA: RAND
corporation.
Ge´rvas, J., Starfield, B., & Heath, I. (2008). Is Clinical Prevention Better than Cure?
The Lancet , 372 (9654), 1997–1999.
Giles, J. (2011). Social Science Lines Up its Biggest Challenges. Nature, 470 (7332),
18–19.
Goldman, D., & Smith, J. P. (2002). Can Patient Self-Management Help Explain the SES
Health Gradient? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 99 , 10929–10934.
Gøtzsche, P. C., & Jørgensen, K. J. (2013). Screening for Breast Cancer with Mammog-
raphy. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews(CD001877).
Gøtzsche, P. C., & Nielsen, M. (2011). Screening for Breast Cancer with Mammography.
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews(CD001877).
Gøtzsche, P. C., & Olsen, O. (2000). Is Screening for Breast Cancer with Mammography
Justifiable? The Lancet , 355 (9198), 129–134.
157
Grossman, M. (1972). On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health.
The Journal of Political Economy , 223–255.
Hanson, K., McPake, B., Nakamba, P., & Archard, L. (2005). Preferences for Hospital
Quality in Zambia: Results from a Discrete Choice Experiment. Health Economics ,
14 (7), 687–701.
Harris, E. E., Correa, C., Hwang, W.-T., Liao, J., Litt, H. I., Ferrari, V. A., & Solin,
L. J. (2006). Late Cardiac Mortality and Morbidity in Early-Stage Breast Cancer
Patients after Breast-Conservation Treatment. Journal of Clinical Oncology , 24 (25),
4100–4106.
Harteloh, P., de Bruin, K., & Kardaun, J. (2010). The Reliability of Cause-of-Death
Coding in the Netherlands. European Journal of Epidemiology , 25 (8), 531–538.
Hausman, J. (2012). Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives , 26 (4), 43–56.
Hayashi, K., Fukushima, K., Sagara, Y., & Takeshita, M. (1999). Surgical Treatment
for Patients with Lung Cancer Complicated by Severe Pulmonary Emphysema. The
Japanese Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery , 47 (12), 583–587.
Haydon, A. M., MacInnis, R. J., English, D. R., & Giles, G. G. (2006). Effect of Physical
Activity and Body Size on Survival after Diagnosis with Colorectal Cancer. Gut , 55 (1),
62–67.
Heck, K. E., & Pamuk, E. R. (1997). Explaining the Relation between Education and
Postmenopausal Breast Cancer. American Journal of Epidemiology , 145 (4), 366–372.
Hensher, D. A. (2006). How do Respondents Process Stated Choice Experiments? At-
tribute Consideration under Varying Information Load. Journal of Applied Economet-
rics , 21 (6), 861–878.
Hensher, D. A., Rose, J. M., & Greene, W. H. (2005). Applied Choice Analysis: A
Primer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heron, M. (2015). Deaths: Leading Causes for 2011 (Vol. 64; National Vital Statistics
Reports No. 7). Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics.
Hershman, D. L., Buono, D., McBride, R. B., Tsai, W. Y., Joseph, K. A., Grann, V. R., &
Jacobson, J. S. (2008). Surgeon Characteristics and Receipt of Adjuvant Radiotherapy
in Women with Breast Cancer. Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 100 (3),
199–206.
158
Hoch, S. J., & Loewenstein, G. F. (1991). Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer
Self-Control. Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (4), 492–507.
Holland, R., Rijken, H., & Hendriks, J. H. C. L. (2007). The Dutch Population-Based
Mammography Screening: 30-Year Experience. Breast Care, 2 (1), 12–18.
Holmes, M. D., Chen, W. Y., Feskanich, D., Kroenke, C. H., & Colditz, G. A. (2005).
Physical Activity and Survival after Breast Cancer Diagnosis. Journal of the American
Medical Association, 293 (20), 2479–2486.
Honore´, B. E., & Lleras-Muney, A. (2006). Bounds in Competing Risks Models and the
War on Cancer. Econometrica, 74 (6), 1675–1698.
Huber, J., & Zwerina, K. (1996). The Importance of Utility Balance in Efficient Choice
Designs. Journal of Marketing Research, 33 (3), 307–317.
Independent UK Panel on Breast Cancer Screening. (2012). The Benefits and Harms of
Breast Cancer Screening: An Independent Review. The Lancet , 380 (9855), 1778–1786.
International Agency for Research on Cancer. (2002). IARC Handbooks of Cancer Pre-
vention. Breast Cancer Screening (Vol. 7; H. Vainio & F. Bianchini, Eds.). Lyon: IARC
Press.
Ippolito, P. M. (1981). Information and the Life Cycle Consumption of Hazardous Goods.
Economic Inquiry , 19 (4), 529–558.
Jatoi, I., & Miller, A. B. (2003). Why is Breast Cancer Mortality Declining? The Lancet
Oncology , 4 (4), 251–254.
Johansson-Stenman, O. (2011). Health Investments under Risk and Ambiguity. In
J. L. Lusk, J. Roosen, & J. F. Shogren (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics
of Food Consumption and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnston-Early, A., Cohen, M. H., Minna, J. D., Paxton, L. M., Fossieck, B. E., Ihde,
D. C., . . . Makuch, R. (1980). Smoking Abstinence and Small Cell Lung Cancer
Survival: An Association. Journal of the American Medical Association, 244 (19),
2175–2179.
Jusot, F., Or, Z., & Sirven, N. (2012). Variations in Preventive Care Utilization in
Europe. European Journal of Ageing , 9 (1), 15–25.
Kaestner, R., Darden, M., & Lakdawalla, D. (2014). Are Investments in Disease Pre-
vention Complements? The Case of Statins and Health Behaviors. Journal of Health
Economics , 36 , 151–163.
159
Kahn, M. E. (1998). Education’s Role in Explaining Diabetic Health Investment Differ-
entials. Economics of Education Review , 17 (3), 257–266.
Kahn, M. E. (1999). Diabetic Risk Taking: The Role of Information, Education and
Medication. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , 18 (2), 147–164.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux.
Kalager, M., Zelen, M., Langmark, F., & Adami, H.-O. (2010). Effect of Screening Mam-
mography on Breast Cancer Mortality in Norway. New England Journal of Medicine,
363 (13), 1203–1210.
Kamphuis, C. B. M., de Bekker-Grob, E. W., & van Lenthe, F. J. (2015). Factors
Affecting Food Choices of Older Adults from High and Low Socioeconomic Groups:
A Discrete Choice Experiment. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 101 (4),
768–774.
Katzung, B. G., Masters, S. B., & Trevor, A. J. (2012). Basic & Clinical Pharmacology
(12th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Professional.
Kawahara, M., Ushijima, S., Kamimori, T., Kodama, N., Ogawara, M., Matsui, K., . . .
Furuse, K. (1998). Second Primary Tumours in more than 2-year Disease-Free Survivors
of Small-Cell Lung Cancer in Japan: The Role of Smoking Cessation. British Journal
of Cancer , 78 (3), 409–412.
Kenkel, D. S. (1991). Health Behavior, Health Knowledge, and Schooling. Journal of
Political Economy , 99 (2), 287–305.
Khwaja, A., Sloan, F., & Chung, S. (2006). Learning about Individual Risk and the
Decision to Smoke. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24 (4), 683–699.
Khwaja, A., Sloan, F., & Chung, S. (2007). The Relationship between Individual Ex-
pectations and Behaviors: Mortality Expectations and Smoking Decisions. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty , 35 (2), 179–201.
Kjær, T., Bech, M., Gyrd-Hansen, D., & Hart-Hansen, K. (2006). Ordering Effect and
Price Sensitivity in Discrete Choice Experiments: Need We Worry? Health economics ,
15 (11), 1217–1228.
Krantz, D. H. (1991). From Indices to Mappings: The Representational Approach to
Measurement. In D. Brown & J. Smith (Eds.), Frontiers of Mathematical Psychology
(pp. 1–52). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
160
Lairson, D. R., Chan, W., & Newmark, G. R. (2005). Determinants of the Demand for
Breast Cancer Screening among Women Veterans in the United States. Social Science
& Medicine, 61 (7), 1608–1617.
Lakdawalla, D., & Philipson, T. (2009). The Growth of Obesity and Technological
Change. Economics & Human Biology , 7 (3), 283–293.
Lakins, N. E., LaVallee, R. A., Williams, G. D., & Yi, H. (2008). Apparent Per Capita
Alcohol Consumption: National, State, and Regional Trends, 1977–2006 (Surveillance
report No. 85). Arlington, VA: National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.
Lancaster, K. J. (1966). A New Approach to Consumer Theory. Journal of Political
Economy , 74 (2), 132–157.
Lancsar, E., & Louviere, J. (2008). Conducting Discrete Choice Experiments to Inform
Healthcare Decision Making. Pharmacoeconomics , 26 (8), 661–677.
Lange, F. (2011). The Role of Education in Complex Health Decisions: Evidence from
Cancer Screening. Journal of Health Economics , 30 (1), 43–54.
Lauby-Secretan, B., Scoccianti, C., Loomis, D., Benbrahim-Tallaa, L., Bouvard, V., Bian-
chini, F., & Straif, K. (2015). Breast Cancer Screening - Viewpoint of the IARC
Working Group. New England Journal of Medicine, 372 (24), 2353–2358.
Leganger, A., & Kraft, P. (2003). Control Constructs: Do They Mediate the Relation
between Educational Attainment and Health Behaviour? Journal of Health Psychology ,
8 (3), 361–372.
Leslie, W. S., Hankey, C. R., & Lean, M. E. J. (2007). Weight Gain as an Adverse Effect
of some Commonly Prescribed Drugs: A Systematic Review. QJM: An International
Journal of Medicine, 100 (7), 395–404.
Loomis, J. (2011). What is to Know about Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference
Valuation Studies? Journal of Economic Surveys , 25 (2), 363–370.
Louviere, J. J., Flynn, T. N., & Carson, R. T. (2010). Discrete Choice Experiments are
not Conjoint Analysis. Journal of Choice Modelling , 3 (3), 57–72.
Mackenbach, J. P. (2006). Health Inequalities: Europe in Profile (Tech. Rep.). London:
U.K. Department of Health.
Ma¨kimattila, S., Nikkila¨, K., & Yki-Ja¨rvinen, H. (1999). Causes of Weight Gain dur-
ing Insulin Therapy with and without Metformin in Patients with Type-2 Diabetes
Mellitus. Diabetologia, 42 (4), 406–412.
161
Malhotra, A. (2013). Saturated Fat is not the Major Issue. BMJ , 347 .
Mancia, G., Fagard, R., Narkiewicz, K., Redon, J., Zanchetti, A., Bo¨hm, M., . . . others
(2013). 2013 ESH/ESC Guidelines for the Management of Arterial Hypertension: The
Task Force for the Management of Arterial Hypertension of the European Society of
Hypertension (ESH) and of the European Society of Cardiology (ESC). Blood Pressure,
22 (4), 193–278.
Mangham, L. J., Hanson, K., & McPake, B. (2009). How to Do (or not to Do) – Designing
a Discrete Choice Experiment for Application in a Low-Income Country. Health Policy
and Planning , 24 (2), 151–158.
Manski, C. F. (2009). Identification for Prediction and Decision. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Mathios, A. D. (2000). The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices:
An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market. The Journal of Law and Economics , 43 (2),
651–678.
Meara, E. (2001). Why is Health Related to Socioeconomic Status? (Working paper No.
8231). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Meissner, H. I., Breen, N., Taubman, M. L., Vernon, S. W., & Graubard, B. I. (2007).
Which Women are not Getting Mammograms and Why? (United States). Cancer
Causes & Control , 18 (1), 61–70.
Menvielle, G., Kunst, A. E., Van Gils, C. H., Peeters, P. H., Boshuizen, H., Overvad,
K., . . . others (2011). The Contribution of Risk Factors to the Higher Incidence of
Invasive and In Situ Breast Cancers in Women with Higher Levels of Education in the
European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition. American Journal of
Epidemiology , 173 (1), 26–37.
Michael, R. T., & Becker, G. S. (1973). On the New Theory of Consumer Behavior. The
Swedish Journal of Economics , 378–396.
Miller, A. B., Wall, C., Baines, C. J., Sun, P., To, T., & Narod, S. A. (2014). Twenty Five
Year Follow-Up for Breast Cancer Incidence and Mortality of the Canadian National
Breast Screening Study: Randomized Screening Trial. BMJ , 348 .
Mozaffarian, D., Benjamin, E. J., Go, A. S., Arnett, D. K., Blaha, M. J., Cushman, M.,
. . . others (2015). Heart Disease and Stroke Statistics-2015 Update: A Report from
the American Heart Association. Circulation, 131 (4), e29–e322.
162
Mullahy, J. (1999). It’ll Only Hurt a Second? Microeconomic Determinants of Who Gets
Flu Shots. Health economics , 8 (1), 9–24.
National Cancer Institute. (2011). Cancer Prevalence and Cost of Care Projections.
http://costprojections.cancer.gov/.
National Evaluation Team for Breast Cancer Screening. (2009). National Evaluation
of Breast Cancer Screening in the Netherlands: 1990-2007 (12th evaluation report).
Rotterdam: Department of Public Health, Erasmus MC.
National Evaluation Team for Breast Cancer Screening. (2014). National Evaluation of
Breast Cancer Screening in the Netherlands 1990-2011/2012 (Tech. Rep.). Rotterdam:
Department of Public Health, Erasmus MC.
Nelson, H. D., Tyne, K., Naik, A., Bougatsos, C., Chan, B. K., & Humphrey, L. (2009).
Screening for Breast Cancer: An Update for the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force.
Annals of Internal Medicine, 151 (10), 727–737.
Neter, J. E., Stam, B. E., Kok, F. J., Grobbee, D. E., & Geleijnse, J. M. (2003). Influence
of Weight Reduction on Blood Pressure: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled
Trials. Hypertension, 42 (5), 878–884.
NIBUD. (2014). Wat Geeft U uit aan Voeding? http://www.nibud.nl/uitgaven/
huishouden/voeding.html.
Niezen, M. G., Stolk, E. A., Steenhoek, A., & Uyl-De Groot, C. A. (2006). Inequalities
in Oncology Care: Economic Consequences of High Cost Drugs. European Journal of
Cancer , 42 (17), 2887–2892.
Nwankwo, T., Yoon, S. S., Burt, V., & Gu, Q. (2013). Hypertension among Adults in the
United States: National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 2011-2012 (Data
brief). Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics.
Nystro¨m, L., Andersson, I., Bjurstam, N., Frisell, J., Nordenskjo¨ld, B., & Rutqvist, L. E.
(2002). Long-Term Effects of Mammography Screening: Updated Overview of the
Swedish Randomized Trials. The Lancet , 359 (9310), 909–919.
OECD. (2014a). Health at a Glance: Europe 2014. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2014b). Obesity Update 2014 (Tech. Rep.). Paris: OECD.
O’Malley, M. S., Earp, J. A., Hawley, S. T., Schell, M. J., Mathews, H. F., & Mitchell,
J. (2001). The Association of Race/Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status, and Physician
163
Recommendation for Mammography: Who Gets the Message about Breast Cancer
Screening? American Journal of Public Health, 91 (1), 49–54.
Opie, L. H., & Lecour, S. (2007). The Red Wine Hypothesis: From Concepts to Protective
Signalling Molecules. European Heart Journal , 28 (14), 1683–1693.
Oreopoulos, P., & Salvanes, K. G. (2011). Priceless: The Nonpecuniary Benefits of
Schooling. The Journal of Economic Perspectives , 159–184.
Oster, E. (2015). Diabetes and Diet: Behavioral Response and the Value of Health
(Mimeo).
Otten, J. D., Broeders, M. J., Fracheboud, J., Otto, S. J., de Koning, H. J., & Verbeek,
A. L. M. (2008). Impressive Time-Related Influence of the Dutch Screening Programme
on Breast Cancer Incidence and Mortality, 1975-2006. International Journal of Cancer ,
123 (8), 1929–1934.
Otto, S. J., Fracheboud, J., Looman, C. W. N., Broeders, M. J. M., Boer, R., Hendriks,
J. H. C. L., . . . de Koning, H. J. (2003). Initiation of Population-Based Mammography
Screening in Dutch Municipalities and Effect on Breast Cancer Mortality: A Systematic
Review. The Lancet , 361 (9367), 1411–1417.
Otto, S. J., Fracheboud, J., Verbeek, A. L. M., Boer, R., Reijerink-Verheij, J. C. I. Y.,
Otten, J. D. M., . . . de Koning, H. J. (2012). Mammography Screening and Risk of
Breast Cancer Death: A Population-Based Case-Control Study. Cancer Epidemiology
Biomarkers & Prevention, 21 (1), 66–73.
Pale`ncia, L., Espelt, A., Rodr´ıguez-Sanz, M., Puigpino´s, R., Pons-Vigue´s, M., Pasar´ın,
M. I., . . . Borrell, C. (2010). Socio-Economic Inequalities in Breast and Cervical
Cancer Screening Practices in Europe: Influence of the Type of Screening Program.
International Journal of Epidemiology , 39 , 757–765.
Penston, J. (2011). Should We Use Total Mortality rather than Cancer Specific Mortality
to Judge Cancer Screening Programmes? Yes. BMJ , 343 .
Picone, G., Sloan, F., & Taylor Jr, D. (2004). Effects of Risk and Time Preference and
Expected Longevity on Demand for Medical Tests. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty ,
28 (1), 39–53.
Prospective Studies Collaboration. (2009). Body-Mass Index and Cause-Specific Mortal-
ity in 900,000 Adults: Collaborative Analyses of 57 Prospective Studies. The Lancet ,
373 (9669), 1083–1096.
164
RAND Corporation. (2011). American Life Panel. https://alpdata.rand.org/.
Revelt, D., & Train, K. (2000). Customer-Specific Taste Parameters and Mixed Logit:
Households’ Choice of Electricity Supplier (Working paper No. E00-274). Berkeley,
CA: University of California at Berkeley.
Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu. (2015). Bevolkingsonder-
zoek Borstkanker voor Professionals. http://www.rivm.nl/Onderwerpen/
B/Bevolkingsonderzoek borstkanker voor professionals/Achtergrond
organisatie kosten en geschiedenis/Geschiedenis.
Roberto, C. A., Larsen, P. D., Agnew, H., Baik, J., & Brownell, K. D. (2010). Evaluating
the Impact of Menu Labeling on Food Choices and Intake. American Journal of Public
Health, 100 (2), 312.
Rock, C. L., & Demark-Wahnefried, W. (2002). Nutrition and Survival after the Diagnosis
of Breast Cancer: A Review of the Evidence. Journal of Clinical Oncology , 20 (15),
3302–3316.
Rose, J. M., & Bliemer, M. C. J. (2013). Sample Size Requirements for Stated Choice
Experiments. Transportation, 40 (5), 1021-1041.
Rossi, A., Dikareva, A., Bacon, S. L., & Daskalopoulou, S. S. (2012). The Impact of
Physical Activity on Mortality in Patients with High Blood Pressure: A Systematic
Review. Journal of Hypertension, 30 (7), 1277–1288.
Russell, L. B. (1986). Is Prevention Better than Cure? Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution.
Russell, L. B. (1993). The Role of Prevention in Health Reform. New England Journal
of Medicine, 329 (5), 352–354.
Russell, L. B. (2009). Preventing Chronic Disease: An Important Investment, But do
not Count on Cost Savings. Health Affairs , 28 (1), 42-45.
Saffer, H. (2014). Self-Regulation and Health (Working Paper No. 20483). Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sambamoorthi, U., & McAlpine, D. D. (2003). Racial, Ethnic, Socioeconomic, and Access
Disparities in the Use of Preventive Services among Women. Preventive Medicine,
37 (5), 475–484.
165
Savage, L., & Widener, A. (2008). Physician Characteristics are Associated with Quality
of Cancer Care. Journal of the National Cancer Institute.
Schouten, L., Meijer, H., Huveneers, J., & Kiemeney, L. (1996). Urban-Rural Differ-
ences in Cancer Incidence in the Netherlands, 1989–1991. International Journal of
Epidemiology , 25 (4), 729–736.
Selvin, E., & Brett, K. M. (2003). Breast and Cervical Cancer Screening: Sociodemo-
graphic Predictors among White, Black, and Hispanic Women. American Journal of
Public Health, 93 (4), 618–623.
Shapiro, S., Venet, W., Strax, P., Venet, L., & Roeser, R. (1982). Ten-to Fourteen-
Year Effect of Screening on Breast Cancer Mortality. Journal of the National Cancer
Institute, 69 (2), 349–355.
Shiv, B., & Fedorikhin, A. (1999). Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect
and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making. Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (3),
278–292.
Sigal, R. J., Kenny, G. P., Wasserman, D. H., & Castaneda-Sceppa, C. (2004). Physical
Activity/Exercise and Type-2 Diabetes. Diabetes Care, 27 (10), 2518–2539.
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment. Psychological
Review , 63 (2), 129–138.
Slade, A. N. (2012). Health Investment Decisions in Response to Diabetes Information
in Older Americans. Journal of Health Economics , 31 (3), 502–520.
Slade, A. N., & Kim, H. (2014). Dietary Responses to a Hypertension Diagnosis: Evidence
from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 2007–2010.
Behavioral Medicine, 40 (1), 1–13.
Slovic, P. (1995). The Construction of Preference. American Psychologist , 50 (5), 364–
371.
Smith, J. P. (1999). Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives , 13 , 145–166.
Smith, J. P. (2007). The Impact of Socioeconomic Status on Health over the Life-Course.
Journal of Human Resources , 42 (4), 739–764.
Smith, K. V., Taylor Jr, D. H., Sloan, F. A., Johnson, F. R., & Desvousges, W. H. (2001).
Do Smokers Respond to Health Shocks? Review of Economics and Statistics , 83 (4),
675–687.
166
Steele, R. J. C., & Brewster, D. H. (2011). Should We Use Total Mortality rather than
Cancer Specific Mortality to Judge Cancer Screening Programmes? No. BMJ , 343 .
Steptoe, A., Pollard, T. M., & Wardle, J. (1995). Development of a Measure of the
Motives Underlying the Selection of Food: The Food Choice Questionnaire. Appetite,
25 (3), 267–284.
Taba´r, L., Vitak, B., Chen, T. H.-H., Yen, A. M.-F., Cohen, A., Tot, T., . . . Duffy, S. W.
(2011). Swedish Two-County Trial: Impact of Mammographic Screening on Breast
Cancer Mortality During 3 Decades. Radiology , 260 (3), 658–663.
Thompson, F. E., & Subar, A. F. (2008). Dietary Assessment Methodology. In
A. M. Coulston, C. J. Boushey, & M. G. Ferruzzi (Eds.), Nutrition in the Preven-
tion and Treatment of Disease (3rd ed.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Train, K. E. (2009). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation (2nd ed.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Unesco Institute for Statistics. (2011). ISCED: International Standard Classifica-
tion of Education. http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international
-standard-classification-of-education.aspx.
United Nations General Assembly. (2011). Political Declaration of the High-Level Meet-
ing of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable
Diseases.
Urban, N., Anderson, G. L., & Peacock, S. (1994). Mammography Screening: How
Important is Cost as a Barrier to Use? American Journal of Public Health, 84 (1),
50–55.
U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2011). Free Preventive Care. https://
www.healthcare.gov/health-care-law-protections/free-preventive-care/.
U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
(2010). Dietary Guidelines for Americans (7th Edition ed.). Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1990). The Health Benefits of Smoking
Cessation (A Report of the Surgeon General). Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services.
167
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Agriculture.
(2005). Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2005 (6th ed.). Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2012). Sodium in your Diet. Using the Nutrition
Facts Label to Reduce your Intake.
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. (1989). Guide to Clinical Preventive Services: An
Assessment of the Effectiveness of 169 Interventions. Report of the U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force. Philadelphia: Williams & Wilkins.
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. (2009). Screening For Breast Cancer: U.S. Preven-
tive Services Task Force Recommendation Statement. Annals of Internal Medicine,
151 (10), 716–726.
Van Leeuwen, F. E., Van den Belt-Dusebout, A. W., Benraadt, J., Diepenhorst, F. W.,
Van Tinteren, H., Coebergh, J. W. W., . . . Bontenbal, M. (1994). Risk of Endometrial
Cancer After Tamoxifen Treatment of Breast Cancer. The Lancet , 343 (8895), 448–452.
Van Rossum, C. T. M., Fransen, H. P., Verkaik-Kloosterman, J., Buurma-Rethans,
E. J. M., & Ocke, M. C. (2011). Dutch National Food Consumption Survey 2007-2010
: Diet of children and adults aged 7 to 69 years (Tech. Rep.). Bilthoven: Rijksinstituut
voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu RIVM.
Van Schoor, G., Moss, S. M., Otten, J. D. M., Donders, R., Paap, E. D. E. N., den
Heeten, G. J., . . . Verbeek, A. L. M. (2011). Increasingly Strong Reduction in Breast
Cancer Mortality Due to Screening. British Journal of Cancer , 104 (6), 910–914.
Variyam, J. N. (2008). Do Nutrition Labels Improve Dietary Outcomes? Health Eco-
nomics , 17 (6), 695–708.
Walsh, B., Silles, M., & O’Neill, C. (2011). The Importance of Socio-Economic Vari-
ables in Cancer Screening Participation: A Comparison between Population-Based and
Opportunistic Screening in the EU-15. Health Policy , 101 (3), 269–276.
Wansink, B., & Chandon, P. (2006). Can “Low-Fat” Nutrition Labels Lead to Obesity?
Journal of Marketing Research, 43 (4), 605–617.
Welch, G. H., Schwartz, L., & Woloshin, S. (2011). Overdiagnosed: Making People Sick
in the Pursuit of Health. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
168
Willett, W. C., Sampson, L., Stamper, M. J., Rosner, B., Bain, C., Witschi, J., . . .
Speizer, F. E. (1985). Reproducibility and Validity of a Semiquantitative Food Fre-
quency Questionnaire. American Journal of Epidemiology , 122 (1), 51-65.
Wisdom, J., Downs, J. S., & Loewenstein, G. (2010). Promoting Healthy Choices:
Information versus Convenience. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics ,
2 (2), 164–178.
World Health Organization. (2009). Global Health Risks: Mortality and Burden of Disease
Attributable to Selected Major Risks. Geneva: WHO Press.
World Health Organization. (2011). 10 Facts on Cancer. http://www.who.int/
features/factfiles/cancer/facts/en/index.html.
World Health Organization. (2014). Global Status Report on Noncommunicable Diseases
(Tech. Rep.). Geneva: World Health Organisation.
169
The Tinbergen Institute is the Institute for Economic Research, which was founded in
1987 by the Faculties of Economics and Econometrics of the Erasmus University Rotter-
dam, University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. The Institute is named
after the late Professor Jan Tinbergen, Dutch Nobel Prize laureate in economics in 1969.
The Tinbergen Institute is located in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The following books
recently appeared in the Tinbergen Institute Research Series:
596. S.L. BLAUW, Well-to-Do or Doing Well? Empirical Studies of Well-Being and
Development
597. T.A. MAKAREWICZ, Learning to Forecast: Genetic Algorithms and Experiments
598. P. ROBALO, Understanding Political Behavior: Essays in Experimental Political
Economy
599. R. ZOUTENBIER, Work Motivation and Incentives in the Public Sector
600. M.B.W. KOBUS, Economic Studies on Public Facility Use
601. R.J.D. POTTER VAN LOON, Modeling Non-Standard Financial Decision Making
602. G. MESTERS, Essays on Nonlinear Panel Time Series Models
603. S. GUBINS, Information Technologies and Travel
604. D. KOPA´NYI, Bounded Rationality and Learning in Market Competition
605. N. MARTYNOVA, Incentives and Regulation in Banking
606. D. KARSTANJE, Unraveling Dimensions: Commodity Futures Curves and Equity
Liquidity
607. T.C.A.P. GOSENS, The Value of Recreational Areas in Urban Regions
608.  L.M. MARC´, The Impact of Aid on Total Government Expenditures
609. C. LI, Hitchhiking on the Road of Decision Making under Uncertainty
610. L. ROSENDAHL HUBER, Entrepreneurship, Teams and Sustainability: A Series
of Field Experiments
611. X. YANG, Essays on High Frequency Financial Econometrics
612. A.H. VAN DER WEIJDE, The Industrial Organization of Transport Markets: Mod-
eling Pricing, Investment and Regulation in Rail and Road Networks
170
613. H.E. SILVA MONTALVA Airport Pricing Policies: Airline Conduct, Price Dis-
crimination, Dynamic Congestion and Network Effects
614. C. DIETZ, Hierarchies, Communication and Restricted Cooperation in Cooperative
Games
615. M.A. ZOICAN, Financial System Architecture and Intermediation Quality
616. G. ZHU, Three Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance
617. M. PLEUS, Implementations of Tests on the Exogeneity of Selected Variables and
their Performance in Practice
618. B. VAN LEEUWEN, Cooperation, Networks and Emotions: Three Essays in Be-
havioral Economics
619. A.G. KOPA´NYI-PEUKER, Endogeneity Matters: Essays on Cooperation and Co-
ordination
620. X. WANG, Time Varying Risk Premium and Limited Participation in Financial
Markets
621. L.A. GORNICKA, Regulating Financial Markets: Costs and Trade-Offs
622. A. KAMM, Political Actors Playing Games: Theory and Experiments
623. S. VAN DEN HAUWE, Topics in Applied Macroeconometrics
624. F.U. BRA¨UNING, Interbank Lending Relationships, Financial Crises and Monetary
Policy
625. J.J. DE VRIES, Estimation of Alonso’s Theory of Movements for Commuting
626. M. POPLAWSKA, Essays on Insurance and Health Economics
627. X. CAI, Essays in Labor and Product Market Search
628. L. ZHAO, Making Real Options Credible: Incomplete Markets, Dynamics, and
Model Ambiguity
629. K. BEL, Multivariate Extensions to Discrete Choice Modeling
630. Y. ZENG, Topics in Trans-Boundary River Sharing Problems and Economic Theory
631. M.G. WEBER, Behavioral Economics and the Public Sector
171
632. E. CZIBOR, Heterogeneity in Response to Incentives: Evidence from Field Data
633. A. JUODIS, Essays in Panel Data Modelling
634. F. ZHOU, Essays on Mismeasurement and Misallocation on Transition Economies
635. P. MULLER, Labor Market Policies and Job Search
636. N. KETEL, Empirical Studies in Labor and Education Economics
637. T.E. YENILMEZ, Three Essays in International Trade and Development
638. L.P. DE BRUIJN, Essays on Forecasting and Latent Values
639. S. VRIEND, Profiling, Auditing and Public Policy: Applications in Labor and
Health Economics
640. M.L. ERGUN, Fat Tails in Financial Markets
641. T. HOMAR, Intervention in Systemic Banking Crises
642. R. LIT, Time Varying Parameter Models for Discrete Valued Time Series
643. R.H. KLEIJN, Essays on Bayesian Model Averaging using Economic Time Series
644. S. MUNS, Essays on Systemic Risk
645. B.M. SADABA, Essays on the Empirics of International Financial Markets
172
